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First Committee
13th meeting
Monday, 17 October 2005, 10 a.m.
New York

President: Mr. Choi ..... (Republic of Korea)

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Agenda items 85 to 105 (*continued*)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman: Before we start our thematic discussion, on the issue of regional disarmament and security, together with other disarmament measures and international security, I would like first to give the floor to Mr. Vicente Berasategui, Chairman of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, as our guest speaker for today.

Mr. Berasategui: First, allow me to say that it is a pleasure for me to work under your guidance, Mr. Chairman, knowing your experience and diplomatic ability.

(*spoke in Spanish*)

I should like today to present the 2005 reports of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, which have been issued as reports of the Secretary-General in documents A/60/285 and A/60/135.

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held its forty-fourth and forty-fifth sessions from 23 to 25 February 2005 and from 29 June to 1 July 2005 in New York and Geneva, respectively. A complete summary of the Advisory Board's work during 2005 has been annexed to the documents to which I have just referred. For my part, I would simply like to highlight some of the observations and recommendations made by the Board. Allow me first to take up the general comments made by the Board.

Mindful of the current international situation, the Advisory Board took up recent developments in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. It expressed its deep concern about the lack of progress on a number of critical issues. Many members specifically deplored the failure of the 2005 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) resulting from the lack of consensus on the important issues before the Conference. The Board underscored the urgent need to make progress with regard to disarmament measures and related matters, including the issue of non-State actors, in order to prevent a weakening of the current system of legal norms relating to disarmament and non-proliferation.

The Board took up four substantive items as part of its 2005 agenda, the first of which was gaining control of the nuclear fuel cycle and fissionable materials cycle. In its deliberations on that issue, the Board took into account the report on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, published this year by the Expert Group set up by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was acknowledged that creating multilateral nuclear approaches might offer multiple advantages in the area of non-proliferation. It was said, however, that

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this was no panacea for dealing with existing failures to comply or for lack of universality, nor could it guarantee full participation on the part of States that are not Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Notwithstanding all that, the Board's view was that achieving a multilateral agreement on guarantees regarding nuclear fuel was not out of the question. The Board put forward a number of recommendations for dealing with the matter. First of all, it felt that the opportunities most at hand for applying multilateral nuclear approaches on a voluntary basis should be considered. Secondly, it felt that continued thought should be given to the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change with regard to a voluntary moratorium on the building of facilities in exchange for guarantees with regard to the supply of fissionable material.

Thirdly, it felt that the existing approaches and tools should be used fully, including export controls, steps taken by the Security Council, including those under resolution 1540 (2004), the broadest possible accession to the model Additional Protocol for IAEA safeguards and intensification of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

The second item was regional security and global standards for small arms and light weapons. The Board made the point that the United Nations had, in a relatively short time, had taken some initial but major steps in devising global norms. By the same token, it acknowledged its satisfaction with the role played by regional and subregional organizations alike, as well as that played by civil society, in combating the scourge of small arms and light weapons. The Board recommended that the second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, already held in July of this year here in New York, as well as the conference of the parties to review progress in the implementation of the Programme of Action to be held next year, should be expanded and should go in greater depth into the matter of global norms in this regard.

Secondly, there should be stronger coordination and greater cooperation, including between the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as between the United Nations and the relevant financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the regional development banks, in order to come to grips with the problem of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects using a broad and holistic approach. The third item involved regional challenges and opportunities with regard to weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms.

The Board noted that, in the period following the cold war, opportunities for adopting more dynamic regional and subregional approaches both to disarmament and non-proliferation had come to the fore. These approaches, it was felt, should be prompting simultaneous negotiations to deal with more extensive and more generalized measures to lead to general and complete disarmament. The Board recommended that regional disarmament agreements should contribute to enhancing security and stability region-wide, at the lowest possible level of arms and armed forces, and this without diminishing security for all participating States.

The Board also looked at this issue in the context of the specifically regional dimension, considering the nuclear issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the praiseworthy cycle of democracy, multilateralism and peace developed in Latin America, and the threat of small arms and light weapons in Africa.

The fourth item considered was disarmament machinery. In reviewing this machinery specifically, the Board recommended that the Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating body available to the international community, be kept intact and indeed strengthened, without closing the door on the possibility of adjusting its procedural provisions in such a way as to facilitate progress in reviewing disarmament measures.

A number of ideas were advanced, such as creating groups and the adoption of decisions, including the need to avoid any abuse of the standard of consensus, along with establishment of subsidiary bodies.

As to the Disarmament Commission, while certain members advocated extending the current mandate, others took the view that its functions could be absorbed by the First Committee or a body subsidiary to this Committee. Acting as the Board of Trustees for UNIDIR, the Advisory Board adopted the report of the Institute's Director covering UNIDIR

activities for the period from August 2004 to July 2005 for submission to the General Assembly, together with the programme of work and the budget for 2006 (A/60/135).

This year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of UNIDIR. During its twenty-five years in existence, the Institute has done an impressive job, accomplishing extremely impressive work with limited resources. UNIDIR's work has been acclaimed in the most diverse forums. The Board, once again, appeals to Member States for greater support for UNIDIR's invaluable work.

The First Committee has a draft resolution on UNIDIR before it for adoption (A/C.1/60/L.2). Given the signal job done by the Institute for so many years, and in my capacity as the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, I would like to invite the First Committee to give its determined support to UNIDIR, as well as to the Board's recommendations embodied in the draft resolution, with a view to facilitating the management and financial functioning of the Institute.

Turning to future work, the Board decided to include the following items on its agenda for its forty-sixth session, to be held in New York in February 2006: first, consideration of the situation in the disarmament arena, taking into account the decisions adopted at the summit that opened the sixtieth session of the General Assembly; and, secondly, measures to prevent acquisition of arms systems by non-State actors.

On the first of those agenda items, I should like to point out that it was introduced in the hope that the summit would take up issues crucial to disarmament and non-proliferation. While the sections on values and principles and on peace and collective security in the 2005 Summit Outcome are directly linked with those matters, I profoundly regret that the world summit outcome document failed to include a section on disarmament and non-proliferation — issues that for decades have been considered among the most urgent problems facing the international community. A number of the members of the Advisory Board have shared with me their concerns at that astonishing omission. Fortunately, the Board's recommendations have been circulated and are well known to the United Nations membership, and there are grounds for hoping that they will be taken into account in the Organization's future work.

In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Nobuyasu Abe, for the efficacious assistance he provided to the Advisory Board in general and to me personally, as well as for his outstanding input on matters of substance, which facilitated the orientation of our work. I would also like to thank the staff of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, in particular, the Secretary of the Board, Mr. Wang, and his assistant, Ms. O'Sullivan-Gurz, for their cooperation during my chairmanship of the Advisory Board.

The Chairman: I would now like to invite our second guest speaker for this morning, Mr. Andrei Krutskikh, Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, to take the floor.

Mr. Krutskikh (*spoke in Russian*): I would like to share with members my impressions on the first discussion of experts, held under United Nations auspices, on one of the most important issues affecting international security today, one whose roots lie in the global information revolution.

In its resolution 58/32, adopted by consensus in December 2003, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General, with the help of a group of governmental experts to be appointed by him on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to consider existing and potential threats in the area of information security and possible joint measures to eliminate such threats, to examine relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session. The Group is composed of experts from 15 States, including Belarus, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Group has held three meetings: the first, for five days in July 2004 at United Nations Headquarters in New York; the second, for five days at the end of March and beginning of April 2005 in Geneva; and a third and final 10-day session in July 2005 here in New York. In their work, the Group considered the replies received from Member States on their implementation of

General Assembly resolutions related to international information security, as well as many substantive contributions of Government experts, including national contributions, on issues in international information security. The work of the Group appointed by the General Assembly was the first attempt to consider the issue of information security in the context of international security. The Group itself provided a unique mechanism for research into that issue. The Group conducted an in-depth and systematic analysis of the issues included in its mandate. Overall, the discussion was constructive and balanced. The experts showed keen interest and strong determination with regard to undertaking an in-depth study of the whole range of substantive issues.

The Group fully agreed with the preambular part of the draft report, as well as with the chapter relating to the survey of the current status in the area of ensuring international information security. All of the experts emphasized that, at present, States and individual citizens depend increasingly on information and communication technologies (ICT) for economic development, security and social prosperity. It was recognized that such technologies could have a significant impact on national and international security. Indeed, information is becoming a very valuable element of national property and a very important resource.

The Group noted that issues of confidentiality, integrity and the accessibility of information are a cause for growing concern as a result of the increasing dependence of States, organizations and citizens on information and communication technologies at the national and local levels. The increasing number of security breaches has already caused significant financial damage and undermined confidence among users. The interconnection between electronic and physical infrastructures means that, in the event of accident, error or attack, problems will arise in critically important information systems that provide vitally important services.

Such linkages make ICT extremely attractive to those who wish to have a negative impact on society and its interests and on the integrity of the infrastructure of States and to those who wish to disrupt security, in both civilian and military spheres, as the General Assembly has noted on many occasions.

The Group focused attention on the need to counter challenges to security by means of threat reduction and risk-management activities. The vulnerabilities of information systems could be exploited by many individuals, and it is not always easy to identify those individuals. It is thus important to assess, manage and reduce risks by analysing threats and vulnerabilities. The Group noted that attacks against ICT and critically important infrastructure could be carried out not only by hackers and criminals, but also by terrorists and hostile States. Such actions could have extremely serious consequences.

The Group recognized that terrorists use ICT for the purposes of recruitment, training, information-gathering, money-laundering and the coordination of activities. A small but highly motivated group of non-State actors could, in a short period of time, disrupt the work of networks and information assets. We cannot rule out the possibility that hostile States might hire cyber-criminals and wage an information war using new forms and new methods.

Increased attention is being paid to the potential threat to information security posed by hostile States. The Group agreed that preventing attacks and identifying and prosecuting the individuals who conduct such attacks remains a priority. In this connection, the Group recognized that threats reduction and confidence-building measures can help to strengthen information security. In this regard, the Group also noted that information security is a national responsibility, and that international cooperation could significantly strengthen national efforts.

The Group circulated the reports submitted by countries on national practices with regard to strengthening information security. On the basis of the results of the work carried out, the Group came to the conclusion that, although there are many national approaches to promoting information security — and the great variety of approaches is a response to specific conditions in various States — there are a number of common elements in terms of an effective approach to strengthening information security at both the national and global levels.

These elements include strengthening coordination, adopting preventive measures, reacting to disruptions, including by bringing prosecutions, in the area of information technology. The Group analysed measures already adopted for the purpose of

strengthening information cyber-security on a regional level, in particular among the countries of the Group of Eight, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Organization of American States, as well as at the international level, including in the United Nations, in the context of the World Summit on the Information Society and the International Telecommunication Union.

We researched efforts carried out to that end by standard-setting organizations and groups that react to emergency situations in the area of information technology, computers and computer security. We analysed initiatives carried out by private-sector organizations, such as Internet Alliance, the Global Information Infrastructure Commission and the World Information Technology and Service Alliance. In that context, the Group noted that, although individual Member States must take measures to ensure their own information security, the global nature of ICT and the threats, vulnerabilities and linkages in that area mean that international actions in that context are equally important. The Group of Experts have proposed a number of steps and measures that could be adopted jointly by members of the international community for the purpose of strengthening international information security, including in the long term.

The Group agreed on a significant number of sections of substantive importance in its final report. However, the elaboration of a full text that could be adopted by consensus was not possible, at least at this stage. I attribute that to a number of factors. We had very limited time in which to consider a whole range of comprehensive issues that are confronting the international community with fundamentally new and sensitive problems to which we must find joint responses. It is clear that the process of doing that will not be brief.

There were other objective reasons as well, often related to the substance of the issues. Even with the use of translation, the members of the Group of Governmental Experts spoke different languages with respect to essential issues related to international information security, because the international community has still not developed unified and generally accepted definitions of key terms and concepts in that area. To a significant extent, moreover, various States have different laws regulating issues related to ensuring information security and cyber-security. Many countries are only in the initial phase of bringing their domestic statutes and regulations into conformity with the relevant norms and principles. There are also differing interpretations of current international law in the area of international information security.

There is no longer any doubt that, given the potential and credible threats to international information security posed by criminals, terrorists and States, more time and greater efforts will be needed if the international community is to develop common approaches aimed at reducing the number of such threats and diminishing the vulnerabilities and risks related to information and communication technology. I believe it is important that such efforts continue. It is only through the joint consideration of these issues, under the auspices of the most influential international organization, the United Nations, that this problem can be swiftly resolved so that humanity will not repeat the mistakes already made with respect to other technologies, which, like genies, became monsters that were not put back into the bottle in time.

The Chairman: The Committee will now have an interactive discussion with our guest speakers by way of an informal question-and-answer session. Before we do so, I shall suspend the meeting so that we can continue our discussions in an informal mode.

The meeting was suspended at 10.45 a.m. and resumed at 11 a.m.

The Chairman: I shall now give the floor to delegations wishing to comment on the thematic subjects of, first, regional disarmament and security and, secondly, other disarmament measures and international security.

Mr. El Hadj Ali (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is seen as an effective way to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and to substantively support nuclear disarmament efforts. Indeed, nuclear-weapon-free zones have been universally recognized as both an important instrument in attaining the fundamental objective of strengthening peace and security at the regional, and, by extension, the international, level, as well as an important regional confidence-building measure.

The establishment of denuclearized zones should be understood as falling within the article VII prerogatives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — which recognizes the right of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories — as well as a measure that will help us to advance towards a nuclear-weapons-free world.

The adoption by many countries of a strategic approach that rejects the nuclear element as a guarantor of their national security has created a conducive climate for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In fact, nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, in the South Pacific, in South-East Asia, and in Africa — established by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba — have considerably reduced the risks of nuclear proliferation and have contributed to strengthening international peace and security.

Our continent, Africa, made a decisive advance towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone with the adoption of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which was the product of the collective political will of African States.

Algeria, which has opted for promoting nuclear technologies for peaceful uses and for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime as a fundamental pillar of nuclear disarmament, is fully invested in the work that resulted in the adoption of the Treaty of Pelindaba — building an Africa free of nuclear weapons. We were the third African State to ratify that Treaty.

At the same time, given its proximity and the close ties between Africa and the Middle East, Algeria remains deeply concerned by the absence of progress regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that difficult region, where Israel, alone, continues to refuse to join the NPT and to submit all of its facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. As a result, we feel that it is essential to take specific measures to implement the goals and objectives of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review Conference.

In order to attain our ultimate goal, namely, freeing the world of the threat of nuclear weapons, the international community must make a decisive declaration and a steadfast commitment to establish such zones throughout the world. At the same time, my delegation would like to note that the only real safeguard for security is the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Ms. Al Owais (United Arab Emirates) (*spoke in Arabic*): Notwithstanding confidence-building measures adopted by the Arab States, including the United Arab Emirates, with regard to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disarmament, the security situation in the Middle East continues to pose a major threat to international peace, security and stability. This is due to the fact that Israel continues to possess a nuclear weapons arsenal and their means of delivery. The United Arab Emirates — while voicing its concern that Israel is the only State in our part of the world not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and that it is unwilling to place its nuclear facilities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — feels that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East has been prevented because of inequality of treatment and of double standards applied in the realm of disarmament in general. That, in turn, has encouraged Israel, in various ways, to pursue its irresponsible policy of developing its own nuclear weapons arsenal, and has encouraged other States to revive their push for acquiring nuclear weapons in the framework of their own conception of security deterrence.

We therefore cal upon the international community to assume its full responsibility regarding peace and security in the Middle East by undertaking the following commitments. First, effective measures should be taken to force Israel to dismantle its nuclear facilities and to subject them to the comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring and safeguards regime. Secondly, the international community should exert more effective and serious pressure on the Israeli Government, including economic pressure, to prompt it without reserve to heed the call to join the NPT and the IAEA and its two protocols designed to enhance that Agency's mandate. Thirdly, we call upon all States, notably the nuclear-weapon States, to abide by the commitments they have made under relevant international resolutions proscribing the provision of financial, technical or scientific support for the development of Israel's nuclear weapons programme.

Those measures are designed to enhance confidence and build a positive environment, and once

hey are taken they will give a fresh impetus to the peace process in our part of the world. They would also strengthen efforts to contain violence and forestall any nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of errorists and other irresponsible elements. Finally, we nope that delegations in this Committee will lend their support to the two draft resolutions concerning the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and addressing the danger of nuclear proliferation in that part of the world (A/C.1/60/L.3 and A/C.1/60/L.6). Those draft resolutions accurately reflect the concerns of the States of the region and dovetail with the efforts of the international community to achieve general and complete nuclear disarmament, with a view to ridding all of our peoples of the horrors of nuclear war.

Mr. Al-Kubaisi (Qatar) (*spoke in Arabic*): As this is the first time I take the floor, I am pleased to join my colleagues in congratulating you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. I wish you every success in your endeavours. Also, I would be remiss if I failed to extend my congratulations to the Vice-Chairmen, as well as to the entire Bureau, on their well-deserved election to their posts. Under your able leadership and with the cooperation of the members of the Bureau, we are certain that our work will have a successful outcome.

The General Assembly, in a number of resolutions, the latest being 59/63, has urged all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In that same resolution, the General Assembly urged the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In that connection, the Assembly has also urged all States that had not yet done so to submit their nuclear facilities and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime. Until the day when a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is a reality, we must work for the acceptance of the principles on which it is based; we must help generate the political will among the parties involved to take the steps designed to bring it about and to refrain from producing, acquiring or testing nuclear weapons and from placing such weapons on their territories or on lands under their control.

The delegation of Qatar would like to emphasize that States in our part of the world generally agree with the provisions of that and other relevant resolutions. With a view to achieving general and complete disarmament, Qatar welcomes all initiatives aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as all weapons of mass destruction. In that connection, my country signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on 10 December 1996. Qatar has reaffirmed at the international level its determination and sincere commitment to making the Middle East a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

We believe that, if all the States in the region were to become parties to disarmament arrangements, peace, security and stability would be strengthened throughout the region, which would and result in more confidence among the countries concerned. In order for that to occur, Israel must also submit itself to the NPT process and place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. It must also implement the relevant resolutions that it has been called upon to accept in order to bring its nuclear facilities under those safeguards. We call upon all States to exert pressure on Israel to get it to yield to the will of the international community and implement the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. Israel is the only State in our region not to have signed the NPT or placed its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. That fact breeds insecurity in the region and poses a threat to our part of the world as a result of the existence of these deadly weapons. Were Israel to do so, other States might be prompted to follow its example; conversely, they might emulate it and act with impunity.

Relevant conventions on disarmament must be fully implemented in order to maintain international security. We welcome all initiatives aimed at bringing about general and complete disarmament, especially in the Middle East. We emphasize that the Middle East must become a region free of all weapons of mass destruction. We also reaffirm the role played by the United Nations in that regard.

Miss Majali (Jordan): Jordan is party to all international disarmament-related treaties prohibiting weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and adheres fully to its obligations under them. As such, Jordan welcomes all initiatives that can lead to general and complete disarmament and has

continuously supported all related efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at the regional, subregional and international levels. It has also welcomed all efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world, as it believes that such efforts constitute positive steps towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament.

In that connection, Jordan continues to view as vital efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, including nuclear weapons. Currently, however, Israel remains the only State in the region that has not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It also refuses to subject its nuclear facilities and weapons to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and inspections. As a result, the potential for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in our region remains real. This is therefore a matter of concern, as it threatens regional security and stability.

In that context, Jordan would like to recall that since 1974 the General Assembly has adopted more than 32 resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, and has called upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of that proposal. Among other things, the Assembly has also called for States to affirm that they refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, agree to place their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and declare their support for the establishment of such a zone. To date, however, that remains to be realized.

Furthermore, Jordan would like to recall that, under both the 1995 resolution and the 2000 conclusions on the Middle East, which were adopted at the respective Review Conferences of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as under numerous resolutions, including those of the General Assembly, the international community is required to urge Israel to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision. Ways and means should therefore be instituted to bring about such implementation.

Jordan stresses that Israel's accession to the NPT remains of the utmost importance. On the international level, such an undertaking would bring the world closer towards attaining the universality of the NPT and would further consolidate the global non-proliferation regime. Regionally, Israel's accession to the Treaty would defuse existing tensions, bring about tangible progress in other bilateral tracks of the peace process, enhance confidence-building measures among all parties, mitigate the regional arms race, which would allow for huge financial resources to be redirected towards economic and social development, and have an overall positive impact on regional peace and security. The implementation of IAEA safety measures on its un-safeguarded nuclear facilities would also prevent the occurrence of potential nuclear accidents and the risk of radiological contamination, sparing the region in general, and Jordan in particular, of their disastrous effects.

Finally, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones is pivotal for maintaining the international non-proliferation regime and for consolidating international peace and security. Jordan welcomes the zones that have already been established throughout the world and reiterates that establishing a zone free from nuclear weapons in the region of the Middle East is of the utmost importance. Jordan therefore takes this opportunity to reiterate once again the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT, as we believe that that would bring us closer to security, stability and, ultimately, the long-awaited and desired peace in our region.

Ms. Mourabit (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): The radical changes taking place in the world today call for international cooperation in the area of security. Moreover, the traditional way of viewing national defence in the Mediterranean region has evolved towards an awareness of the existence of a common security interest and a need to react collectively to common threats.

The Mediterranean region requires common commitment and solidarity from the international community and the countries of the region in order to overcome the many common security challenges resulting from the continued existence of regions of tension that undoubtedly provide a fertile breeding ground for the rise in all sorts of extremism, which can be exploited by terrorist networks.

The development gulf between the two shores of the Mediterranean is constantly widening. That results in frustration and is a potential source of tension for the security of the Mediterranean region. Closing that gap requires both active cooperation between both sides of the Mediterranean and the establishment of true economic integration for the countries of the southern Mediterranean. The international community has an obligation to ensure that the Mediterranean remains a haven of peace, security and prosperity and a forum for interaction — and even an alliance of civilizations.

Morocco reaffirms its steadfast adherence to the various commitments it has entered into on the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. We also reaffirm our active support for the international community's efforts to maintain international peace and security. We urge peace-loving Powers to work with the necessary determination to find peaceful and fair ways to resolve tensions throughout the world, especially in the region of the Middle East. The situation in the Middle East is still fraught with threats and tensions that pose a major obstacle for the political and economic development of the Mediterranean region.

The 1995 Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference, which officially launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which Morocco joined, made ensuring peace and stability throughout the Mediterranean region its main priority. The Partnership aims at integrating the economies of the southern Mediterranean into the European Union before 2010. It is our hope that the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona process, which will be commemorated on 27 and 28 November 2005, will energize the programmes of action established to achieve various goals, especially to strengthen peace and stability, to promote economic development, to strengthen democracy and to launch efforts to achieve security throughout the region. In that regard, the colloquium held in Rabat from 1 to 3 October 2005 on political pluralism and the electoral process will certainly give further impetus to the Barcelona process and serve to revitalize the Partnership.

Morocco's participation in a variety of Mediterranean forums — whether in the context of the Five plus Five dialogue, its partnership with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or NATO's Mediterranean dialogue — points to our commitment to security and cooperation in the region. Those various initiatives and efforts would be more effective if they were carried out in a joint and coordinated manner while making optimal use of ways and means.

Other efforts, such as the 2001 conclusion of the four-party agreement on the establishment of a free trade zone by 2007 between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, constitute a promising step to the building of a Euro-Mediterranean zone of peace and shared prosperity.

The collective determination of the States of the Mediterranean Basin to make our region one of peace, security and cooperation can be made a reality only through the strengthening of the Arab Maghreb Union. The building of a united Maghreb where solidarity prevails can only contribute to strengthening security throughout the Mediterranean region. The concept of the indivisibility of security, which makes the two shores of the Mediterranean a single space, makes it necessary to expand Mediterranean solidarity to other regions, including Africa.

Morocco believes that a regional approach to security should also include an African dimension, in order to help the continent cope with the economic and social difficulties it faces, including the conflicts that generate insecurity, famine, disease and migration flows to countries of the northern Mediterranean. Drug trafficking, money laundering, the trade in human beings, smuggling and illegal migration are some of the other scourges dangerously impacting the Euro-Mediterranean region.

It is for all those reasons that Morocco believes that strengthening security and cooperation between the countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership requires committed and effective solidarity at the regional and international levels. A tripartite discussion on the national, regional and international levels will make it possible to better adapt the approach to security in the Mediterranean region on the basis of socio-economic development, the strengthening of democracy, the establishment of lasting peace and the promotion of harmonious relations between peoples and civilizations.

Mr. El-Anbaki (Iraq) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I should like to refer to article 9 of Iraq's draft Constitution, on which a referendum was held on Friday, 15 October. Subparagraph (e) states that,

> "The Iraqi Government shall respect and implement Iraq's international commitments regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Associated equipment, material, technologies and communications systems for use in the development, manufacture, production and use of such weapons shall be banned."

It is our hope that the Constitution will be approved, once the results of the referendum are announced in the next few days.

The item under discussion, namely, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, has been, as you all know, on the agenda of the First Committee since 1974. This is an item of particular importance, especially for the members of the Group of Arab States.

As members are well aware, three decisions were adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including one to extend the NPT indefinitely. The Conference also adopted a resolution on the Middle East, calling upon all States of the region that had not yet acceded to the NPT to do so without exception and as soon as possible, as well as to place their nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards regime.

The 2000 NPT Review Conference underscored the results of the 1995 Conference and emphasized the importance of Israel's adherence to the NPT. All Arab States of the Middle East are parties to the NPT. That also includes parties to other regional arrangements, given that Arab African States belong to the Treaty of Pelindaba on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, all States parties underscored the importance of bringing about the universality of the Treaty. As a State of the Middle East, Israel's adherence would be a step towards that goal.

Most speakers at the NPT Review Conference in May 2005 emphasized the importance of establishing in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Israel was specifically called upon to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear State and to implement the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards regime.

As members are also well aware, the Security Council has adopted resolutions, including resolution 487 (1981), calling upon the States of the region, including Israel, to place all their nuclear facilities under the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards regime. Paragraph 14 of Council resolution 687 (1991) also referred to the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the first preambular paragraph of Council resolution 1284 (1999) recalled resolution 687 (1991).

Iraq calls for the implementation of the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, so as to speed up the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We also call for the establishment of an appropriate and effective mechanism to ensure that Israel adheres to the NPT and places its nuclear facilities under the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards regime.

Mr. Atieh (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): At a time when we aspire to the complete eradication of nuclear weapons and the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), we continue to ignore the fact that Israel, which has acquired nuclear weapons, continues to remain outside the NPT regime. Israel actually continues to receive support, while States parties to the NPT are being deprived of the use of nuclear technology for development and peaceful purposes.

Israel continues to pursue its hostile expansionist policies in the Middle East relying on its possession of a huge arsenal of conventional and non-conventional weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons. Israel is running a dangerous military nuclear programme that threatens the security of the region and the world. That programme is not under any effective international safeguards regime, and there has not been any international response to this serious situation. The Middle East is, therefore, the region of the world most exposed to military and security threats.

Syria was among the first countries to call for the designation of the Middle East as a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, and has worked seriously towards that goal. The draft resolution presented by Syria to the Security Council on 29 December 2003 on behalf of the Group of Arab States was among the latest initiatives in that regard. It called for ridding the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear

weapons, in the context of collective international supervision and the United Nations. The goal of the draft resolution was to promote multilateral international agreements in the area of disarmament. The fact that that Arab initiative has, to date, not been adopted serves to encourage Israel to remain outside the NPT and to keep its nuclear facilities and activities outside the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In that regard, we look forward to the international community's support in the form of clearly calling on Israel to adhere to the NPT and of finding an effective mechanism to bring about that goal, so as to contribute to the stability of the region and the establishment of a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East.

Mr. Meyer (Canada): My apologies, Mr. Chairman, I did not realize that we had not yet exhausted the subject of regional security. I was to speak on the issue of disarmament machinery. I would specifically like to address the issue of verification and compliance, to which we have already referred under this cluster.

I am very pleased to return to a subject that is of great importance to my delegation, namely, the issue of verification in international arms control and disarmament agreements. As we noted in our opening statement, the current challenges to the integrity of those regimes have underscored the central role that verification plays in assuring States parties that these instruments are in fact producing the security they promise.

Verifying compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements provides significant security benefits to the international community. We must continue to "trust but verify", precisely because non-compliance with arms control and disarmament commitments can seriously erode the trust that is so vital to their success. While verification mechanisms require significant resources, they represent wise investments, considering the costs of alternative approaches such as the maintenance of large military forces. Furthermore, the continued potential threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — in particular to international peace and security — means that questions of potential non-compliance will remain front and centre.

Like military equipment, verification requires an active research and development programme, if it is to be kept up to date. Canada is continuing its tradition of funding advanced verification research through the International Security Research and Outreach Programme at Canada's Ministry for Foreign Affairs. We also recently established the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance, in conjunction with Carleton University in Ottawa. Launched in March of this year, the Centre's initial focus has been on arms control and disarmament treaties dealing with weapons of mass destruction.

One of the Centre's first projects, undertaken with funding from the Government of New Zealand, was the production of a study for the International Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, which is chaired by Hans Blix of Sweden, on the future of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and options for preserving its capacities and experience. That study, entitled "A standing United Nations WMD verification body: necessary and feasible", was presented at the United Nations this spring during the recent Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

At the United Nations as well, verification has a long and distinguished history. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, noted that adequate verification created confidence that arms control and disarmament agreements were being observed by all parties. In 1985, Canada initiated resolution 40/152, which was adopted by consensus and called on all States to communicate their views on the subject. In 1987 and 1988, Canada chaired a working group that developed the Sixteen Verification Principles, which were subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly and remain key expressions of international consensus. In 1990 and 1995, separate groups of governmental experts charged with studying the role of the United Nations in the field of verification reported their recommendations. I would note that some of those recommendations have yet to be fully considered or acted upon. Following the 1995 report, Canada took the lead on the First Committee resolution reaffirming the Sixteen Principles.

But, in the spirit of reform, the draft resolution introduced last year — which was adopted as resolution 59/60 — took a more activist role and

decided to establish a panel of government experts in 2006 to examine the issue and report to the First Committee. The panel will begin work in January and will explore all aspects of verification, as well as the role for the United Nations in that area.

I would like to lay out four possible areas of consideration for the panel. First among them would be a review of the conclusions of the 1990 and 1995 Groups of Government Experts. That would be consistent with the approach of earlier expert groups and would allow for the identification of areas of analysis that could be usefully updated to provide a longer-term vision of verification trends. Such analysis could also be made broader by including results from some of the many studies in this area by the United Nations and other bodies over the past decade. I would also note that a number of the reports of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters have contained suggestions regarding verification.

A second area would be analysis of the lessons drawn from recent verification experiences. Institutions, techniques and technologies for the verification of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have evolved dramatically in the past few years, and the growing technical competence of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is widely recognized. At the same time, conventional-arms-sector approaches can provide valuable and often innovative experience, such as the roles played by civil society and the Landmine Monitor in the verification of the Ottawa Convention.

Thirdly, the panel could look at how to improve existing mechanisms, whether through their universalization or simply through their enhanced or fuller implementation. An examination of emerging technologies would also be important. New technologies and scientific developments may help the verification process, but they may also be used to circumvent it. Both possibilities should be considered. In addition, most verification systems were set up with State-to-State relationships in mind and may need to be revisited, given the growth in the importance of non-State actors.

A fourth area would be the role of the United Nations in verification. The experience of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission demonstrated the capacity of the United Nations to develop and maintain a highly professional, impartial and effective verification organization capable of operating in the most difficult geopolitical environments. It also shows the efficiencies that can be realized through cooperation and complementarity between the United Nations and specialized agencies, such as the IAEA and the OPCW. The issue of a standing multilateral verification capability has been actively considered by previous verification expert groups, and the 2006 panel may wish to examine whether it is an idea whose time has come.

The issue of verification raises challenges in many other contexts as well — the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, most prominently, but also the issue of national submissions under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the consideration of WMD delivery systems, such as ballistic missiles, recognizing that they are not currently subject to a multilateral legally binding control regime.

Naturally, we welcome further discussion on this topic. In that regard, I would especially like to commend those countries that have already expressed their views to the Secretary-General on the topic of verification in response to the note verbale of the Department for Disarmament Affairs of 25 February. We would encourage others to do so prior to January so that the panel of government experts can consider those views as it begins its deliberations.

Mr. Loedel (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the countries members of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and its associated States: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, to discuss the subject of confidence-building measures.

MERCOSUR and its associated States believe that confidence-building measures are a basic tool for achieving peace and security at the global level. That belief was expressed through the Declaration of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile as a Zone of Peace, signed at Ushuaia in 1998. That instrument, in addition to declaring the subregion free of nuclear weapons, calls for, among other things, the strengthening and progressive coordination of consultation and cooperation mechanisms on security and defence issues among its member States and the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures.

Our region has been a pioneer in the implementation of such measures, and we have witnessed the benefits that they have yielded in terms of safeguarding peace and strengthening democracy in the Americas, making possible greater transparency and dialogue among countries. That has helped to create a favourable environment for the control and limitation of conventional weapons, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament, which would enable us to allocate greater resources for the economic and social development of peoples.

Likewise, we have recognized that it is necessary to develop and implement new confidence-building measures to overcome traditional threats to security as well as the other challenges of the twenty-first century and to tackle the new security realities. Indeed, we believe that non-military measures must be developed to supplement activities and initiatives undertaken to help build confidence among States.

For MERCOSUR and its associated States, confidence- and security-building measures are a substantial and irreplaceable component of the network of bilateral, subregional and regional cooperative agreements that have been developed to supplement security institutions established over many years. We made progress in identifying and implementing confidence- and security-building measures during the first Forum on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, held in April 2005.

Moreover, we are participating in the information system of the Organization of American States in the belief that exchanging information promotes the strengthening of confidence-building measures at the hemispheric level. We are a party to the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions and to the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials.

In addition, the countries of MERCOSUR and its associated States have created the Consultative and Political Coordination Forum, which receives reports from a series of working groups responsible for tackling security-related issues, including the working group on firearms. The working group recently adopted a memorandum of understanding for the exchange of information on the manufacturing of and illicit trafficking in firearms, not only to facilitate tracing, but also to implement concrete measures related to complementary policies implemented by countries in the region.

At the same time, MERCOSUR and its associated States are benefiting from related bilateral and subregional experiences, including, inter alia, the adoption of standardized methodologies for quantifying military expenditures, the publication and exchange of defence white papers and the carrying out of joint demining activities, military exercises, meetings of border commissions and early-warning activities to prevent natural disasters. In parallel, we wish to highlight the holding of high-level regional meetings participated in by ministers for foreign affairs and defence and meetings aimed at consultation and agreement on common bilateral, subregional and regional positions, so that we can begin frank and direct dialogue on joint assessments of various security and defence aspects and can exchange ideas and views on national defence policy objectives and on means to address common problems in this area.

In the global arena, MERCOSUR members and associated States have a high degree of compliance with the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms requests for information and have been regularly submitting our standardized reports on defence expenditures. At the same time, the countries of the region believe that confidence-building measures are a dynamic tool and are modified by the particular States involved. That is why we feel it is indispensable to exchange information on experiences in this area at the bilateral, subregional and regional levels, so that we can contribute to the design of analogous projects in other regions.

During the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Member States adopted resolution 59/92, whose objective, among others, is to strengthen the exchange of information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms. In implementation of that resolution, informal meetings have been held to exchange experience and to build on it. However, it is necessary to fine tune that machinery by creating a computerized database to facilitate periodic consultation of advances in the design and implementation of such global measures. We hope that the database will be ready in the next three months and that we will thus have complementary machinery that

builds on that which already exists within the United Nations system.

Ms. Tan (Singapore): The swiftly evolving security environment of the new millennium has brought into sharp focus new global security challenges that are immediate and critical. Today, the concept of proliferation does not only refer to the nuclear arsenals kept by States. The threat of proliferation has widened to include all actors at the international, regional and subregional levels. The materials being proliferated include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, all of which have the potential to cause staggering harm and destruction.

The possibility of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction is not only dangerous, that threat can also all too easily slip through the gaps in the existing framework of non-proliferation controls. The global terrorist network has the resources to acquire weapons of mass destruction and it would have no qualms about using them. Indiscriminate terrorist attacks on innocent civilians have demonstrated our collective inability to respond to this new security challenge effectively.

In this dynamic and complex security environment, united and inclusive action on the multilateral, regional and national fronts are essential to preserving our continued security. The traditional security architecture of the cold war era and the argument that nuclear weapons protect States' security are no longer credible solutions to the problem. For collective action to be effective, however, States need to demonstrate firm political will.

First, the international community must recognize the need to move forward on the twin fronts of disarmament and non-proliferation. Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation remain at the heart of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and are mutually reinforcing. Compliance with the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament treaties remains a key priority for Singapore. The failures of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the world summit outcome document to produce any concrete achievements this year are symptomatic of the narrow lens with which some States view the problems of disarmament and non-proliferation. However, that should not be used as an excuse to block further progress, nor should we hold either disarmament or non-proliferation hostage to one another.

Secondly, all States should fully support and contribute to the vibrancy of multilateral non-proliferation regimes. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) are the basic instruments in the international effort to fight the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, the time when such instruments were adequate on their own belongs to an earlier age, when the realities of proliferation were different.

To fully address the current proliferation threat by non-State actors, States must proactively contribute to the effectiveness of national controls. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which calls on Member States to enhance domestic controls and step up cooperation against WMD proliferation, fills a gap in other non-proliferation regimes that do not account for non-State actors. However, its effectiveness can only be complete when individual States enact, implement and enforce export control legislation with rigour. Illicit nuclear supply networks have slipped past States that have inadequate controls, but even countries with stringent export control systems could unknowingly provide subcomponents and materials to proliferators.

Singapore has taken a multi-pronged approach to ameliorate the potential dangers of the new, interlinked challenge of terrorism and WMD proliferation. Our approach centres on multilateral, multi-State and national measures, to create a tiered network of closely coordinated controls.

Let me now elaborate on our efforts in three areas: implementation of the CWC; our export control systems; and our participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Singapore places great emphasis on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Through the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act, we have incorporated the Convention's requirements into Singapore's legal system. The Act makes it an offence for any person to engage in activities involving the use, production, stockpiling or transfer of chemical weapons. We have also supported the verification exercises of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) by contributing scientific

expertise. In April 2003, Singapore's Defence Science Organisation's chemical verification laboratory was accredited as an OPCW certified laboratory. In line with article XI of the CWC, the Singapore International Symposium for Protection Against Toxic Substances has been held biennially since 1998.

Singapore's export control system complements and strengthens the CWC. In January 2003, Singapore enacted a strategic goods control act. That legislation covers the export, re-export, trans-shipment, transit, brokering, and intangible technology transfer of strategic goods. It includes a control list of sensitive items drawn from the international regimes, as well as a catch-all provision to include all other items suspected of WMD end use. At the port level, we also participate in the Container Security Initiative and the radiation detection Megaports Initiative.

Singapore also participates in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which seeks to build capacity for inter-State cooperation to disrupt the clandestine supply of WMD and related material to illegitimate non-State actors. The maritime interdiction exercise that we hosted this August brought together 13 other States, encompassing authorities from military, enforcement, port and civil aviation authorities, as well as members of industry. When PSI first started, there was uncertainty about the legality of some of its aspects. However, PSI's foundational principles give unequivocal assurance that all actions taken under the Initiative will be consistent with national and international law and frameworks. The United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change emphasized that all States should be encouraged to join the PSI. In that respect, Singapore urges PSI countries to support participation by more States, with a view to forming an effective global network of non-proliferation control.

The involvement of many different agencies and types of expertise in a given PSI exercise underscores the varied types and levels of action that States can, and should, take to counter proliferation threats. As a small country that is highly dependent on our port and aviation hub for our livelihood, Singapore is cognizant of the need to balance security and economic interests. Nonetheless, we recognize that it is in our immediate and long-term interest to have robust domestic controls and vigilant enforcement of those measures.

At the same time, the universalization of non-proliferation efforts is crucial to achieving effective international commitment. In that regard, Singapore fully supports the various non-proliferation regimes, and is fully committed to the United Nations leadership of the international community. Singapore is proud to be a sponsor of this year's draft resolution on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

It is only when national authorities act wholeheartedly and in concert with multilateral structures that a truly robust international non-proliferation regime can flourish. My delegation encourages all States to actively support the international non-proliferation agenda, in both word and spirit, at home and abroad.

Mr. MacLachlan (Australia): This morning, I wish to speak on non-proliferation and disarmament education.

The Australian Government considers it one of its fundamental responsibilities to safeguard Australians from the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There can be no doubt that that is among the gravest threats confronting not just Australia but the entire international community. Too often, however, international security affairs can seem remote from the day-to-day lives of citizens, merely the subject of discourse among academics and experts. But the reality, especially with regard to WMD proliferation, is very different. For that reason, non-proliferation education is an important element of the Australian Government's efforts to safeguard Australians from the threat of WMD proliferation.

Last week, Australia's Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, launched a publication entitled "Weapons of mass destruction: Australia's role in fighting proliferation", copies of which can be found in boxes at the table at the back of the room. It describes the nature of the WMD threat and what the Australian Government is doing to confront it. It seeks to contribute to debate within Australia on non-proliferation issues, although delegations here, I am sure, will find it useful and informative.

The need for such a publication is underscored by the complexity of the themes within it. The global security environment has changed markedly since the end of the cold war. Globalization has increased the opportunities for States to acquire or develop WMD. Moreover, with the rise of transnational terrorism, we

confront the menace of terrorists fulfilling their desire to obtain and use WMD. In that complex global environment, Government strategies must be multidimensional and must involve the entire Government. That is precisely the approach taken by the Australian Government, as is explained in the publication.

Internationally, Australia is working to strengthen the implementation and durability of the international system of non-proliferation treaties. We support practical initiatives — such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and export control regimes — which further support those treaties.

Domestically, the Australian Government has strengthened controls against the risk of WMD terrorism. Critically, the Government is stepping up its engagement with Australian business and universities to improve their awareness of proliferation risks associated with the export of sensitive materials and the transfer of know-how through person-to-person contacts.

The international community can ill afford the perils of WMD proliferation. In tackling that threat, we must ensure greater understanding about its nature, the importance of making full use of the range of tools developed to curb the spread of WMD and the need for strengthened international cooperation through a concerted educative effort.

Mr. Mine (Japan): I would like to commend the efforts of the Government of Australia in strengthening education about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Building on previous working papers, Japan, together with seven other countries — namely, Egypt, Hungary, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland and Sweden — submitted to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) a working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education that stressed that the successful implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations study would require an active partnership among national Governments, regional and international organizations, academic institutions and civil society. While it is extremely regrettable that the Review Conference was unable to agree on a final document on substantial matters, including on disarmament and non-proliferation education, we nevertheless believe our working paper and its concrete recommendations can serve as a useful reference for Member States.

Japan attaches great importance to disarmament and non-proliferation education. Among other things, we are making the following efforts in that field.

First, under the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme, Japan has been inviting various Government officials to visit Japan each year since 1983, amounting to a total of around 580 participants to date. This year, participants recently completed a visit to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which I hope helped to provide an insight into the reality of atomic bombing. They are with us here at this session of the First Committee.

Secondly, Japan has sponsored a United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in a different local city every year since 1989, providing a valuable opportunity for disarmament experts from around the world to exchange views and enhancing awareness of the importance of disarmament at the regional level. This year's Conference was held in Kyoto from 17 to 19 August and included a session on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Thirdly, on the basis of the recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, Japan has invited disarmament and non-proliferation experts to give lectures on disarmament and non-proliferation, working with high school students, civic leaders, and atomic bomb survivors, known by the Japanese name *hibakusha*. *Hibakusha* share their experiences first-hand, in order to educate students and the public about a culture of peace by creating awareness of the devastation caused by nuclear weapons.

This year marks the sixtieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons continue to exist. The voice of the citizens of Japan and the international community calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons is stronger than ever. I feel that one of the main reasons for the continued existence of nuclear weapons is that the true nature of the nuclear devastation they cause is not well understood. I believe the true terror of nuclear weapons lies in the fact that the vast majority of casualties are unavoidably innocent civilians, regardless of whether or not the intention was to attack civilians. It also lies in the fact that the use of those

weapons leads to the most horrific, long-lasting, complex and inter-generational effects.

There is a pressing need to correctly convey the inhumane effects caused by nuclear weapons. To that end, it is essential to further promote disarmament and non-proliferation education. It is encouraging to learn that various efforts have already begun around the world, both at the national and international levels, with the aim of raising public awareness of the dangers of such weapons and of the need to further strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation measures. We will continue to work towards that end. As an active advocate of disarmament and non-proliferation education, Japan would like to work with interested countries and the community of non-governmental organizations to consider and propose concrete measures to implement the recommendations of the United Nations study.

Mr. Vasiliev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We would like to speak on other matters of disarmament in our national statement on international information security. At the same time, since we are concluding the second segment of today's work — with your permission and in order to increase effectiveness and not duplicate our work, we would also like to submit our draft resolution on the topic of international information security.

First, I would like to thank my colleague Mr. Andrei Krutskikh, who was the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts, for his very useful and important information.

Since 1998, the Russian Federation has submitted each year to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly a draft resolution on achievements in the area of computerization and telecommunications in the context of international security.

Considering the scope of the influence of information and communications technologies in all areas of the activities of society and the State, Russia looks at the issue of international information security as one of the foremost priorities, requiring extremely serious international consideration — in particular under the auspices of the United Nations.

As the discussions have shown — including at the current session of the General Assembly — the opportunities for hostile use of information and communications technologies by criminals, terrorists or States constitute a credible threat to security on the regional, national and international levels.

We need a clear understanding of the character of those threats and challenges confronting mankind resulting from the global spread of information technology, so that we can develop unified mutually acceptable approaches to their neutralization in order to strengthen international information security. That is the only way we can guarantee maximum use of the advantages that we derive from information and communications technologies and form a global information society for the well-being of all countries in the world.

We are in the initial phases of the consideration of those topical and sensitive problems. Useful work in that regard was conducted by the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 58/32. At the current stage, it did not prove possible to agree on wording for the final report, given the novelty and complexity of the range of issues. Nevertheless, the discussion was constructive and promoted a better understanding of the range of issues involving international information security, as well as the positions of individual countries.

The experts of the Group showed significant interest in their consideration of the range of issues relating to international information security in all its facets. The discussion in the Group was substantive, systematic and enlightened. On a number of aspects, there were converging or similar assessments.

Naturally, as in any policy discussion — in particular one discussed for the first time on a new theme — there were disagreements as well. In our view, they related to the prioritization of various threats in the area of international information security. However, the presence of those threats, in this day and age, is not disputed by anyone. It is clear that, in order to develop common approaches for threat reduction in that area, we would need more time. It is to be noted that the Group held only three short sessions in two years.

The Russian Federation believes that global computerization has opened up extensive prospects for the progressive development of nations and mankind overall. However, in conjunction with that, the achievements in information and communications technologies could be used to promote goals that are incompatible with the need to maintain international

stability and security and to comply with the principles of the sovereign equality of States, peaceful settlement of conflicts, non-use of force or threat of force, non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and respect for human rights and freedoms.

Of particular danger, in our view, are threats of the hostile use of information and communications technologies for military, political, criminal or terrorist purposes. The distinguishing features of information and communications technologies tools, when applied destructively, are their general accessibility and, in many cases, their indiscriminate impact, as well as the possibility of their being used anonymously and their being camouflaged by peaceful activities, their potential for wide-ranging trans-boundary use and their low cost and general effectiveness. Information and communications technologies can be used not only by individual lawbreakers and criminal groups, but also by terrorists and extremist organizations, as well as States, for hostile, political, military, economic and other purposes. It is exceedingly dangerous to have new information and communications technologies included in the arsenals of terrorist organizations.

In United Nations Security Council resolution 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999, we emphasized that a growing number of acts of international terrorism, using communications technologies for their preparation and conduct,

> "endangers the lives and well-being of individuals worldwide as well as the peace and security of all States".

We believe that the vulnerability of information space and the specific features of information and communications technologies that we have mentioned make them an attractive means for negatively impacting society, its interests, the security of States, organizations and citizens. The global nature of today's threats — including threats to information and communications security — has proven that security in today's world is indivisible, and consequently, combating the threats must occur through collective effort.

We are convinced that we must work to alert people to avoid repeating the errors of the past. We have precedent for that. This year, upon the initiative of the Russian Federation, the General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which is already being signed. That universal Convention was developed as an alert — before the perpetration of terrorist acts using nuclear materials and other radioactive substances. We believe it is critically important, useful and a timely step.

The international community would be well-advised to stick with that sort of approach — aimed at adopting preventive measures — in combating the entire range of threats to international information security. Bearing in mind the interests of States in further consideration of the range of issues concerning international information security in all its aspects, we believe it would be advisable to continue the discussion in the First Committee and to resume, as previously in a research format, the work of the Group of Governmental Experts. That has been suggested at meetings of the Group and at the current session of the General Assembly. I would emphasize we are speaking of an activity aimed at research. We all need to do better in getting to the bottom of the phenomenon, so that the development of information technologies will not draw mankind into yet another, new sort of arms race, as happened with nuclear weapons, and so that we may save money and resources for purposes of development, and so as to prevent the use of advanced technologies in communications and computerization by international terrorists.

We would hope that within the new Group of Governmental Experts we would find representatives of States that previously expressed the wish to participate in the Group, but did not have that opportunity during the period from 2004 to 2005. That would allow the Group to make maximum use of the experience accumulated in various countries throughout the world in the area of international information security. We are in favour of enlarging the membership of the Group, in order to make it more representative.

Russia has submitted for the First Committee's consideration a draft resolution entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security" (A/C.1/60/L.29). The draft resolution is based on previous resolutions on the subject, which were adopted by consensus in past years. It also takes into account the results of the work done by the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.

Given the importance of continuing to address the range of issues associated with international information security with minimal interruption, we had initially suggested that the Group of Governmental Experts should resume its work in 2007. However, given the budgetary complications in ensuring financing for the Group's work beginning in 2007 and in order to accommodate requests made by our partners, we have deferred the resumption of the Group's work until 2009. That is the only change we have made to the original draft resolution that was circulated to capitals.

We are prepared to work closely with all delegations. Informal consultations to discuss our draft resolution will take place on Wednesday, 19 October at 3 p.m. in Conference Room A. We call on all delegations to support the Russian draft resolution. As in past years, we look forward to its adoption by consensus.

Ms. Darlow (New Zealand): I would like to take this opportunity to support, and elaborate on, the statements made earlier by the representatives of Australia and Japan on the subject of disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Education in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation is essential for maintaining and strengthening the links between multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and the international community that they serve. Civil society plays a vital role in that process, instigating progress and engagement within individual Governments. Among other contributions, the continuing involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGO) on technical issues in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation education is particularly valuable. It is imperative that effective partnerships are maintained between academic institutions, think tanks and Governments in order to ensure that institutional memory and technical expertise are employed to full effect in ongoing negotiations.

In 2002, New Zealand was honoured to participate in the Secretary-General's group of governmental experts on disarmament and non-proliferation education. We support the recommendations of the United Nations study, and urge all States to take effective measures to ensure their full implementation at the national and international levels.

In terms of taking effective measures at the national level to improve systems for disarmament and non-proliferation education, there may be merit in more direct engagement with educational agencies and authorities in order to facilitate the permeation of disarmament and non-proliferation topics into domestic curriculums.

New Zealand has found the inclusion of NGO representatives on delegations a valuable way to strengthen links between Government and civil society perspectives, enhancing educational opportunities on all sides. We will continue that practice, and we look forward to engaging with other delegations on ways to seek improvement in disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Mr. Najafi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I would like to speak on the topic of regional disarmament and security.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is a recognized regional instrument to strengthen regional and international peace and security. More importantly, that idea plays an instrumental role in preventing the threat of nuclear war. Such an arrangement is in conformity with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which was the Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament.

Three decades have elapsed since the first introduction — by Iran in 1974 — of the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East that have been adopted without a vote by the General Assembly since 1980 represent the significance of realizing that noble idea in the wider region of the Middle East.

By renouncing the nuclear option and placing its nuclear facilities under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Islamic Republic of Iran has shown its determination to achieve the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear weapons in particular. Such an act underscores the undiminished support of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, with the ultimate objective of securing a world free of nuclear weapons.

Iran ratified the IAEA's Statute in 1958, and subsequently signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1969, which its Parliament ratified in 1970. That process was furthered by the ratification of IAEA safeguards agreements in 1973, and ultimately further accomplished by the signature of an additional protocol to our safeguards agreement in 2003.

In implementing its obligations under the NPT — specifically articles II and III thereof — all of the nuclear facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran are devoted to peaceful purposes and are under full-scope IAEA safeguards. Furthermore, in order to contribute to the realization of a world free from weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran has also acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Owing to Israel's non-adherence to the NPT and, more importantly, that regimes refusal to place its un-safeguarded nuclear facilities under the IAEA's verification system, the realization of such a zone — a lofty and long-sought-after aspiration of countries in the region — has yet to materialize. Under General Assembly resolution 59/63 of 3 December 2004, the Secretary-General was asked to inform the Assembly of the results of his consultations with the countries of the region on the realization of that idea. It is our conviction that the Secretary-General should dispatch a special envoy to the countries of the region in order to carry out the required consultations with countries to facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. At present, Israel is the only non-party to the NPT in the region.

Despite repeated calls by the international community, demonstrated in the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, related resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly, the decisions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and those of the IAEA and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Israel — confident of the political and military support of the United States — has neither acceded to the NPT nor placed its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. Israel has not even declared its intention to accede to the NPT. Israel's clandestine nuclear activities seriously threaten both regional peace and security and endanger the non-proliferation regime.

The Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believes that an agreed plan of action and timetable for the universality of the NPT in the Middle East should be a top priority on the agenda of all States parties to the Treaty, especially nuclear-weapon States. There needs to be enough pressure on Israel to get it to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, in order to pave the way for the long-sought-after goal of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The Chairman: As there does not seem to be any further request for the floor on today's thematic issues, let us now proceed to the introduction of draft resolutions and decisions.

I call on the representative of Germany to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.42.

Mr. Brasack (Germany): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first time that Germany is taking the floor in a formal meeting, I would like to take the opportunity to welcome you in the Chair and to pledge the continued full support of the German delegation.

I have the pleasure of introducing the biennial resolution A/C.1/60/L.42, entitled "Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures". I would like to take this opportunity to thank those nations that have co-sponsored our consensus draft resolution this year for the first time, which has brought the number of sponsors up to 70 nations so far. Let me encourage those delegations that are still considering sponsorship to do so.

Mr. Chairman, the German-Romanian biennial draft resolution, which you have before you, is a follow-up to the 2003 version. It again encourages Member States that have no information to provide to submit nil returns. Thus, participation could further be increased towards the goal of universalization.

I appeal to all countries that have so far not yet participated to join the two global arms transparency instrument, by submitting information next year.

Let me continue with some general remarks on the operational side of the draft resolution. Significant progress was recorded this year in the level of participation by Governments in the two global arms transparency instruments maintained and operated by the United Nations Secretariat, the Register of Conventional Arms and the Standardized Instrument

for Reporting Military Expenditures, based on their respective resolutions, one sponsored by the Netherlands and the other by Germany and Romania. It is encouraging that the number of new participants in the two arms transparency instruments continues to grow, registering significant increases over past years.

A promising upturn and a record number of submissions by Governments have been recorded for the United Nations system for the standardized reporting on military expenditures. In 2004, we note 79 reports, and this year the United Nations Secretariat has so far received submissions from 70 Governments. I wish to mention the Governments of Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Israel, Republic of Korea and Solomon Islands, who have participated in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting on military expenditures for the first time by making a submission this past year. The standardized reporting format covers expenditures on personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement and construction and research and development. So far, more than 115 Governments have participated in the reporting instrument at least once, and in recent years the data provided by an increased number of participating Governments constitute collectively more than 80 per cent of global military expenditure.

A sustained effort is being made by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs — and here I would like to express my gratitude to the Department — to increase familiarity with the procedures of these instruments, with a view to encouraging greater and more consistent participation. With the assistance of interested Governments, a series of regional and subregional workshops was conducted in 2004 and early 2005 that focused on the signatory States of the Nairobi Declaration, covering the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the Great Lakes region, as well as on the States belonging to the Southern African Development Community, meeting with representatives of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures was also discussed at a regional workshop covering Member States belonging to the Pacific Islands Forum, held in Nadi, Fiji, from 18 to 20 August 2004, which was organized by the Department for Disarmament Affairs. It was also discussed in a presentation by the Department in the plenary session of the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the Organization of American States, held in Washington, D.C., on 25 April 2005.

In addition to raising funds to hold workshops, the Department for Disarmament Affairs has also made efforts to promote the United Nations reporting instrument by publishing booklets and through other activities. It has recently issued a booklet containing guidelines for making submissions to the United Nations reporting Instrument, and it has collaborated with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean on a report to promote the transparency of military expenditures in that region.

Although it is focused on Latin America, many aspects of that report are relevant for all regions of the world. I have been informed that both of these publications, as well as an information sheet containing the latest data on the United Nations reporting Instrument, have been distributed to all Member States today.

Additionally, I would like to draw delegates' attention to a report of the Secretary-General (document A/60/159) dated 25 July 2005; this report contains information from Member States on their military expenditures. In my opinion, it is worth looking at this informative document.

These efforts help to enhance and sustain the progress of the global transparency instruments towards fulfilling their respective confidence-building and arms-restraint objectives. We, therefore, would welcome support from other interested Governments through sponsorship of these activities to advance the objectives of arms transparency.

Also, I appeal to those who have participated only once, or just a few times, to do so on a consistent basis. Consistency alone will significantly raise the level of participation each year, thereby contributing to our common goal of transparency.

I express the hope that this draft resolution will be adopted again this year without a vote.

Mr. Costea (Romania): Romania is honoured to be the co-author of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.42. In this capacity, allow me to add several remarks to the most eloquent introduction just made by my German colleague.

First, it was in 1999 that we decided to bestow a biennial character to this draft resolution. One could say that that is solid proof that we do believe in the streamlining and rationalization of resolutions. Secondly, the importance of transparency in military expenditures cannot be overstated; hence, the very decision of tabling this draft resolution again this year.

On 12 December 2005, 25 years will have passed since the General Assembly adopted resolution 35/142 B on the reduction of military budgets, which set up the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures.

Together with the United Nations Register for Conventional Arms, these two global arms inventories are truly valuable sources of data for both the military and the civil societies.

Thirdly, more needs to be done to develop a real culture of reporting, which would lead, at the end of the day, to increased openness and transparency. Both are needed, mainly in regions where tension still rules, including in Romania's neighbourhood, because of uncontrolled — not to mention unauthorized — conventional arsenals.

Like my German colleague, we hope that the draft resolution will again be adopted without a vote.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of the United States to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.1.

Ms. DeSutter (United States of America): As the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation, I am grateful for the opportunity to address this body on a subject of great professional interest to me. As some may recall, I spoke on this matter last year, and I believe it is critical that we continue our dialogue in the light of progress made and challenges remaining since that time.

The United States this year is sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.1, entitled "Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements". This is not the first time that we have introduced such a draft resolution. We hope, however, that delegations will view our draft resolution as an opportunity for the international community to reflect upon the changing face of global arms control and non-proliferation challenges that we all face. The draft resolution is intended not only to bring the issue of compliance to the attention of the international community, but also to emphasize that compliance with international treaties and obligations is critical to international peace and security, and to exhort Governments to seek common cause in pursuit of diplomatic means to bring intentional violators back into compliance.

Just this past August, Secretary of State Rice, on behalf of President Bush, submitted to the United States Congress the most recent non-compliance report prepared by my bureau in full coordination with all the relevant departments and agencies of the United States Government. This report, the unclassified version of which is available to all interested persons on the State Department's website, lays out the findings of the United States regarding questions of non-compliance by other nations. It provides, in as much detail as possible in an unclassified document, the evidence and the reasoning behind our compliance judgments. The non-compliance report, which I believe is the only document of its type produced in the world, seeks to alert the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government and the public to both existing non-compliance and potentially emerging violations.

The United States and most of the other nations represented here today have sought to supplement our national efforts at strengthening security with multilateral tools. These tools have included arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements. The United States, however, generally does not join regimes or sign international agreements that constrain our freedom to exercise our national right to pursue our security when United States compliance is not going to be reciprocated. This is just common sense. Few of you sitting here today would be likely to enter into any agreement — be it multilateral or bilateral — if you believed that other parties were unlikely to comply with its terms.

Therefore, when the United States adheres to a treaty, we want to know whether the other parties are also complying, and we want to discover non-compliance early enough to be able to deny violators any benefit from such non-compliance. Thus, the United States views verification, compliance and compliance enforcement as critically interrelated. For example, verification has two purposes: detection and deterrence. If detection has no consequences for the

violator, then verification has no meaning, and deterrence is unachievable.

The cases of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran illustrate vividly the importance of two concepts that are inherently part of compliance: compliance assessment and compliance enforcement. The United States process of reaching non-compliance judgments is defined in United States law, based on international obligations. Our Congress has established specific institutions — my bureau, most notably — to ensure that the compliance assessment process is rigorous, systematic and objective. While the United States experience is in many ways unique, the methods we use are available to all.

While all nations have sources of valid or corroborating information for reaching their own non-compliance judgments, some States have expressed concern that they lack the technical capabilities that commonly have been associated with verification — satellites, for example — to watch the activities of their treaty partners. The United States believes that the means by which States parties can acquire relevant information for reaching non-compliance judgments are far more extensive than has been generally acknowledged or than was true in the past. The old verification concept — national technical means of verification — fails to capture the totality of resources available to States parties. The modern concept of national means and methods recognizes that every State has access to information that can be relevant to reaching compliance judgments — whether from its diplomats overseas, reports from dissident groups that reveal the non-compliance of their Governments, reports from international inspectorates, commercial satellites or other means.

While all information, whatever its source, warrants evaluation, information that can be independently confirmed is considered to be the most reliable, especially when it can be confirmed from multiple sources. When the information available to us suggests that there may be a compliance question, one of the first steps we take is to study the international agreement or other commitment in question to see what States parties are obligated to do.

It is always important — and sometimes decisive — to establish clearly what the precise obligation is in the case under review. While the review of obligations and commitments is under way, we seek all possible additional information regarding the activities of concern. Multiple sources of information are especially important when the matter is grave.

In cases where the information is troubling, but insufficient to reach a firm finding of violation, we will attach a "caveat" or warning to it by explicitly noting uncertainties or ambiguities in the evidence. Whenever we can, we distinguish between inadvertent and deliberate violations, because this distinction can have an important bearing on what action will need to be taken in order to address the problem. We also endeavour to communicate the degree of seriousness of a violation and to identify the steps that might be needed to bring the party back into compliance or respond in other ways to rectify the situation.

Let me underscore that making a determination as to whether another State is in violation of its international obligations is not a simple matter. The process is time-consuming, rigorous and systematic. However, as a State party to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments, we rest our safety and security in part upon other countries' compliance with those agreements and commitments. Therefore, the compliance assessment process is, for us, a key component of our national security and a necessary early warning call to action.

Along with compliance assessments and compliance enforcement we consider verification to be an essential part of what we call the "compliance process". It is impossible to consider any of these three elements except as part of a whole.

I am often asked if the United States demands "perfect" verification. Let me be clear, there is no such thing as perfect verification. The term "effectively verifiable" does not mean, and should not be taken to mean, that there is, or can ever be, certainty that every violation will be detected. This phrase indicates the aspiration to achieve reasonable confidence that, under the circumstances, detection of non-compliance will occur in sufficient time for appropriate remedial responses to be undertaken.

The United States considers an arrangement or treaty to be effectively verifiable if the degree of verifiability is judged sufficient, given the compliance history of the parties involved, the risks associated

with non-compliance, the difficulty of response to deny violators the benefits of their violations, the language and measures incorporated into the agreement and our own national means and methods of verification. The degree of verifiability must be high enough to enable the United States to detect non-compliance in sufficient time to reduce the threat presented by the violation and deny the violator the benefits of his wrongdoing.

It is a common misperception that a combination of international data declarations, international cooperative measures (including technical measures) and on-site inspection regimes can, by themselves, be sufficient for detecting non-compliance. In fact, data declarations, cooperative measures and on-site inspections can provide useful and often invaluable information. They are useful tools for investigating indications of non-compliance — as we have seen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) do in Iran, for example — and for detecting inadvertent violations. However, inspections provide information according to the agreed access and collection capabilities negotiated by the parties, and provide only such information as is available at the specific time and place of the inspection. They provide, at best, a snapshot in time. Even cooperative measures, such as remote cameras and seals for continuous monitoring — while quite powerful — are limited to the locations where they are employed.

The degree of verifiability is not judged solely on the basis of whether or not the agreement contains detailed provisions for data exchanges, on-site inspections or other types of cooperative arrangements. Such measures are tools that may help to increase our confidence that other States are complying, but may or may not facilitate detection of non-compliance — their efficacy is thus limited. Verifiability assessments are also informed by a much broader array of factors. These include, but are not limited to, the proven reliability of our negotiating partners in adhering to agreements, the incentives given parties may have to cheat on a given agreement, and the relative significance of cheating pursuant to the obligations.

The United States considered all these factors, for example, when we conducted our verification assessment of the proposed fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). After two years of concerted effort and study of the problem, we concluded that an "internationally and effectively verifiable treaty" was not achievable, even with a highly intrusive inspection regime. Having come to such a conclusion, we believe that attempts to negotiate "good enough" verification, as some have suggested, are not only futile but also harmful and delay completion of the treaty. Furthermore, an ineffective regime could lull the international community into a false sense of confidence that obligations were being adhered to.

It is for this reason that the United States urges our colleagues at the Conference on Disarmament to join us in concluding a normative treaty that relies on each State using its own resources to verify compliance. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, we call on all nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to make a public commitment not to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Four of the five nuclear-weapon States — including, of course, the United States — have made such a commitment.

Why do I mention the fissile material cut-off treaty in a discussion of compliance? Simply to make the point that there is a need for international acceptance of the fact that not all agreements need to take the form of the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements of the twentieth century. For example, the Moscow Treaty model and our experiences with Libya — which reflect less detailed and extensive negotiated regimes — offer other models for consideration in situations in which the relationship is one of partnership and/or where there is a genuine accepted strategic commitment.

The international community is facing significant proliferation challenges, none of which are more dangerous than non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations. It is well known that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has a nuclear-weapons programme and that it concealed that programme while it was a party to the NPT. I would note that the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did its duty in reporting to the Security Council the non-compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its nuclear safeguards agreement to the Security Council on several occasions. The agreed framework, signed in 1994, froze plutonium production; however, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea embarked on a covert uranium enrichment programme. The country then expelled the IAEA inspectors in late December 2002.

Reinforced by the concern of the international community, the last round of the Six-Party Talks concluded with a public commitment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to give up all its nuclear weapons and all its existing nuclear programmes and to return to the NPT and its nuclear safeguards agreement. Obviously, there is much work yet to be done. And again obviously, given the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's past record of disregard for its international commitments, the international community will expect a sufficiently strong verification regime to ensure that North Korea is meeting its obligations. As Ambassador Hill stated in Beijing following the adoption of the Joint Statement, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must promptly eliminate all nuclear weapons and all nuclear programmes, and that must be verified to the satisfaction of all parties by credible international means, including the IAEA.

Iran's nuclear programme marks another area of concern. Last month, the Board of Governors of the IAEA formally declared what many of us had known for some time - that is, that Iran's breaches and failures with respect to its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement constituted non-compliance in the context of article XII (C) of the IAEA Statute. As members are aware, by a simple reading of the IAEA Statute, such a finding requires a report to the Security Council. The Board will discuss the timing and content of that report at its next session. In that regard, it is important to note that such a report in and of itself will not resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. Resolution requires Iran's rulers to make the strategic decision to comply with their international obligations, not to flout them.

In both of these cases, parties to international agreements undertook actions over years and even decades to cheat. Their non-compliance is not what is sometimes called technical. These were not accidents or oversights. If they had been, it would be reasonable to expect that expressions of concern would result in timely resolution. We have seen this work numerous times, including in cases described in the non-compliance report to which I referred earlier. In Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we are dealing with cases of intentional non-compliance. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran made strategic decisions to pursue programmes and undertake activities that they knew full well violated their obligations. They invested vast national resources in pursuing these covert programmes — resources that their people may well have wished were being invested in other ways. These programmes were pursued covertly. The two regimes took advantage of the period before discovery to reap benefits — such as technical cooperation and assistance — that flowed from being parties to the NPT.

There is some good news in that regard, however. The international community is addressing in various forums the problem of proliferation and the abuse of peaceful cooperation. For example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has developed new guidelines that support the suspension of transfers of trigger-list items to States that have been found to be in non-compliance with their safeguards obligations. In those circumstances, a special plenary meeting of the Group would be called to review the situation and to consider an appropriate response. In Iran's case, we look forward to participating in the extraordinary NSG plenary meeting to be held this Wednesday, 19 October, in Vienna.

What is to be done now? How can the international community use its collective diplomatic resources to bring those countries back into compliance? How can we address these cases, and others that may still be undiscovered, in a way that strengthens the deterrence of future and further non-compliance? If these countries benefit from their non-compliance, what lessons will other nations learn, and which of our other regimes will come under assault next? We cannot allow violators to benefit from their violations. Doing so undermines the regimes and our faith in them, and reduces security for us all.

In conclusion, I believe that each of our countries will need to consider these questions. The challenge posed by non-compliance is great. There are no easy answers. The question is, are we up to the challenge? The United States believes that we are. I thank the members of the Committee for their attention to this matter.

The Chairman: I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.47.

Mr. El Hadj Ali (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): It is an honour and a pleasure for the Algerian delegation to introduce to the First Committee, once again this year, draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.47, entitled "Strengthening

of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region", on behalf of the sponsors: Albania, Andorra, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Greece, Jordan, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Algeria.

By introducing this draft resolution on a regular basis, the group of sponsors is showing its tireless commitment to making the Mediterranean region a zone of peace and stability. At the same time, the sponsors reaffirm their will to promote cooperation and solidarity in an area rich in terms of both its potential and its cultures — a part of the world that has benefited from exchanges among people since early times. Moreover, the shared destiny of the region's peoples has made necessary and appropriate the increasingly in-depth negotiations on the various joint initiatives establishing frameworks for dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean: the Mediterranean Forum, the Five plus Five Dialogue and the Conference of the Ministers of the Interior of the Western Mediterranean. Those initiatives attest to the growing awareness of the close link between security in Europe and security and stability in the Mediterranean.

Over the past 10 years, the countries of the European Union and the countries surrounding the Mediterranean have engaged in a process of dialogue and partnership by intensifying their joint efforts to promote and consolidate peace and security in the region and to lay the groundwork for various forms of cooperation and a partnership with the ultimate objective of shared prosperity and stability. Thus, the Barcelona Conference established the basis for new relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean, reflecting both a recognition of the special nature of Euro-Mediterranean relations and the need for collective action with a view to eliminating misunderstandings and reducing the inequalities and imbalances in the Mediterranean Basin.

We therefore welcomed the Barcelona Declaration, whose tenth anniversary we are getting ready to celebrate on 21 November. That Declaration represented a historic transformation of our common perception of the Mediterranean. That document marked a recognition of the historically significant nature of Euro-Mediterranean relations and of the need to work together to eliminate prejudice and misunderstanding and to draw on the large reservoir of complementary interests that can be used in a mutually beneficial, equitable way.

The draft text that the sponsors are submitting for consideration by members of the First Committee repeats the content of the resolution adopted at the previous session and covers a wide range of themes having to do with the strengthening of Mediterranean security and cooperation. It underscores the indivisible nature of security in the Mediterranean region, and it recalls all the initiatives undertaken by Mediterranean countries with a view to consolidating peace, security and cooperation.

The draft resolution reaffirms the responsibility of all States to contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean area and their commitment to respecting the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The draft resolution goes on to emphasize the fundamental principles that are the basis for the efforts being made by Mediterranean countries in order to eliminate all causes of tension in the region and to achieve a peaceful, just and lasting resolution of the problems there. It also stresses that the elimination of economic and social disparities linked to unequal levels of development, as well as the promotion of mutual respect and a better understanding among cultures of countries in the Mediterranean basin, will strengthen peace, security and cooperation among the countries of the region.

In terms of disarmament, the text calls on all States in the region that have not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and it encourages all States to promote the establishment of confidence-building measures and to promote candor and transparency.

The States in the region are also encouraged to do more to strengthen their cooperation in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, bearing in mind the relevant United Nations resolutions, as well as in combating organized crime, illegal arms transfersand the production and trafficking of drugs, which pose a threat to peace and stability.

Like at previous sessions, the sponsors of this draft resolution remain confident that it will have the valued support of all members of this Committee and that it will be adopted without being put to a vote.

The Chairman: I now, have more than four delegations wishing to introduce draft resolutions and draft decisions, and one delegation is requesting the right of reply. However, time is up, so I propose that we adjourn for the day.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

United Nations A/C.1/60/PV.14

General Assembly
Sixtieth session

Official Records

First Committee
14th meeting
Tuesday, 18 October 2005, 10 a.m.
New York

Chairman: Mr. Choi ..... (Republic of Korea)

The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

Agenda items 85 to 105 (*continued*)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman: This morning, before we being with our thematic discussion on the issue of disarmament machinery, I would like to give the floor to those delegations that were unable to introduce their draft resolutions and decisions yesterday, due to time constraints. I will then give the floor to those delegations that had wished to exercise their right of reply yesterday.

Mrs. Martinic (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): I am honoured to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.58, "Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms", on behalf of the 64 delegations mentioned in that document, along with those that have swelled the ranks of the sponsors since last Wednesday.

As will be recalled, Argentina's initiative in submitting this draft resolution is part of the effort to restore the dialogue that occurred on this issue at the 2000, 2001 and 2003 substantive sessions of the Disarmament Commission. We can state with satisfaction today that such dialogue has occurred this year, beginning with the 24 January meeting at which the Under-Secretary for Foreign Policy of the Argentine Republic, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán, together with the then-Chairman of the Hemisphere Security Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS), Ambassador Carmen Marina Gutiérrez of Nicaragua, and the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Abe, discussed resolution 59/92 and OAS experience with confidence-building measures.

Subsequently, on the sidelines of the Biennial Meeting of States on small arms, we had a meeting where we pursued the dialogue on this issue, with a variety of presentations organized by Ambassador Basile Ikouebe, Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Congo, with regard to the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. In addition, experts from Slovenia and Germany spoke of the experience gained by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. We also maintained contact with the other sponsors to jointly explore how to move forward with the implementation of resolution 59/92, and we took note of the fact that financial contributions had been made to set up the relevant database.

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.58, which my delegation is introducing today, reflects those developments and moves us closer to the objective of setting up an electronic database, storing information voluntarily submitted by States and assisting them, upon their request, in organizing workshops, seminars and the like.

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.

05-55687 (E)

We thus deem it necessary for this initiative to be strengthened. In the future, we will consider the possible biennialization of such draft resolutions. Argentina is grateful for all the expressions of support and hopes that the draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. Shamaa (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): It is a pleasure for me to submit, on behalf of the Group of Arab States, the draft resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", document A/C.1/60/L.6. This draft resolution reflects the concern of countries in the region — and indeed, that of the international community — regarding the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and by the existence of nuclear facilities that are not subject to the comprehensive safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This is a concern that has been expressed at successive Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The draft resolution emphasizes the need for all States concerned to take practical and urgent steps to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as well as the need for all States to become parties to the NPT and to comply with its provisions. The draft resolution calls upon Israel, as the only State in the region that has not yet become party to the NPT, to do so, and to place its nuclear facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards. In the draft resolution, the Assembly would request the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its next session on the implementation of these measures.

I should also like to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East", document A/C.1/60/L.3. Once again, Egypt is submitting a draft resolution on this item, as we have done for more than 25 years. The draft resolution urges the parties concerned to take practical steps required for the elimination of nuclear weapons in the Middle East region, as well as to place all nuclear facilities in the region under the comprehensive safeguards regime of the IAEA.

The draft resolution also calls on all States in the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

We hope that the draft resolution will be adopted by consensus, as similar texts have been every year in the past. We further call on Member States to support draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6, on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

Mr. Prasad (India): I have the honour, on behalf of the sponsors, to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.53, entitled "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament".

India first brought a draft resolution on this subject before the First Committee in 1989. Continued advances in information technology, advanced materials, biotechnology and space applications since then offer promising opportunities for the social and economic development of all countries. Access to these technologies is undoubtedly crucial for developing countries. This is recognized in several disarmament and arms control agreements, treaties and conventions.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the first multilateral disarmament agreement with a universal character eliminating a complete class of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), provides an example of a multilaterally negotiated, non-discriminatory and legal mechanism that addresses proliferation concerns about transfers without impeding the economic interests of States parties.

The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.53 want to make the Chemical Weapons Convention a model for other future agreements. India recognizes the dual-use character of many of the advances in science and technology. The potential for their use for both civilian and military applications is a legitimate cause for concern. However, discriminatory regimes deny developing countries access to these crucial technologies, even for peaceful developmental purposes.

The sponsors have consistently maintained that multilaterally negotiated and non-discriminatory agreements that are transparent and open to universal participation would be the best way to address proliferation concerns. The Non-Aligned Movement's Kuala Lumpur Summit Final Document, adopted in 2003, also supported this approach.

There is continuing need, more than ever before, to agree on an effective and transparent system of export control over technologies and materials that would achieve the objectives of non-proliferation in all its aspects, while at the same time ensuring access to these technologies for peaceful applications. This draft resolution encourages and supports such a process.

India, along with the other sponsors, hopes that this draft resolution will receive the widest possible support.

Mr. Jenie (Indonesia): I have the honour to introduce a number of draft resolutions and draft decisions on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) for consideration by the Committee. The submission of these texts reflects our efforts to tackle very important and relevant issues, particularly given the current international situation, in which it is urgent to achieve the political will necessary to advance the cause of disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects.

Moreover, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 59/95, on improving the effectiveness of methods of work of the First Committee, Member States are, inter alia, invited to consider the possibility of submitting draft decisions. In this spirit, at this year's session, the NAM is submitting two draft decisions, in addition to five draft resolutions, under cluster 6, "Other disarmament measures and international security", and cluster 7, "Disarmament machinery".

First, we are introducing draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.19, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace", under agenda item 89. Since the adoption of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, in 1971, the situation in the world, particularly in the Indian Ocean area, has undergone major changes. Today, in that region, a number of initiatives have been taken to bring about socio-economic development of the countries concerned on the basis of economic, technical and scientific cooperation. In this context, there is still ample room to develop measures to realize the objectives of the 1971 Declaration.

The second draft resolution we are introducing, under agenda item 97 (g), is contained in document A/C.1/60/L.15 and is entitled "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control". NAM considers that the continued sustainability of the global environment is an issue of utmost importance, especially for succeeding generations. We should collectively endeavour to ensure that necessary measures are taken to preserve and protect the environment, especially in the formulation and implementation of agreements concerning disarmament and arms control. We call upon all Member States to ensure the application of scientific and technological processes in the framework of international security, disarmament and other related fields, without detriment to the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development.

Our third draft resolution, submitted under agenda item 97 (h), and contained in document A/C.1/60/L.14, is entitled "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation". NAM believes strongly in multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as the only sustainable way to address disarmament and international security issues. NAM also believes that it is critical for the General Assembly to adopt such a draft resolution to reflect its continued convictions regarding the role of the United Nations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. NAM underscores that multilateralism is the core principle of negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope.

Fourthly, under agenda item 97 (i), we wish to introduce a draft decision entitled "Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament", contained in document A/C.1/60/L.17. It is the understanding of the Movement that resolution 59/71, which was adopted without a vote last year, has given a new mandate to the Open-ended Working Group on the fourth special session on disarmament (SSOD IV) to hold an organizational session in order to set the dates for its substantive sessions. After having consulted the Secretariat, I can say that the organizational session of the Open-ended Working Group is tentatively scheduled to be held on 20 January 2006. In addition, three substantive sessions have also been scheduled, totalling 15 meetings; these are to be endorsed at the organizational session. The first session will take place from 3 to 7 April 2006; the second session will take

place from 29 May to 2 June 2006, and the third will take place from 19 to 23 June 2006.

By resolution 59/71, budget and services have been allocated for the holding of the Open-ended Working Group meetings for next year. The report of the Group will be submitted prior to the conclusion of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, at the latest in August 2006. In that regard, NAM encourages all Member States to work closely and constructively to fully utilize the forthcoming substantive sessions of the Open-ended Working Group mandated to consider the objectives and agenda of SSOD IV. NAM believes that the convening of SSOD IV can set the future course of action and a balanced approach to reach a new consensus in arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and related international security matters, including a comprehensive review of the disarmament machinery.

Fifthly, with regard to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/60/L.16 entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development", submitted under agenda item 97 (n), NAM believes that the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development and the important role of security in that connection cannot be denied. NAM is concerned at increasing global military expenditure, which could otherwise be spent on development, poverty eradication and elimination of diseases, in particular in the developing countries. NAM reiterates the importance of exercising restraint in military expenditure, so that human and financial resources thus saved can be used for ongoing efforts to eradicate poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. In that connection, NAM welcomes the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (A/59/119) and its reappraisal of this significant issue in the current international context.

Sixthly, concerning the draft resolution entitled "United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament", submitted under agenda item 98 (b) and contained in document A/C.1/60/L.18, NAM emphasizes that the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament have been instrumental in promoting understanding and cooperation among States in their respective regions in the fields of peace, disarmament and development. By this draft resolution, the General Assembly would continue its appeal to all Member States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations, to make voluntary contributions to the centres in order to strengthen, facilitate and implement their programmes and activities.

Lastly, I wish to introduce a draft decision entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security", submitted under agenda item 105 and contained in document A/C.1/60/L.13. NAM reaffirms the importance of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1970, which, inter alia, emphasizes the need for the United Nations to exert continuous efforts for the strengthening of international peace and security.

In conclusion, the Non-Aligned Movement hopes that all delegations will be able to join us in extending their support to the five draft resolutions and two draft decisions that my delegation has just introduced.

Mr. Rivasseau (France) (*spoke in French*): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.39, entitled "Preventing the risk of radiological terrorism", on behalf of France and the other sponsors. The question of terrorism has become a major cause for concern within the multilateral disarmament community. In that connection, I would like to draw attention to our new draft resolution which is being submitted for the first time for adoption by the First Committee this year, concerning preventing the risk of radiological terrorism. Radiological terrorism is the threat of radioactive substances employed in civilian industry or medicine being used by terrorists to manufacture what are generally known as dirty bombs.

Strictly speaking, these are not weapons of mass destruction. For that reason, we are introducing this text under the cluster on international security. However, they are weapons of mass disruption. Why should we be spotlighting this subject? Quickly, here are some thoughts on that matter.

There is an genuine risk of radiological terrorism. Criminal groups have already succeeded in acquiring radioisotopes. In 1998, an attempt to use a dirty bomb was fortunately prevented. The consequences would be considerable, more in terms of panic than in numbers of victims. Time is required to reassure people and to decontaminate places that have been targeted. Used in a major city, either in the North or in the South, dirty bombs would make it possible for terrorists to

profoundly disrupt economic and social activity. Dirty bombs are easy to make. Radioisotopes are used in all kinds of equipment in medicine, oil prospecting, agriculture and university research. To the extent such equipment is not properly monitored, terrorists could easily get their hands on such material.

France is active in the realm of radioactive sources. We are convinced that they have a beneficial role to play in both economic and social development. But precisely because we take the view that the world needs those products in order to develop, we are also convinced that we must protect them from the terrorist threat and use them under circumstances assuring the greatest possible security.

Thus, in all forums where it is active, France has tried to draw the attention of its partners to the range of issues concerning nuclear terrorism: within the Group of Eight, the European Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. We also hope to do so here in the General Assembly.

A number of consensus agreements have been adopted in this realm, and we believe that the First Committee can do a useful job by drawing attention to those texts and the measures in them and by encouraging all States to draw inspiration from them. We hope, through this draft resolution, to contribute to the ongoing endeavour being made through two other draft texts before the First Committee: Nigeria's draft resolution on prohibition of the dumping of radioactive waste (A/C.1/60/L.9), and India's on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (A/C.1/60/L.5).

We therefore sought to craft a text that is complementary to the other two draft resolutions without repeating them. Since Nigeria's draft resolution covers radioactive material that has been abandoned and its transport abroad, we are focusing here on materials and sources currently in use, and on action to be taken by States on their own territory.

By the same token, since the Indian draft resolution deals with fissile nuclear material being used to manufacture nuclear bombs, we decided to focus on other radioactive material.

We have also taken care to focus on consensus texts, in particular those formulated by the IAEA and those drafted in the universal context of the United Nations, such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which encompasses non-fissile isotopes.

Furthermore, we were careful not to put forward ideas or language lacking consensus backing. This is thus a text with a clearly defined scope, but which we believe sends a message that will be useful for all States. Our wish is to build consensus on this text. We have already received suggestions from a number of countries, and we are going to work to take them into account.

We have also consulted with particular attention the States of the African Group, which is sponsoring the draft resolution on radioactive waste, and the delegation of India. In the days ahead, we expect to gather other ideas from delegations, further enhancing our draft resolution, in order to arrive at a consensus text.

The Chairman: I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who had asked yesterday to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. Ri Jang Gon (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I wish to respond to remarks made yesterday by the representative of the United States. As every member delegation knows, the United States delegate yesterday made a provocative remark aimed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as regards "non-compliance". The non-compliance referred to by the United States delegate is a vivid example of the selectivity and double standards pursued by the United States vis-à-vis nuclear issues. This is a United States political fabrication. It is a product of the hostile United States policy aimed at stifling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Non-existent non-compliance was used for political purposes to put pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is engaged in peaceful nuclear activities.

Let me take a moment to put some questions to the First Committee. Who made nuclear bombs first? Who used nuclear bombs first? Who continues to maintain a large nuclear arsenal and even spreads — I say, spreads — nuclear weapons outside its own borders? The answer is crystal clear: it is the United States.

Nonetheless, it talks loudly about non-proliferation and verification of selected countries.

What is the real purpose behind this? The real objective of the United States is to use its monopoly on nuclear weapons to dominate and dictate to others. It was none other than the United States that pursued us and pushed us systematically to acquire today's physical nuclear deterrence. The United States is the key country engaged in proliferation and should announce dismantlement of all its nuclear weapons within its borders and abroad, once and for all, before saying anything about non-proliferation. Then others will follow. The joint statement of the recent six-party talks clearly mentioned the obligation of the United States vis-à-vis the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

My delegation urges the United States to make a strategic and political decision to give up its deep-rooted, hostile policy and its nuclear threats against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to put that decision into action without further delay. Only then will the nuclear issue be resolved smoothly.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed with its thematic discussion on the subject of disarmament machinery. There is no guest speaker for today, and I shall therefore give the floor to members of the Committee who wish to make a statement on this subject.

Mr. Masood Khan (Pakistan): Disarmament machinery as it exists today is eminently suited to deal with matters of disarmament and international security. Political divisions are blocking forward movement on key issues. Current difficulties stem from relations between Member States, their priorities, preferred linkages between various issues and the prevalent security interests of States. The United Nations summit this year could not agree on language on disarmament and non-proliferation for inclusion in the outcome document (resolution 60/1), thus signalling the absence of consensus on these issues. The machinery and the "decalogue" fashioned by the first special session on disarmament do not seem to be holding well. Such a hiatus is bound to affect the working of the First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

The Conference on Disarmament is already going through a period of chronic impasse and the Disarmament Commission is in a state of paralysis. That leaves the First Committee. We must not forget that the General Assembly and the First Committee are political bodies representing sovereign States. If there is no direction at the strategic level, these bodies dealing with disarmament and non-proliferation issues are bound to suffer from varying degrees of inaction. When there is a serious deadlock at the political level, active delegations start wondering if there is something wrong with the procedures or the methods of work. First Committees Chairs are taking initiatives to rationalize the agenda and resolutions. Reform of the Committee methods, or the streamlining of the agenda or draft resolutions and their periodicity, must be based on a cogent, clearly stated mission statement.

The change we are seeking should be substantive, not cosmetic. The basic objective should be to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the First Committee. The question of the merger of draft resolutions or changing free-standing draft resolutions into omnibus texts should be left to the sponsors. If they do so voluntarily, well and good; otherwise they should be encouraged to make their draft resolutions sharper and more operative. Rationalization of the agenda should not be used to remove subjects of vital importance because some countries do not want to address them.

If the recommendations and resolutions presented year after year are not heeded, ways should be found to implement those resolutions more effectively. A resolution reflects aspirations of multiple sponsors and constituencies. When the simple device of a merger is used, the inherent thematic integrity of a draft resolution cannot be preserved unless sponsors have decided to rationalize the text through consultations. More rigour should go into implementing the resolutions than into looking at the size and shape of the paper.

Of course, delegations can try to refine the agenda and streamline draft resolutions. This requires a consultative process. Consultations can start during the First Committee sessions, but they will be more productive if they are undertaken during the intersessional period, either in New York or in Geneva.

It is increasingly difficult to justify a prolonged period of inactivity in the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference delegations act as a nucleus for other disarmament-related activities, but in the Conference itself, nothing much is happening. Despite this failure, it is important to ensure the continuity of the sole negotiating forum on disarmament. Three reasons come to mind: the Conference on Disarmament has

survived such periods of inactivity in the past, it still acts as a vehicle for exchange of views on security issues, and it is difficult to revive a forum once it has been partially or fully suspended. Exchanges of views are fine, but the Conference on Disarmament cannot hold town hall meetings. It is a negotiating, not a deliberative, forum. In order to fill the growing vacuum, all we can hope to do is to hold discussions that can create an enabling environment for negotiations and serve as a useful prelude. The differences on a programme of work are quintessentially political, not procedural. Six delegations this year gave what they called a wake-up call to the Conference. We understand their motivation and their disappointment. Our fear was that ad hoc parallel mechanisms could have hurt the Conference and disrupted the delicate balance between the four core issues.

The existing machinery includes treaty bodies, some of which are working fine. The International Atomic Energy Agency is strong and resilient. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has an impressive track record. There are institutional deficits in other weapons of mass destruction regimes, but conventional wisdom and empirical evidence suggest that multilateralism offers both longevity and legitimacy of such regimes. Secretary-General Kofi Annan rightly observed in his report "In larger freedom" (A/59/2005) that exclusive or non-institutionalized forums will not have legitimacy in the long run.

If we want to work towards a new consensus to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation or to revalidate the existing agreements, the disarmament machinery can deliver, provided we decide to use it. A new security consensus should take into account the need to address existing and emerging challenges to international and regional security. We can pursue that goal through the Conference on Disarmament or through a special session of the Disarmament Commission.

Mr. Landman (Netherlands): This year, the fundamental crisis in disarmament manifested itself across the broad spectrum of the disarmament machinery: no programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament; no programme of work in the United Nations Disarmament Commission; no final document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); and, most embarrassingly, no language at all on disarmament and non-proliferation in the outcome document (resolution 60/1) of the recent world summit.

Most of us will agree it is not a flaw in the disarmament machinery itself that is the origin of the coma-like situation we are experiencing in disarmament. It is also not the oft-cited political will that is lacking. The quasi-unison statements and the virtual convergence on the subject in the general debate speak for themselves. The initiative by six States to get the Conference on Disarmament back to work is, in any case, a clear reflection of a profound malaise.

It is not the fault of the machinery. Rather, progress on disarmament is hampered by States' inability to reach a joint security analysis. Earlier this year, Secretary-General Annan put his finger on the spot, when he said that "Collective security today depends on accepting that the threats which each region of the world perceives as most urgent are in fact equally so for all" (*A/59/2005, para. 79*), and that "In a world of interconnected threats and challenges, it is in each country's self-interest that all of them are addressed effectively" (*para. 18*). The Netherlands fully agrees with that line of thinking.

The courageous cross-regional initiative by Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden has indeed functioned as a wake-up call. For the Conference on Disarmament — which is entering its ninth year of stalemate on a simple programme of work — next year would be a most unwelcome jubilee of sorts if we do not succeed in having, at least, a meaningful and structured debate on the core issues at hand. We really do hope that the incoming Polish President of the Conference, together with the five Presidents that are to follow him, will enable us, through an agreed proposal, to get out of the present situation.

Clearly, our disarmament machinery can function when we want it to. It is not the machinery's fault that we are in the state we are in. That said, this does not free us from the obligation to explore ways of adapting that machinery, if we see a possibility to do so, which could help us to get out of the present impasse. Our forums must be optimally suited to effective discussions and negotiations. They must continue to allow for a balance between the sovereign rights and

security interests of all States and streamlined input from regional and cross-regional coalitions.

Moreover, the disarmament machinery cannot continue to function effectively without a modest further opening to the outside world. Here, I wish to refer to last year's report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations (A/58/817), chaired by former Brazilian President Cardoso. We see no reason for categorically excluding the Panel's recommendations as they relate to disarmament matters. The paralysis we are facing should be enough reason to take action.

For example, in the field of disarmament, as in other fields, the practice of holding interactive hearings between Member States and non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives with the relevant and necessary expertise on the issue on the agenda could be instituted prior to major events. In addition, a strengthened engagement of parliamentarians in disarmament matters would be beneficial to bridging what the Cardoso report recognized as a democracy deficit at the international level. Of course, the establishment of a trust fund to increase the participation of representatives of NGOs from developing countries, as announced by the Secretary-General, is an important part of those measures.

If United Nations reform turns out to be possible except for the disarmament machinery, then there must be something wrong in the way we operate. Over the past two years, we have made a modest beginning in improving the effectiveness of the First Committee's methods of work. The seminar on that subject organized by the Netherlands two weeks ago showed that most of the work still needs to be done. One point that was consistently made in that debate was that First Committee reform should not be dealt with in a vacuum. We could not agree more. Constant attention is required to keep the whole disarmament machinery well oiled and up to date. Let me stress that the Netherlands is committed to contributing further to this important debate.

Mr. Hu Xiaodi (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): In recent years, the multilateral arms control and disarmament process has continued to find itself in a stalemate. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has failed to conduct substantive work for almost a decade. For two years now, the United Nations Disarmament Commission has failed to agree on an agenda. The 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ended without substantive result. Finally, no consensus was reached on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation language for the outcome document of the 2005 United Nations summit (resolution 60/1).

Many countries are pondering the reasons for those negative developments. Many of them have asked what is wrong with the traditional multilateral arms control and disarmament process.

During the First Committee meetings last year, we had lively discussions on improving the Committee's working methods. Over the past year, in view of the difficulties besetting the traditional arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms, some countries came up with bold ideas for reform that they believe will be conducive to launching negotiations and achieving substantive work on important issues in this area. My delegation would like to share our views on these issues.

The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD I), held in 1978, established multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery within the United Nations framework: the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament were added to the First Committee.

For decades, important treaties and conventions, such as the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons have constituted the international legal framework of multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Multilateral organs closely related to those treaties, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as review mechanisms on the implementation of particular treaties, such as the NPT Review Conferences, have played important roles in the smooth implementation of these international legal instruments.

What needs to be emphasized is that, due to the authority and broad representativity of these traditional mechanisms, multilateral efforts conducted through them have never failed to receive the most extensive support from and participation by the international community. This is something that cannot be replaced by any other international mechanism.

Today, some countries have advocated that, in the face of the new international security situation, the international community and the relevant international mechanisms need to keep pace with the times, handle new issues and respond to new challenges. Many other countries have stressed the point that, since the agenda and objectives set forth by the first special session on disarmament (SSOD I) have yet to be fulfilled, they are not out of date and require continued efforts.

We believe that both arguments are credible. They reflect different aspects of reality. They should therefore be viewed as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive. Likewise, it is necessary to attain coherence in a wide spectrum of efforts on international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation and on addressing humanitarian concerns.

While advancing the traditional disarmament goals, it is important to seek new opportunities and respond to new challenges, thus comprehensively consolidating, strengthening and improving the current international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation machinery, which is pivotal for maintaining world peace, security and stability.

To promote the fair, rational, comprehensive and sound development of the international cause of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, the international community should follow the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and other universally recognized norms governing international relations. It should foster a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, enhance mutual trust through dialogue and promote common security through cooperation.

The right of all countries to equal participation in international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation affairs should be guaranteed, and the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation process should be promoted on the basis that the security of no country should be diminished.

Secondly, it is of vital importance to give full play to the role of the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. It is essential to respect the authority of the traditional multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation machinery and make full use of existing traditional mechanisms. It is on that premise that parties must discuss how to improve the efficiency of the relevant machinery.

Thirdly, it needs to be emphasized that political will is a precondition for diplomatic efforts. Multilateral diplomacy is no exception. Universal participation is the key to ensuring successful multilateral efforts. The multilateral process should be inclusive, not exclusive. Only by including all stakeholders will it be possible for parties to reach multilateral agreements that are genuinely universal and effective. It is thus necessary to continue to adhere to the principle of consensus in all substantive negotiations on international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. This will guarantee the fairness, equality, rationality and universality of international arrangements.

Fourthly, major reform of the traditional multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation machinery needs to be realized through the convening of a fourth special session on disarmament. Only SSOD IV and its preparatory process can provide Member States with opportunities to fully and substantively air their views on all issues related to reform and to reach a new consensus on the adjustment of multilateral mechanisms. It does not matter if consensus among all the parties cannot be reached quickly. The international discussion itself is a process for creating conditions for consensus. What is important is that all parties attach great importance to and fully use this process and make tireless efforts towards the goals I have described.

The Chinese delegation will continue to follow and take an active part in the multilateral discussions on these matters, and we will exert unswerving efforts to safeguard the traditional multilateral mechanisms within the United Nations system, to accelerate the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation process and to maintain world peace, security and stability.

Ms. Borsiin Bonnier (Sweden): It is a pleasure to take the floor under your chairmanship, Sir.

The rule of law is a fundamental principle in domestic affairs. The fact that some citizens might break the law does not make the law less important. The same goes for international affairs. The disarmament machinery has played a fundamental role in producing vital pieces of international law, and it has created mechanisms to monitor treaties and norms to ensure that they are being upheld. But lacunae remain both on the legal side and on the implementation side.

The disarmament machinery should be mobilized to fill those gaps.

It is disturbing to sometimes see a reluctance to be bound by international norms and agreements freely entered into and an unwillingness to enter into new binding agreements. This is particularly disturbing at a time when globalization makes weapons and weapon technologies more and more accessible and security problems more and more interconnected globally. Rejecting the use of the disarmament machinery to develop necessary rules and norms and to strengthen verification and compliance carries significant risks for the security of us all.

We need focused and concerted efforts to operationalize and implement existing commitments. Key words are compliance, implementation and verification. We need to feel confident that treaties and agreements entered into are not discarded. The recently concluded Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a case in point. And year after year the General Assembly adopts resolutions that are not implemented. Also, year after year, key disarmament issues are put on a programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament which is not adopted.

So we must ask ourselves what can be done to hold States accountable for non-implementation and for the present inertia in the disarmament machinery. Representatives of civil society clearly also have a role to play here.

Some say that the disarmament agenda is outdated and that we should bring in new issues. Perceptions, threats and challenges obviously change over time, and they will continue to do so. But the emergence of new dangers does not lighten the burden of dealing with the old ones, and addressing the old ones is no reason not to face up to the new ones.

The present debate on old versus new threats is, to my mind, a false debate, and the effect has largely been that neither is dealt with. Instead of fruitless debates in which some agenda priorities are pitched against others, we should open our minds — and the agendas — to all global security concerns, be they old or new.

It is a common phenomenon that when diplomats and bureaucrats fail on the substance, blame is put on the machinery and its procedures. We must not fall into that trap. The main difficulty is not the machinery itself. Actually, the machinery is nothing other than us. Of course we can always do some sound housekeeping to make it smoother and more effective. But the key problem is our inability to fully utilize the potential of all its parts. That goes for the General Assembly and its First Committee; it goes for the Disarmament Commission and for the Conference on Disarmament; and it goes for the various review processes connected to the body of international treaties.

We could also be a lot more flexible in utilizing the interrelationship and possible interaction between the various parts of the machinery and between different United Nations forums. That could take different forms. The handling of the issue of the weaponization of outer space, for example, would benefit from a better understanding of the work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Also, the potentials of the mechanisms and capabilities at the disposal of the Secretary-General and the Security Council could be far more systematically explored.

Those overriding aspects not withstanding, I believe that we need to reassess the way we work — our modus operandi — not as a substitute for substance but because some of the working modes from the cold war period have become counterproductive.

The present geographical groupings were established for election purposes. They still serve that purpose reasonably well. But during the cold war they were also used for position-taking in negotiating processes. Today, like-minded States and common interests are found in all groupings. The time has come for working much closer together across the geographical groupings. The New Agenda Coalition is one example. Recently, seven nations joined together to try to rally support for the inclusion of non-proliferation and disarmament in the summit outcome document (resolution 60/1). I believe that we will see more intercontinental groupings like those in the future, because they are needed.

A few weeks ago, here in the First Committee, another six countries, my own among them, took an initiative to try to break the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament. The simple idea was to use a well established mechanism of the General Assembly and unused funds allocated to the Conference to get some

work done until such a date when the Conference agrees on a programme of work. The time was not ripe and the idea was too unconventional for some. For the time being, it will be kept on the back burner while, hopefully, other creative alternatives will emerge while the Conference on Disarmament is given a ninth year to find an effective way forward.

We also need to reflect on how consensus rules are being applied. Is it reasonable that procedural vetoes can be systematically and routinely put into play to prevent substantive discussions from even beginning? For three out of four weeks, the NPT Review Conference was effectively blocked that way. For eight years, the Conference on Disarmament has similarly been stymied. Consensus requirements on substance, once the discussions or negotiations are under way, are quite another matter. The right to say no is absolutely legitimate and essential when national security matters are at stake, not the least for smaller nations outside defence alliances.

In conclusion, much could and should be done to make the disarmament machinery more effective. But in order to get out of the present stalemate and to meet the security challenges in an era of galloping globalization, we all need to approach our common multilateral system with an attitude of cooperation and compromise, of give and take, rather than of confrontations based on all or nothing, my way or no way. Business as usual — meaning no business at all — is simply not an option.

Mr. Meyer (Canada): The first rule of a good machine is that it performs well its intended task. Against that standard we have to acknowledge that the United Nations disarmament machinery is failing and is in need of an overhaul. For many, that was highlighted by the absence in the outcome document (resolution 60/1) of last month's United Nations summit of any reference to non-proliferation and disarmament matters. The current session of the First Committee provides an opportunity to discuss renewal of our global disarmament machinery.

Two key multilateral disarmament bodies, the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission, are currently not functioning as intended. The former has been unable to agree upon a programme of work, the latter on an agenda. Neither have in recent years undertaken the substantive work for which they are mandated and resourced.

The First Committee is also less effective than it could be, notwithstanding ongoing efforts to enhance the value of its work. Canada, like many other States, would like to see effective multilateralism being practised by the United Nations organs associated with disarmament matters, and in that light we need to promote a far better level of productivity than is currently the case.

The Conference on Disarmament, established in 1979 as a multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, is a vital mechanism for advancing the multilateral disarmament agenda. The Conference's failure to adopt a programme of work has not only inhibited the international community from advancing collective efforts to respond to serious threats to global peace and security but has also contributed to the current crisis of confidence in the multilateral non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament arena.

Like the Disarmament Commission, the Conference is blocked by differences of national priorities that, unresolved, make agreement on a comprehensive programme of work impossible. Whether one prefers to speak of linkage or respect for the concerns of others, it has long been evident that in that consensus-based body, an adoption of a programme of work will require action on the following four issues: a fissile material cut-off treaty, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances.

Canada is concerned about the negative implications for our own security, as well as for general security, of the Conference's nearly eight-year deadlock in agreeing on a programme of work. Owing to the importance of the Conference's priority issues, unless it is able to embark on substantive work soon, we must retain the option of taking up its subject matter elsewhere. While we remain very much committed to a Conference on Disarmament that is fulfilling its responsibilities, we will not resign ourselves to a dysfunctional Conference on Disarmament. I would refer colleagues to the statement in this regard made by my Foreign Minister to the Conference on Disarmament in March of this year (see CD/PV.978).

We have also taken note of the intentions of the next three Conference on Disarmament Presidents for 2006 to pursue an initiative aimed at commencing a structured discussion of core issues within the Conference that would be sustained throughout the year. We look forward to working with the representatives of Poland, the Republic of Korea and Romania and the other Presidents to advance their useful ideas, and we offer them our full support. We intend to work positively with all members of the Conference on Disarmament to realize our common objective of an effective and relevant Conference on Disarmament.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission, created in June 1978 by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, has shown the potential, over the years, to formulate consensus principles, guidelines and recommendations on a large number of subjects. When that deliberative body is able to work, its treatment of various problems in the field of disarmament can serve to guide multilateral efforts towards enhanced cooperation and more effective action.

However, the potential value of that body has been lost in recent years, as its members have been unable or unwilling to reach agreement on an agenda. While awaiting agreement on a formal agenda, which we hope will soon be forthcoming, we wonder if the Disarmament Commission could not take up the file of the convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD IV), on which a decade-long debate has failed to produce a common stance. In order to facilitate an eventual agreement on the convening of this fourth special session, it could be useful for the Disarmament Commission to take stock of what has been achieved and what remains to be done in realizing the goals set out by SSOD I, in 1978, and whether those goals might be revised.

The sixtieth session of the First Committee, on disarmament and international security, provides a timely opportunity to address the current crisis besetting our shared non-proliferation and disarmament regime. As the universal body dealing with non-proliferation and disarmament matters, the First Committee enables States not members of the Conference on Disarmament or of other restricted bodies to voice their views about the international security agenda.

We think it is desirable that the First Committee continue to give democratic expression to the hopes and expectations of the United Nations membership insofar as disarmament and international security are concerned. We are encouraged by the progress to date in utilizing this more political function of the First Committee and hope it will continue to be developed in the future.

Mr. Rapacki (Poland): As I am taking the floor for the first time during this session of the First Committee, please allow me, Mr. Chairman, to congratulate you on your election to your high office. My pleasure is even greater as Poland and the Republic of Korea are close partners on many important issues, including disarmament and non-proliferation.

The topic of today's thematic debate, disarmament machinery, is of very great interest to my delegation. Poland has traditionally been involved in the international community's efforts aimed at strengthening the disarmament machinery. My country is a State party to all disarmament treaties. Last year we announced that we would join the Mine Ban Treaty. We are party to all export control regimes. We are actively involved in developing new tools in non-proliferation and disarmament. The Proliferation Security Initiative, known as the Krakow Initiative, and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction are two excellent examples of our commitment to the goal of strengthening the disarmament machinery.

Having said that, let me reiterate that Poland has a very keen interest in the effective functioning of the United Nations disarmament machinery. We recognize that the disarmament machinery finds itself in a difficult situation. The inability of the Disarmament Commission to adopt its agenda and the lack of a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament are most evident examples. Failure of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to agree on a final document earlier this year and the omission of non-proliferation and disarmament from the outcome document (resolution 60/1) of the United Nations summit in September further exacerbate the worrisome picture. All those negative developments within the machinery do not contribute to resolving the complex challenges in non-proliferation and disarmament.

Therefore, we should not give up our efforts in increasing the effectiveness of the machinery which is at our disposal, by bringing certain bodies back to work on substantive issues. It was for this exact reason that the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, proposed that the Secretary-General establish a group of sages, which would work on comprehensive ways of generating political will and make it possible to break the stalemate in such important bodies as the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament.

We need effectively functioning disarmament machinery. That is why Poland supported last year's efforts to improve the method of work of the First Committee. Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba of Mexico, Chairman of the Committee at that time, has proven that we can find ways to revitalize the work of the machinery. Let me stress that, at this point, the ultimate success of revitalization efforts lies in the hands of delegations. It is up to us to make real efforts towards streamlining the work of the First Committee. It is also up to Member States to implement resolutions adopted on the Committee's recommendation.

On 1 January 2006, Poland will take over the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Together with all of next year's Presidents — the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Senegal and Slovakia — we have engaged in discussions on how to advance the work of the Conference throughout the 2006 session. We believe that the establishment of a common platform of cooperation between the session's Presidents can advance us closer towards long-awaited progress on substantive issues.

As is widely recognized, the problems of the Conference are of a political nature and can be overcome only by political decisions developed in capitals. It is my delegation's view that we should concentrate on discussing substantive issues. Only such discussion can bring us closer to understanding which topics are ready for negotiation. We will count on, and we look forward to, the cooperation of all Conference members in finding ways to get back to work.

We all share the same responsibility to advance work in the disarmament machinery, as we all face the same threats and challenges. I hope that, despite the worrisome setbacks in 2005, 2006 will be a year of positive developments in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Ms. Panckhurst (New Zealand): Many delegations have referred to the loss this year of two major opportunities to engage substantively on disarmament and non-proliferation — the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the United Nations summit — at a time when the international community is facing unprecedented challenges and when citizens are looking to their Governments to take action to pursue disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.

At the same time, the consensus rule is being misused to prevent even the initiation of informal discussions on those crucial issues in the United Nations body that is meant to address them, the Conference on Disarmament. New Zealand completely supports the need for the consensus rule when substantive negotiations on matters of national security are being held. We are frustrated, however, by its misuse on procedural issues to prevent the initiation of such work.

Against the backdrop of disappointment from the past year, to which most delegations have referred in their statements, there is a need to put forward concrete proposals in order to break the logjam in the Conference on Disarmament. Together with Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico and Sweden, New Zealand put forward one such proposal for initial consideration by Member States at this year's session of the First Committee. After discussion with other delegations, we agreed that it would be best not to submit the proposal formally at this year's session, in order to give more time for delegations to consider the ideas and to allow space and time for the incoming Conference on Disarmament Presidents to develop their plans. In that connection, we very much welcome the thoughts outlined by Poland.

However, New Zealand has been extremely heartened by the amount of interest shown in the initiative we put forward, even by those who opposed it. Among the most encouraging aspects were the rapidity of the response to the initiative, the level of political engagement and the concern shown for the ongoing welfare of the Conference on Disarmament. We hope to maintain that level of interest and engagement over the coming year and would be

delighted to discuss other ideas for getting the Conference back to work after eight sterile years.

Our objective is to see the Conference on Disarmament back in business, real business. And we are looking for assurances to that end from those who continue to frustrate all efforts to settle a work programme and who fail to put forward viable alternative proposals. We have been extremely patient, but that patience is wearing thin.

The First Committee is an ideal forum in which to discuss possible solutions to the Conference on Disarmament deadlock. Indeed, during the general debate, an overwhelming majority of States referred to their frustration over the untenable stagnation at the Conference on Disarmament.

It is in everyone's security interests that substantive negotiations on disarmament and arms control begin. If, as seems to be the case, that is not possible in the Conference on Disarmament at the current time, we will need to look for alternative ways to facilitate the discussion taking place.

Mr. Trezza (Italy): We welcome today's discussion on disarmament machinery, which is connected to the recent process of revitalizing and improving the effectiveness of the working methods of the First Committee. Our first concern should therefore be to ensure compliance with and implementation of resolution 59/95, adopted by consensus last year, the ink on which is still fresh. We commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your efforts to ensure respect for that resolution and for the discipline which you are maintaining in our proceedings.

Italy, as a member of the European Union (EU) and as the holder of its presidency two years ago, when the revitalization process was initiated, recalls the role played by the EU and notes that many EU proposals are reflected in resolution 59/95. We believe that at this stage the First Committee is the main functioning multilateral forum on disarmament and non-proliferation. Safeguarding and strengthening this body is therefore of paramount importance.

The discussion on disarmament machinery, however, exceeds the scope of improving the effectiveness of the First Committee. This is a broader and more complex issue. Is there a need to review the existing machinery? We did not receive any specific mandate on that issue from our leaders at the 2005 world summit. The outcome document (resolution 60/1) contains several recommendations for overhauling existing United Nations structures — for instance, the establishment of a Human Rights Council and a Peacebuilding Commission. But there are no recommendations on disarmament machinery. As a matter of fact, there are no indications whatsoever on weapons of mass destruction disarmament and non-proliferation.

We are among those who believe that the stalemate in which we find ourselves is a symptom of a political divergence on our main priorities. A multilateral compromise at this stage requires further efforts aimed at harmonizing those priorities.

I refer in particular to the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the task of finding an agreement on a programme of work belongs to the members of the Conference on Disarmament themselves, and that progress depends on the political will of member countries. The call by the Group of Eight leaders last July to resume substantive work at the Conference on Disarmament was a political message at the highest level. The importance of the Conference was reaffirmed in last year's Final Document of the fourteenth Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. Both those statements are meaningful expressions of political will, and we should build upon them. One of the best ways to foster a more focused political will is to encourage involvement in the Conference on Disarmament at the political level.

We are not ignoring other calls and suggestions made at the Conference on Disarmament, in the First Committee and as part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process to change or adjust the existing machinery. Nor have the more drastic calls for the suspension of some of our activities gone unheard. Although we understand the spirit that animates some of those proposals, we must address them with caution. We must avoid a situation in which the negotiating stalemate also provokes a paralysis in our deliberations and our dialogue. We cannot run the risk of losing the expertise and the relationships that have been established over many years.

Should the stalemate be prolonged, we do not exclude the option of reviewing the functioning of the existing machinery. However, that process should not be improvised but should follow the appropriate institutional procedures.

Mr. Rachmianto (Indonesia): The situation surrounding multilateral disarmament diplomacy and machinery is depressing. I share the view expressed by some preceding speakers that the latest Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons failed to agree on any substantive recommendations. The United Nations summit also failed to address the issue of disarmament and non-proliferation in its outcome document (resolution 60/1). The Conference on Disarmament has remained deadlocked, without a programme of work, for almost nine years.

We know all too well about the situation in Geneva, and we see how the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament seems to have affected other disarmament machinery, including the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The failure of the Conference on Disarmament to act on pertinent issues such as disarmament and non-proliferation is mainly attributable to the misinterpretation of its rule of consensus. Therefore, we are of the view that there is need to initiate multilateral work to advance the priority issues of disarmament and non-proliferation.

In that context, the Conference on Disarmament has been called upon, inter alia, to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and to commence negotiation on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament within a specified time frame, including on a nuclear weapons convention. In 1995, by the so-called Shannon mandate, the Conference on Disarmament was requested to start negotiation on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty in the context of an ad hoc committee. But since the Conference on Disarmament's programme of work has been held hostage for almost nine years, those mandates cannot be carried out.

To overcome that impasse, a proposal initiated by Mexico and a group of other countries to establish ad hoc committees to deal with the four issues to which Ambassador Paul Meyer has just referred is worthy of our attention. It is a good initiative and will allow Member States to contribute substantively on those important issues. It will also afford us the opportunity to move forward with discussion and deliberation that can set the legal, technical and political framework for substantive action on those four issues by the Conference, once it agrees to do so. We have to be open-minded and take a more constructive approach to any initiative that will move us forward, particularly initiatives aimed at revitalizing the disarmament machinery. A sceptical and negative approach will not help our efforts to address nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

As we have shown in the framework of the seven-nation ministerial declaration (A/60/415, annex) initiated by Norway, Indonesia will continue to support any initiative designed to jumpstart work in the Conference on Disarmament, including Mexico's initiative. We look forward to working together to further that initiative under future presidencies of the Conference.

Allow me also to touch upon issues related to a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD IV). For quite some time now an overwhelming majority of Member States — if not all — have supported General Assembly resolutions on the convening of SSOD IV. As we are aware, the only consensus document to come out of that process is the Final Document of SSOD I, adopted in 1978 (resolution S-10/2). Since that time, a number of international conferences and General Assembly special sessions on issues of global concern — such as HIV/AIDS and the situation of women — have been convened and took decisions that paved the way for multilateral solutions. Unfortunately, disarmament has yet to find its place in a similar ongoing process. Yet the Final Document of SSOD I clearly stated that nuclear disarmament and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction remain the highest priority and the principal task of our time.

Some time ago, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Secretary-General warned us of rust in the disarmament machinery. New threats to international security have also accelerated the need for concerted multilateral efforts to bridge existing differences on key issues on the disarmament agenda. In our view the convening of SSOD IV is the only viable alternative for our collective efforts. It would offer invaluable opportunities for multilateral deliberation, not only on the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agendas, but also to review the disarmament machinery. In the end, it holds enormous potential to promote the achievement of our disarmament goals. In that regard, a road map has been provided by the consensus resolutions 57/61 and 59/71, which mandated the establishment of an Open-ended Working Group to consider the objectives and agenda for SSOD IV. Although no consensus was reached in

the Group's 2003 session, its meetings have clarified the issues involved, which will be useful for our future endeavours. It is therefore important to fully utilize the substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group on SSOD IV in spring 2006 to promote the return of disarmament and non-proliferation to the international community's agenda.

Mr. Langeland (Norway): We consider the First Committee to be an important part of the multilateral disarmament machinery. Further steps to revitalize this body will therefore continue to be an important objective on our disarmament agenda.

We have already made some progress in our efforts to improve the working methods of the Committee. The general debate this year has been more focused than previously. Our thematic debates have been more interactive and more interesting. Our discussion on the small arms draft resolution last week clearly benefited from a more open-ended exchange of views rather than closed consultations. The contribution by external experts has brought broader perspectives to our deliberations. We welcome the presence of non-governmental organizations; they have a vital role to play in ensuring the awareness and support of civil society and opinion makers.

Nevertheless, challenges remain. The Committee still has to take action on up to 60 draft resolutions and draft decisions. Some of them are repetitive. On the other hand, it is encouraging that more and more sponsors are choosing to biennials or triennials their draft resolutions.

Although overall we have seen some progress in improving the working methods of the First Committee, we are still struggling in other parts of the disarmament machinery. It is high time to set a new course for multilateral arms control diplomacy and forge a new consensus. It is feasible. The cross-regional initiative that Norway took prior to the United Nations summit in September demonstrates that it is possible for countries of various regions and with different arms control perspectives to set aside past differences in order to find common ground.

Let the interest of consensus guide us in our quest to respond to our most profound security challenges: proliferation and the actual use of weapons of mass destruction. We need a multilateral response to that threat. It is imperative for us to redouble our efforts to get the Conference on Disarmament back to work. In that respect, it is very encouraging to listen to the incoming Polish President of the Conference. A commencement of the work in the Conference on Disarmament would be a tremendous contribution to our efforts to consolidate and further strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The United Nations Disarmament Commission remains a great disappointment. While we salute the constructive efforts of the outgoing Chairman of the Commission, we need to ask ourselves whether the Commission is serving its purpose. The Commission is a deliberative body under the General Assembly, but for several years it has been unable to produce any agreed recommendations. If that continues, the Commission will lose much of its credibility. We need to ask critical questions on the Commission's format and consider alternative ways of conducting its business.

We are soon to enter the preparatory phase for the 2006 review conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We have an opportunity to show that multilateralism is working. We must strive to reach agreement on credible measures to ensure that all States parties are complying with their obligations.

We must also build on the progress made on the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Convention contains clear, legally binding commitments, as well as provisions to ensure compliance.

We need progress on multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Therefore, we reiterate our call for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We also urgently need a multilateral and legally binding treaty banning the production of fissile materials. We must start negotiations as soon as possible.

Mr. Rivasseau (France) (*spoke in French*): Like its European Union partners, France too is concerned by the difficulties now facing the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation machinery. Those difficulties have manifested themselves in diverse forums — the Conference on Disarmament and the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the United Nations Disarmament Commission — and in the failure of the recent world summit to agree on disarmament and non-proliferation language for inclusion in the outcome document.

For more than two years now, my country has devoted particular attention to efforts to jumpstart work in the Conference on Disarmament, to increase its level of activity and to enable it to respond to the challenges it faces. In particular, we have suggested that it would be good for the Conference on Disarmament to consider not only its traditional agenda items — such as a fissile material cut-off treaty, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances, among others — but also to try and respond to the challenges of today, challenges that have emerged only recently.

That is why some people have sought to sum up this approach using the terms "new issues" and "out-of-the-box issues". We developed this approach on the sidelines of the Conference on Disarmament in an informal, cross-cutting way, calling upon all groups to make inputs. Today, more than half of the members of the Conference, coming in fairly balanced proportions from various regions, have evinced their interest in this approach and their support in principle.

I was delighted in that context, for example, to hear the representative of Indonesia advocate for a Conference on Disarmament work programme embracing not only disarmament but also non-proliferation. We have also sought in this approach to retain the principle of consensus, for we know that this is an obligation in the Conference on Disarmament.

When we talk about such new approaches, we are not trying merely to identify new issues. We are trying also to come up with new working methods, based on the idea that the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament — and when I say the presidency I have in mind not a single President but all the successive Presidents — must make full use of all the resources already available to them under the Conference rules of procedure.

That is how we can limit what certain delegations are calling — as I see it, improperly — abuse of the principle of consensus. The truth is that there is not so much an abuse of that principle as there is an inadequate and weak use of the President's powers. We consider that through this approach we will be able to respond intelligently to the frustrations voiced, for example, in the statement made earlier by the representative of New Zealand.

Indeed, if we look back, in the past it was the President of the Conference who decided on the work programme. But of course he did not himself decide on the negotiating mandate. So, as we see it, there is some scope that is not being used, but which ought to be.

I should like to say as well that I have heard many very pessimistic remarks. We do not want to be pessimistic; we want to be realistic. Realism tells us that for two years we have been making small advances. They are small, but real. With Kenya, then Mexico providing the impetus, we succeeded two years ago in launching informal talks with a view to negotiating all items on the agenda, including the new issues. Two years ago that remained an informal discussion, but the consensus resolution we adopted two years ago reflected those advances.

This year we succeeded in making further strides, spurred along by a number of Presidents, including those from the Netherlands and Norway, as well as from New Zealand and elsewhere. This time, we managed to begin discussions in formal plenary meeting and in a somewhat more focused way: this time we discussed the principal subjects of interest for the Conference on Disarmament, namely, the fissile material cut-off, nuclear disarmament, negative security guarantees and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We also discussed new issues, on the basis of existing proposals. This year's report of the Conference on Disarmament (A/60/27) also reflects this situation.

We have sown the seeds for two years, and we hope that 2006 will see our first harvest, even if it is a modest one. In that regard, for the past several months, France has been lending its support to the efforts of future Presidents, in particular to those of Poland, which will have the difficult task of being the first to take the reins next year to move the Conference on Disarmament forward. And I would like here to reaffirm my support for the presidency, whose efforts, as I see it, can enable us to move forward in a way that will not harm the interests of the international community as a whole.

In our national capacity — and, I hope, together with the European Union, should it agree on a common position on the Conference on Disarmament, as we would wish — we will be prepared to work together with anyone who, in good faith, wants to make progress along these lines.

Mr. De Alba (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like to make some somewhat disorganized and

provocative comments to see if we might not make a bit more progress. I think that a number of common denominators have emerged this morning, as have some exceptions to those common denominators. The first, I venture to say, is that we agree that the situation is not acceptable, that it is a bad one for the disarmament machinery as a whole. I do not think a single speaker has defended the current situation.

So the question is, if the machinery is not working, why is it not working? Is it an institutional problem, a problem of political will or a problem of misusing the machinery? I want to stress that last point: I think the real problem lies in the misuse of the machinery, not in the machinery itself. I think we can reach a good degree of convergence. The representative of France made that point in his statement a moment ago. In the Conference on Disarmament, there are possibilities for action by the President or by delegations that have not been fully exploited. We continue to see demonstrably inefficient practices and inertia, and we keep on repeating them. I think that is the first conclusion that emerges from this debate. The status quo does not need to be; there is scope for action within the existing machinery.

This does not mean that the First Committee does not have a greater responsibility than the other parts of the machinery. That lends legitimacy to this morning's discussion to our adoption of appeals and proposals to break through the inertia in the other forums.

That is why I want to draw attention not just to the issues already mentioned: the lack of progress made in the review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the lack of agreement on an agenda for the Commission on Disarmament and of course the very shameful preparatory process for September's meeting of heads of State or Government. I think we also have to look around at other mechanisms that are having problems. We have a Group of Governmental Experts on information and telecommunications that was unable to submit a report.

We have the Group of Governmental Experts on marking and tracing, which forced a late-night consensus now openly questioned by many of us. We have an Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that is not being fully utilized and whose requests are not being adequately heeded. We have a preparatory process for a fourth special session on disarmament that is experiencing enormous problems. We have an initiative to convene a conference on eliminating nuclear dangers, rightly adopted by consensus in the Millennium Declaration (resolution 55/2). All of today's defenders of consensus oppose the holding of such a conference, despite the fact that they approved it in 2000 and it still has not been held. Incidentally, the initiative was introduced by the Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan.

The problem is a bit more far-reaching than what we now want to see, and, again, the Committee has the obligation to begin to jointly seek alternatives that will enable us to move forward. I believe — and I think it was the representative of Pakistan, Mr. Khan, who proposed this earlier — that it might be worthwhile for the Chairman to hold informal consultations on how to promote this vision of the First Committee as an adjunct to other forums.

In any event, I should like to return to the initiative promoted by six nations, including Mexico, to bring some issues to the attention of the First Committee through the establishment of ad hoc committees. I believe that that is an option that deserves more serious analysis and discussion, and therefore I should like to devote a few minutes to discussing it.

First, I wish to recognize those delegations that have expressed sympathy and support and some — in this case, the delegation of Italy — that have expressed doubts, which I also thank for their comments. I believe what is most serious is a lack of comments; what is most serious is that delegations do not even come to the consultations in which the issues are discussed. I believe that the democratic spirit that inspires this House must be preserved under all circumstances and that we must be able to discuss the merits and problems of any initiative.

In that connection, I thank all those who have been interested and committed and have not necessarily blindly supported the initiative. I believe that it will have to be in sort of stasis, to the extent that we have agreed to give our full support to the Presidents of the Disarmament Commission to make one last attempt. But I want to stress that it is a final attempt, because otherwise I believe we would have to return here with the initiative next year and resolve a matter that has already taken up too much time.

We have already addressed the problem of consensus on other occasions, with a certain spirit of

calm. Here, I merely wish to reiterate that I would respond to the argument that some seek to impose the majority view through the vote by saying that we are very tired of having the minority view imposed on us through consensus. I believe that the majority — the vast majority — has the right to express itself and to promote the items it considers fundamental to its interests, and the First Committee is the only body that will permit that. I believe it is also very important that we resolve these differences between old and new items, between packages and non-packages. I believe that all of those have been the result, quite rightly, of the dialogue process that has begun. In the most recent cases — as the representatives of China and Sweden pointed out — they are complementary visions that we could share at some point. In other words, I believe that if we took stock of what has been discussed today, we could pick out some issues on which there is a degree of consensus — that being understood as the building of a common vision, which will require some time, and not as the impossibility of even discussing the problems besetting us because one or two countries are opposed to it.

Therefore, I reiterate my request that this dialogue move forward. The Chairman may have some substantive role in this process. Perhaps it need not be reflected in written form at this point, but at least let the First Committee — as the Committee that has pursued the revitalization effort — deal with substantive issues.

Mr. Calderón (Peru) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, I express to you, Mr. Chairman, my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you leading the Committee's discussions. We are certain that your wisdom and tact will ensure the success of our work. I should also like, through you, to express to the Pakistan delegation Peru's grief, sympathy and solidarity with regard to the people of Pakistan, who have endured a terrible natural disaster. We trust that the will to live and a fighting spirit will restore to the victims' families the peace that they deserve.

We are discussing the theme "Disarmament machinery". The first realization emerging from this discussion is that that machinery is either rusted or broken. Several previous speakers have made a pessimistic diagnosis of the situation. Naturally, such a diagnosis is a cause for concern.

The fact that the disarmament machinery is in a state of paralysis is not in itself unexpected. Rather, it is the result of a fundamental change in the international situation. When the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature, five Powers were specifically addressed in it. Now we have a new and different situation. In the interval, covert proliferation has occurred, and that naturally has a regional impact. We could say the same with regard to biological weapons. If we recall what happened in the autumn of 2001, after the reprehensible attacks on the towers in New York, the suspicious dissemination of anthrax reflected know-how and mechanisms to spread it and cause harm. And we could continue to talk about other areas in which the arms race, far from stopping, is paradoxically maintaining a brisk pace.

Although it is true that the two major Powers have made bilateral efforts at nuclear arms reduction, we lack transparent international control of the fissionable materials used to produce such weapons.

Beyond that, there are new and extremely dangerous threats, such as terrorism linked to the proliferation of radiological and other types of weapons. In other words, the manner in which the member States of the international community perceive security is changing, because the scenario is a dangerous one. That is reflected in States' interests and priorities and, naturally, in the problems facing them in their attempts to negotiate disarmament or arms control issues.

That is why no one can be pleased that paralysis is affecting both the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament. It is to be hoped that results will be achieved in 2006 with respect to beginning negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. The six-country initiative is not only timely but understandable. We cannot stand by idly and let time pass given the changing security conditions, the increasing problems and the continued scourge of the arms race.

Peru repeatedly has undertaken commitments in favour of peace and of the maintenance of international peace and security by signing all treaties related to arms and disarmament. We believe that it is high time for the international community to address specific disarmament agenda items in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Such issues may not

necessarily involve disarmament directly, but, at the very least, a positive signal needs to be sent to the international community in that regard. It is worth our while to make further efforts next year. Let us not forget that time is passing quickly.

The Chairman: I shall now call on delegations wishing to introduce draft resolutions.

Mr. Masood Khan (Pakistan): I am taking the floor to introduce two draft resolutions on regional disarmament and on conventional arms control, contained, respectively, in documents A/C.1/60/L.23 and A/C.1/60/L.44.

First, I turn to the draft resolution on regional disarmament, which I am presenting on behalf of the delegations of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Turkey and on behalf of my own delegation, Pakistan.

In order to ensure global security and disarmament, it is imperative to pursue efforts at both the international and regional levels. International disarmament measures are unquestionably of vital importance. However, security and disarmament can be promoted most effectively at the regional level. To direct our endeavour, we have the requisite guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security adopted by the Disarmament Commission in 1993.

Regional measures are the building blocks for international security. These guidelines remain relevant in the present day for the promotion of regional disarmament in both the conventional and non-conventional fields.

It is now quite evident that in most of the areas of tension and potential conflict — the Middle East, South Asia, North-East Asia and Central Asia — the regional approach could offer a most effective basis to promote disarmament and thus enhance security. The draft resolution notes the recent proposals for disarmament at the regional and subregional levels. It expresses the conviction that endeavours to promote regional disarmament enhance the security of all States.

These endeavours take into account the specific characteristics of each region and the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments. In order to achieve those objectives, we need sustained efforts. The draft resolution stresses that point. It also affirms that regional approaches to disarmament complement one another, calls on States to conclude agreements wherever possible, welcomes the initiatives towards disarmament, non-proliferation and security undertaken by some countries at the regional and subregional levels, and supports and encourages confidence-building measures.

We believe that the adoption of this draft resolution should encourage the countries concerned to step up endeavours aimed at regional disarmament. Its adoption should also help to strengthen regional and international security. The sponsors and my delegation hope that, as in the past year, the draft resolution will be adopted without a vote.

I should now like to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/60/L.44, entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels", on behalf of the delegations of Bangladesh, Belarus, Germany, Italy, Liberia, Nepal, Peru, Spain, Ukraine and on behalf of my own delegation.

This draft resolution aims to promote disarmament endeavours in the area of conventional disarmament at the regional and subregional levels. Though evidently important, this issue has not received the attention and support it deserves. We need a sharp focus on conventional balance and arms control.

In its preamble, the draft resolution outlines several principles and precepts. These include the crucial role of arms control in peace and security; the threats to peace in the post-cold-war era arising mainly among States located in the same region or subregion; the preservation of a balance in the defence capabilities of States at the lowest level of armaments contributing to peace and stability; the objective of agreements to strengthen peace and security at the lowest possible level of disarmament and military forces; the special responsibility of the militarily significant States and States with larger military capabilities in promoting such agreements for regional peace and security; and the objective to prevent the possibility of military attack launched by surprise and to avoid aggression.

The preamble of the draft resolution also notes with particular interest the initiatives taken in various regions, including a number of Latin American countries, the proposals for conventional arms control in South Asia, and recognizes the relevance and value of the Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) Treaty in

Europe, which is described as a cornerstone of European security.

The operative part of the draft resolution, while deciding to give urgent consideration to the issue of conventional disarmament at the regional and subregional levels, requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider formulating principles that can serve as the framework for regional agreements. It also requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States and submit a report to the General Assembly at its next session.

The sponsors look forward to the Committee's strong support for this draft resolution.

Mr. Calderón (Peru) (*spoke in Spanish*): I should like to introduce the draft resolution on the report of the Conference on Disarmament, contained in document A/C.1/60/L.20. This draft resolution, in its structure and content, builds on resolutions adopted in past years on the same item, which, as representatives will recall, were adopted without a vote.

The draft resolution takes note of the work done by the Conference on Disarmament in 2005, in particular recognizing the importance of the presence of a number of ministers for foreign affairs which reflected the political support of their countries for the work of the Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.

In its operative part the draft resolution further contains an indication on how to move forward in 2006. In particular, let me cite paragraph 4, which welcomes the decision of the Conference to request its current President and the incoming President to conduct consultations during the intersessional period and, if possible, to make recommendations taking into account all relevant proposals, including those submitted as documents of the Conference, views presented and discussions held, and to endeavour to keep the membership of the Conference informed of their consultations.

Paragraph 5 requests States members of the Conference to cooperate with the current President and successive Presidents in their efforts to guide the Conference to the early commencement of substantive work in its 2006 session.

In introducing the draft resolution, I would like to emphasize the determination of the presidency to pursue consultations, jointly with the incoming President of the Conference, Ambassador Rapacki of Poland, with a view to finding ways to rally consensus among Conference members, so that this unique multilateral negotiating forum can commence its work without any further delay.

Before concluding, Sir, I would like to express the appreciation of the Conference presidency for the cooperation and spirit of flexibility shown by all delegations in Geneva, which made possible the timely adoption of the final report of the Conference on Disarmament (A/60/27). I am certain that in 2006, the shared determination of all States will make it possible for the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its mandate: to negotiate. It is my wish that draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.20 will be adopted without a vote.

Mrs. Martinic (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): It is an honour for me, on behalf of the 33 countries members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.21, entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean".

The countries members of the Group would like to place on record our full satisfaction with the work done by the Lima Centre, as reflected in the report of the Secretary-General (A/60/132). Thus, we would like publicly to congratulate the Director of the Regional Centre, Mr. Péricles Gasparini Alves, and his team on their outstanding leadership, commitment, dedication and enthusiasm, which have made the Centre an example to be emulated.

At the same time, we cannot fail to express our thanks to those countries that have given financial backing to the Lima Centre. Without their help it would not have been possible to launch important initiatives concerning arms destruction, management of arsenals, training courses, guidance on the submission of reports and the devising of methodologies, to mention only a few.

The countries members of our Group acknowledge that the Lima Centre can cooperate and help other regional centres also to have efficient management and attain the same level of performance. At the same time, however, we strongly urge the Centre remain completely independent; we will closely follow any discussions or initiatives in that regard.

To sum up, as we see it, the draft resolution that we are putting forward for consideration would recognize the work of the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, and would encourage it to continue its work. Our countries enthusiastically promote its endeavours. We hope that the rest of the international community will continue supporting us in our efforts to attain our region's goals for peace, disarmament and development. It is our desire that, as with similar texts in past years, the draft resolution can be adopted by consensus.

The Chairman: Tomorrow, in accordance with our programme of work, we shall proceed with an informal interactive exchange with the President of the Conference on Disarmament and the Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The Committee will also have time tomorrow to discuss the follow-up of resolutions and decisions adopted by the Committee at its previous session, together with the presentation of reports. If time permits, delegations may also continue introducing draft resolutions and decisions.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.



United Nations A/C.1/60/PV.15

General Assembly
Sixtieth session

Official Records

First Committee
15th meeting
Wednesday, 19 October 2005, 10 a.m.
New York

Chairman: Mr. Choi ..... (Republic of Korea)

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Agenda items 85 to 105 (*continued*)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and the introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman: This morning, as part of the second stage of its work, the Committee will have an interactive discussion with the President of the Conference on Disarmament and the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, whom I have invited to be our guest speakers for today. We will then move on to the follow-up of draft resolutions and draft decisions adopted by the Committee at its previous sessions, including the presentation of reports.

After our informal discussions I will resume the formal meeting in order to invite delegations to continue to introduce draft resolutions and draft decisions.

The meeting was suspended at 10.10 a.m. and resumed at 12 noon.

Mr. Rivasseau (France) (*spoke in French*): We believe that the international community should be able to benefit from the fruits of independent and thorough research on security issues and the prospect of disarmament and non-proliferation.

With that firm conviction, France has introduced the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/60/L.2 on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). I now have the honour of officially introducing that draft resolution before the Committee.

The work of UNIDIR constitutes a particularly relevant contribution to the consideration and the analysis of international security issues in the current situation. As a result of its topical relevance and excellent quality, the Institute's work is of great importance and benefit to all.

We believe that it is essential that the Institute be able to pursue independent research on disarmament and security issues, as well as specialized studies requiring a high degree of expertise. But that depends on UNIDIR receiving sufficient resources to successfully carry out that work.

That is why the draft resolution introduced on behalf of France and some 50 other sponsors, whom I particularly thank, calls on Member States, which provide UNIDIR's budget, to continue to make voluntary contributions to enable the Institute to pursue its mission. More generally, the draft resolution gives us an opportunity to express our satisfaction to UNIDIR and to reaffirm our confidence in it and assure it of our support.

Traditionally, we adopt the draft resolution on UNIDIR on a consensus basis. We hope that this continues to be the case. Thus, we invite all Member States to support and sponsor the draft resolution.

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.

05-55942 (E)

Today, it is important to recall that UNIDIR continues to be part of the international community's efforts in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, which enjoy the support of all Member States.

Mr. De Alba (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): On behalf of the delegations of Andorra, Australia, China, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, South Africa, Zambia and our own delegation, I would like to introduce the revised draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.26/Rev.1, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", which aims to promote the early entry into force of that international instrument.

This year, the sponsors would like to stress the agreements and the action measures that were adopted during the fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was held recently here at Headquarters.

Compared to last year's resolution, the current draft resolution contains changes and updates. The only new paragraph is the last preambular paragraph, where we welcome the final declaration of the fourth Conference.

We should point out that the draft resolution is an important call by the international community for the early entry into force of the CTBT, a key instrument in the disarmament agenda, as well as for non-nuclear proliferation. The draft resolution reaffirms the importance of the CTBT in the global system of nuclear non-proliferation.

Everyone knows that the CTBT is designed to become a very valuable instrument to prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms, and is key to the future viability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has a fundamental role to play in preventing nuclear proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, and the production of new arms. The draft resolution also reaffirms the role of the CTBT as a reliable global monitoring mechanism aimed at building confidence in the international community.

Lastly, Sir, I would like to point out that the draft resolution reflects positions of principle on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation to the effect that the countries that have taken part in the negotiations from the beginning of the CTBT will not rest until they see the Treaty's entry into force.

Mr. Acharya (Nepal): My delegation has the honour to introduce a draft resolution under agenda item 98 (d), entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific", contained in document A/C.1/60/L.32/Rev.1.

The sponsors of the draft resolution are Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, New Zealand, Pakistan, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam, along with the host country Nepal. My delegation expresses its sincere gratitude to all the sponsors and those delegations that were sponsors of the text.

At a time when disarmament and non-proliferation regimes are in disarray, we firmly believe that regional centres for peace and disarmament can make a significant contribution towards promoting a global disarmament campaign, by constructive dialogue for the enhancement of openness, transparency and confidence-building at regional and subregional levels. My delegation sincerely believes that continued dialogue and interaction — not only at the governmental level, but also at the civil society level — is important for creating a conducive environment with greater understanding for global disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Regional centres for peace and disarmament can be effective instruments for realizing that noble objective, by fostering dialogue, advocacy and cooperation.

As the host to the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, Nepal is committed to the enhanced and constructive role of the Centre in our region by consolidating the Kathmandu Process, so as to contribute to peace and disarmament in the region. It is our firm conviction that the relocation of the Centre from United Nations Headquarters — where it is currently carrying out its activities — to the place closely identified to its mission, will give added impetus and momentum to its activities.

With that in mind, Nepal has taken the initiative since 1998 to relocate the Centre to Kathmandu from New York, by introducing a resolution with a view to

expediting the relocation process. His Majesty's Government of Nepal has demonstrated flexibility and has shown its eagerness to sign the host country agreement by accommodating the concerns of the Secretariat. In doing so, my Government has already expressed its readiness to bear the operating costs of the Centre and to accord the appropriate privileges and immunities to the personnel of the Centre, in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946.

My delegation strongly reiterates Nepal's desire to relocate the Centre to Kathmandu and to make it operational during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. We call upon the Secretariat to conclude the Agreement as soon as possible.

By introducing the draft resolution, we have made some factual and technical updates, while most paragraphs of the draft resolution remain unchanged from previous years.

My delegation urges the Committee to adopt the draft resolution by consensus, as in previous years, including the amendments in preambular paragraph 7 submitted yesterday.

The Chairman: Before adjourning, I wish to inform members that a paper grouping the draft resolutions in the agreed "semi-clusters" contained in document A/C.1/60/CRP.3, was circulated this morning to all delegations.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

United Nations A/C.1/60/PV.16

General Assembly
Sixtieth session

Official Records

First Committee
16th meeting
Thursday, 20 October 2005, 10.15 a.m.
New York

Chairman Mr. Choi Young-jin ..... (Republic of Korea)

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Agenda items 85 to 105 (*continued*)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and the introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman: The Committee will now have interactive discussions.

The meeting was suspended at 10.20 a.m. and resumed at 12.10 p.m.

The Chairman: I now call on delegations wishing to introduce draft resolutions.

Mr. Masood Khan (Pakistan): I am taking the floor to introduce two draft resolutions.

The first draft resolution, which is contained in document A/C.1/60/L.45, is entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and is co-sponsored by Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Malawi, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Viet Nam, Zambia and my own delegation.

The provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States is an obligation that arises from the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter obligates Member States not to use, or threaten to use, force. That obligation extends to the non-use, and non-threat of use, of any weapons, including nuclear weapons. Indeed, that fact was underlined by the resolution of the General Assembly adopted at its first session that declared the intention to outlaw nuclear weapons.

The demand for security assurances was raised by non-nuclear-weapon States in the 1960s, and it crystallized in 1968 during the concluding phase of the negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The response of nuclear-weapon States, reflected in Security Council resolution 255 (1968), was considered inadequate by non-nuclear-weapon States. At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-I), agreement was reached for the conclusion of an international instrument that would provide binding and credible negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. However, the declarations made by four of the five nuclear-weapon States at SSOD-I, and later at the NPT Review and Extension Conference and reflected in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), were also considered insufficient, qualified and partial by most non-nuclear-weapon States.

At the end of the cold war there was a general expectation that it would be come easier for nuclear-weapon States to extend nuclear security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Unfortunately, the situation, instead of easing, has become more complex. That is so for several reasons.

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05-56096 (E)

First, with the indefinite extension of the NPT, most nuclear-weapon States have presumed the permanent right to retain nuclear weapons.

Secondly, the commitment contained in article VI of the NPT for complete nuclear disarmament has remained open-ended, even after the widely welcomed commitment at the 2000 NPT Review Conference for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, the NPT Review Conference and the September summit both evaded addressing the issues of disarmament, non-proliferation and negative security assurances.

Fourthly, the geographical scope for the use of nuclear weapons has also expanded with the expansion of nuclear alliances and the operationalization of provisions for sharing nuclear weapons and command and control among alliance members.

Fifthly, one major nuclear-weapon State that formally adhered to the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons has now disavowed that principle and adopted the posture of first-use of nuclear weapons.

Sixthly, new doctrines of possible use of nuclear weapons, contrary to Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995), have been propounded, involving, for example, the use of nuclear weapons against the use or threat of use of biological and chemical weapons, the use of nuclear weapons against terrorism and the development of "mini-nukes" for actual battlefield use.

Finally, two additional nuclear-arms States have emerged on the world scene — and there is one other presumed nuclear-arms State, whose status and obligations remain unclear.

In those circumstances, the conclusion of credible negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States has gained greater urgency. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.45 seek to underline and to operationalize that sense of urgency. The draft resolution reaffirms the urgent need to reach early agreement on effective international arrangements on negative security assurances. It notes with satisfaction that there is no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention on the subject. It appeals to all States, especially nuclear-weapon States, to work towards early agreement. It recommends further intensification of efforts to develop a common approach and formula on the issue. Finally, it recommends that the Conference on Disarmament actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on negative security assurances.

The sponsors believe that the conclusion of effective arrangements on negative security assurances could constitute a major confidence-building measure in the current tense international circumstances between nuclear- and non-nuclear weapons States, as well as among nuclear-weapon States. It could contribute to reducing the nuclear danger. It could ease the threats that arise from new doctrines of nuclear use, and facilitate the negotiations for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. My delegation and the sponsors of the draft resolution therefore urge the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.45 with the widest possible majority.

The second draft resolution that I would like to introduce, which is contained in document A/C.1/60/L.24, is entitled "Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context".

The maintenance of international peace and security at the global level in many ways depends upon stability at the regional and subregional levels. Instability at the regional and subregional levels breeds a series of arms races, undermines efforts aimed at arms control and disarmament and obstructs the peaceful settlement of disputes, rendering their resolution even more difficult. Such instability also increases poverty and spreads despair and anger.

In introducing this draft resolution, we are guided by the universally acknowledged value of confidence-building measures in many regions and subregions of the world. Pakistan remains convinced that the initiation of such confidence-building measures has rendered, and can continue to render, tangible dividends for peace, help to avert conflicts, facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes and allow States to invest their resources and energies in socio-economic development. Such an approach could also supplement efforts at arms control and disarmament.

The draft resolution reflects views expressed by Member States on the draft and respects their sensitivities. There is emerging consensus that the potential of confidence-building measures should be fully used through conscious and consistent efforts at the regional and subregional levels.

In its preambular paragraphs, the draft resolution reiterates the basic purposes and principles of the

Charter of the United Nations, as well as General Assembly and Security Council resolutions relating to the prevention of armed conflicts. It recognizes the need for peaceful dialogue to avert conflict, and welcomes the peace processes already initiated in various regions to resolve disputes through peaceful means, bilaterally or through mediation by third parties.

The draft resolution also recognizes that regions that have already developed confidence-building measures at the bilateral, subregional and regional levels in the political and military fields, including arms control and disarmament, have greatly improved the climate of peace and security in their region, and contributed to the improvement of the socio-economic conditions of their peoples.

The operative paragraphs of the draft resolution call upon Member States to refrain from the use or threat of use of force, and to reaffirm their commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. The draft resolution recalls the ways and means arrived at through confidence-building measures in the 1993 report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and calls upon Member States to pursue them through sustained consultations and dialogue. It also urges States to comply strictly will all bilateral, regional and international arms control and disarmament agreements to which they are parties, underlines that confidence-building measures should contribute to the objectives of strategic stability and emphasizes that the objective of confidence-building measures should be to help to strengthen international peace and security and be consistent with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments.

The draft encourages the promotion of bilateral and regional confidence-building measures to avoid conflict and prevent the unintended and accidental outbreak of hostilities, and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly on the views of Member States on confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context.

My delegation hopes that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/60/L.24 will be adopted with the full consent of this Committee.

Mr. Gatan (Philippines): On behalf of the sponsors, the Philippines would like to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.22, which is entitled "The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation" and which has 104 sponsors. In addition, the following seven delegations have signed on to the draft resolution to express their support for it: Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dominican Republic, Gabon, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Slovakia. That brings to 111 the total number of sponsors to the draft resolution.

I should like to draw the attention of the First Committee to the fact that the draft resolution does not depart from last year's resolution on the subject. The present draft resolution merely contains a technical updating of last year's version.

I would also like to make an oral amendment to paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.22. Instead of referring to 122 subscribing States to The Hague Code of Conduce, the draft resolution should refer to 123, Liberia being the latest country to subscribe to it.

May I also draw the Committee's attention to the fact that the draft resolution was finalized by the plenary of subscribing States to The Hague Code of Conduct. The last intersessional meeting of subscribing States mandated the Philippines to submit this draft resolution as Chair of the subscribing States. On behalf of the sponsors, we therefore commend this draft resolution for adoption by the Committee, preferably by consensus, in order to demonstrate our firm resolve to enhance multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation.

Programme of work

The Chairman: Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to remind members of our programme of work for tomorrow.

As agreed yesterday, we will have informal interactive discussions on disarmament and non-proliferation education in this room for one and a half hours, from 10 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. To facilitate our discussion, it is the intention of the Bureau to invite two guests speakers, Mr. Peter Lucas, professor at Columbia University, and Ms. Kathleen Sullivan, representing Educators for Social Responsibility.

After that, the Committee will consider some matters pertaining to its work next week. It is my intention to adjourn the meeting before noon. For about an hour tomorrow, from noon to 1 p.m., we will have an informal informal open-ended discussion on the possible revitalization of the First Committee's agenda for the next session.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

United Nations A/C.1/60/PV.17

General Assembly
Sixtieth session

Official Records

First Committee
17th meeting
Friday, 21 October 2005, 10 a.m.
New York

Chairman: Mr. Choi ..... (Republic of Korea)

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Agenda items 85 to 105 (*continued*)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and the introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman: As I announced yesterday, because of my strained voice, I will ask a Vice-Chairperson, Mrs. Gabriela Martinic, to chair this meeting. I shall chair the informal meeting, scheduled to start at 12 noon.

Mrs. Martinic (Argentina), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): As agreed, this morning the Committee will first hold an informal interactive discussion on disarmament and non-proliferation education. For this segment the Committee will hear presentations from two invited guests. Before we get down to today's work I shall suspend the meeting for the informal interactive discussion.

The meeting was suspended at 10.10 and resumed at 11.05 a.m.

Mr. Fraser (Canada): I would like to speak briefly about Canada's activities in the field of disarmament education.

Canada has long supported the contributions of civil society, academics and non-governmental organizations (NGO) to broadening our understanding of disarmament and non-proliferation challenges and to the promotion of our objectives in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament. Disarmament education is therefore a key dimension of our broader efforts in that area.

In recognition of the depth of knowledge and expertise in the Canadian academic and NGO communities, Foreign Affairs Canada hosts annual consultations with civil society, covering a range of topics such as nuclear challenges and new non-proliferation mechanisms, missile proliferation controls and defences, chemical and biological weapons, verification and compliance issues, the global partnership programme and space security. Our delegations to recent preparatory committees and review conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have all included representatives of civil society. Canada provides funding to NGOs to convene expert-level consultations and supports efforts at reaching critical will to ensure wide public access to national statements and other documents emanating from meetings of United Nations disarmament bodies.

The International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) of Foreign Affairs Canada serves as a focal point in Canada for regional research and assessment relevant to international security issues, including non-proliferation, arms control and

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disarmament, verification and confidence-building measures. The Programme draws together in-house capabilities, resources from other Government departments and a network of expertise from the academic community and other knowledgeable individuals from Canada and abroad.

As part of its outreach activities, in March 2005, ISROP helped to establish the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance at Carleton University in Ottawa. The Centre's initial focus will be on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties concerned with weapons of mass destruction. In addition to courses, researchers at the Centre will examine how treaty compliance is monitored and verified, as well as the methods for encouraging, facilitating and enforcing compliance. The Centre will provide academic support for one of Canada's stated foreign policy objectives, namely, to verify compliance with legal regimes designed to reduce the threats associated with weapons of mass destruction.

Another significant ISROP initiative over the last year was the launch of international security internships aimed at providing graduate-level students in international affairs with the opportunity to conduct substantive work on particular ISROP research priorities. Canada supports independent graduate-level research through several doctoral- and master's-level research awards offered in collaboration with the Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies at the University of British Columbia. The primary objective of those awards is to enhance Canadian graduate-level scholarship on disarmament and non-proliferation issues and to promote the development of centres of excellence in that area.

Most recently, in partnership with the United Nations Association of Canada, my Government sponsored the production of a disarmament education module intended for students and teachers at the secondary school level. Teaching materials can be viewed at www.unac.org. The module has been well received, both by students and educators, and has been well integrated into the broader provincial and territorial curriculums, with a focus on teachers and training.

The Acting Chair: Does any delegation wish to take the floor to introduce draft resolutions?

That not being the case, we have thus concluded the second phase of the work of the First Committee.

Programme of work

The Acting Chair: In accordance with the Committee's programme of work and timetable, the third phase of our work, action on all draft resolutions and draft decisions submitted under agenda items 85 to 105, will begin next week. In that connection, I would like to draw members' attention to the clustering paper contained in document A/C.1/60/CRP.3, which has been circulated to all delegations.

The Committee will begin its work by taking action on the draft resolutions contained in cluster 1, namely, nuclear weapons, on Monday, 24 October. In that connection, I believe that an informal paper contained in the list of draft resolutions that are ready for action in each of the seven clusters has been circulated by the Secretariat.

With the cooperation of members, and on the basis of past practice and precedent, it is my intention to move as efficiently as possible from one cluster to another upon the completion of action on each given cluster. Nonetheless, while following that procedure, the Committee will maintain a certain degree of flexibility. It is also my intention to follow the precedent set during past sessions in proceeding with action on all draft resolutions. Consequently, during the decision-taking stage of each individual cluster, delegations will first have the opportunity to introduce draft resolutions with regard to any particular cluster.

We still have a number of draft resolutions that must be introduced. I would therefore kindly request the delegations that plan to introduce the remaining draft resolutions to be as brief as possible when doing so. In addition, delegations wishing to make general statements or comments, other than explanations of vote on the draft resolutions contained in a specific cluster, will be permitted to do so. Thereafter, delegations will be provided the opportunity to explain their positions or votes in a consolidated statement on all draft resolutions and draft decisions contained in a particular cluster, before the Committee proceeds to take action on them one after another and without any interruption in between. In other words, delegations will have the chance to explain their positions or votes in a consolidated fashion on all draft resolutions contained in the specific cluster on which action will be taken.

I intend, with the full cooperation of the Committee, to strictly follow that procedure, in order

to ensure the full and efficient utilization of the time and conference resources allocated to the Committee. That is something with which I strongly believe all members of the Committee fully concur. Consequently, I appeal to all delegations strictly to observe that procedure and to avoid any interruptions once voting on cluster begins. Once the Committee completes action on all draft resolutions and decisions contained in a particular cluster, delegations wishing to explain their positions or votes after the voting will be allowed to do so. However, as in the case of consolidated explanations of vote before the voting, delegations are again requested to provide consolidated explanations of their positions after the voting on those respective draft resolutions of the given cluster on which action was completed.

I would also like to stress that, in accordance with the rules of procedure, sponsors of draft resolutions are not permitted to make any statements in explanation of their votes, either before or after action is taken. They will, however, be permitted to make only general statements at the beginning of the meeting on a particular cluster.

In order to avoid any misunderstandings, I strongly urge those delegations seeking recorded votes on any particular draft resolution to kindly inform the Secretariat of their intention as early as possible before the Committee begins to take action on any individual cluster.

Finally, concerning the postponement of action on any draft resolution, I urge all delegations to inform the Secretariat in advance, at least one day before action is taken on the draft resolution. However, every effort should be made to refrain from resorting to a deferment of action.

In order to ascertain that every delegation fully understands the procedure for the action phase, the Secretariat has prepared an information sheet similar to the one circulated last year regarding the ground rules for taking action on draft resolutions. I believe that that paper has already been distributed this morning.

Let me also remind the Committee that, once we have completed action on all disarmament-related draft resolutions and decisions, we will still need to set aside time for the consideration, and action on, the draft resolution on the question of Antarctica. The Committee will also have to consider, and take action on, its tentative programme of work for the sixty-first session.

With the Committee's agreement, it is my intention to follow the procedure that I have just outlined during the third, and last, phase of our work. Unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the Committee agrees with the procedure that I have just outlined.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.

United Nations A/C.1/60/PV.18

General Assembly
Sixtieth session

Official Records

First Committee
18th meeting
Monday, 24 October 2005, 3 p.m.
New York

05-56560*0556560*

Chairman: Choi Young Jin ..... (Republic of Korea)

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

Agenda items 85 to 105 (*continued*)

Action on all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman: In accordance with its programme of work and timetable, this afternoon the First Committee will begin the third phase of its work, namely, action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items 85 to 105.

The Committee will take action on draft resolutions that appear in revised informal working paper 1, which was circulated during the previous meeting, beginning with cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons". After completing action on draft resolutions and decisions contained in cluster 1, the Committee will proceed to take action on draft resolutions contained in cluster 2, "Other weapons of mass destruction". The Committee will then proceed with draft resolutions contained in clusters 5, 6 and 7. In proceeding with our work, I would like to remind delegations that the Committee will follow the same procedure as was already outlined by the Chairman and explained in the ground rules information sheet circulated last Friday.

Allow me once again to remind delegations that sponsors of draft resolutions may make general statements at the beginning of the meeting on a particular cluster. In accordance with the rules of procedure, they may not make statements in explanation of their votes, either before or after action is taken.

Before the Committee proceeds to take decisions on all draft resolutions contained in cluster 1, namely, nuclear weapons, as appear in revised informal working paper 1, I shall give the floor to delegations wishing to make general statements or to introduce draft resolutions.

Mr. Gala López (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): On behalf of my delegation, I should like to make the following general comments on cluster 1, entitled "Nuclear weapons".

Mindful of the danger posed to all humankind by the very existence of such weapons, we reiterate the importance, complete validity and urgency of the issue of nuclear disarmament. Several of the draft resolutions under this cluster contain references to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, which is also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In that regard, we would like to underscore our rejection of the selective implementation of, and double standard approach to, the NPT. We believe that matters pertaining to nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy cannot continue to be put aside while priority is given to issues having to do with horizontal non-proliferation.

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

honour all its State-party obligations entered into in the treaties to which I have referred. My delegation has already spoken in detail about that in our statements during the Committee's general and thematic debates.

With regard to the voting to be conducted on the draft resolutions under cluster 1, my delegation reiterates that it will continue to consider its vote on a case-by-case basis and while assessing each draft resolution's overall balance. We shall do so on the basis of the fact that achieving complete nuclear disarmament under a strict and effective international verification system is Cuba's highest priority in the area of disarmament.

The Chairman: I shall now call on delegations wishing to introduce draft resolution's.

Mr. Udedibia (Nigeria): On behalf of the Group of African States, I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/60/L.9, entitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes".

The dumping of radioactive wastes poses a serious threat to the security and development of all States. It constitutes a serious health hazard to the inhabitants of the area in which they may be deposited, and is known to be profoundly harmful to the environment. Some developing countries, in particular the least developed among them, have been the victims of the dumping of radioactive wastes. Until the General Assembly's adoption of the first resolution on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes, on the initiative of the African Group at the Assembly's forty-third session, in 1988, Africa had been a preferred destination for the transporters of radioactive wastes in search of territories in which to dump such wastes.

Concerned about the serious effects of the dumping of radioactive wastes, the African Group hopes that the international community, as represented at this meeting, will continue to support this draft resolution to protect States from the indiscriminate dumping of these harmful materials, which may infringe upon their sovereignty.

In 1988 and again in 1989, the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) — now the African Union — adopted resolutions concerning the dumping of nuclear or industrial wastes in Africa. Since then, the international community has recognized the need to address the issue. That is particularly so with respect to States members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On 21 September 1990, the IAEA General Conference, at its thirty-fourth regular session, adopted a resolution establishing the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste. In addition, on 21 September 2001, the General Conference, at its forty-fifth regular session, adopted a resolution urging member States that ship radioactive materials to provide, as appropriate, assurances to potentially affected States that their national regulations accord with the Agency's transport regulations and to provide the concerned States with information related to the shipment of such materials. The information provided should in no case be contradictory to the measures of physical security and safety. On 5 September 1997 in Vienna, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management was adopted, as recommended by the participants in the Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security.

This draft resolution calls upon all States to take appropriate measures with a view to preventing any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States, expresses grave concern regarding any use of nuclear wastes that would constitute radiological warfare and have grave implications for the national security of all States, and requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify efforts towards an early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

The draft resolution takes note of the resolution adopted in 1991 by the OAU Council of Ministers on the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa. It expresses the hope that the effective implementation of the IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste will enhance the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories. Finally, it appeals to all Member States that have not yet taken the necessary steps to become parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management to do so as soon as possible.

With the exception of technical updates relating to the preambular paragraphs, the elements of the draft

resolution are the same as those of the one adopted at the fifty-eighth session. The draft resolution has always been adopted without a vote both in the First Committee and in the General Assembly. The African Group would appreciate the cooperation of all delegations in adopting it without a vote once again at the present session.

Mr. De Alba (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): Permit me at the outset to introduce the draft decision contained in document A/C.1/60/L.11, entitled "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament".

Submitted by my country, the draft decision, like those submitted in recent years, is aimed primarily at keeping this issue on the agenda. We are convinced that, five years after the Millennium Assembly's consensus decision to convene such a conference, it remains valid and, I would say, even more necessary than before. It is more necessary because the dangers stemming from the existence of nuclear weapons have intensified, particularly over the past five years and because of the paralysis in the relevant negotiations. Hence, we propose not only to once again seek the inclusion of this item in the agenda, but also to step up the consultations so that we can, hopefully, soon fulfil this aspiration, which was adopted by the unanimous agreement of the membership and, as the Committee is aware, began as an initiative of Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

I should also like to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/60/L.25, entitled "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

The draft resolution was submitted by the States parties to the Treaty, all of which are sponsors. It contains a new paragraph with respect to what has been previously adopted: the sixth preambular paragraph, which notes with satisfaction the leadership of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in the convening of the first Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in Tlatelolco, Mexico, from 26 to 28 April 2005. As members are aware, the results of the Conference were highly satisfactory. We therefore believe it is relevant for us to take note of it.

In its operative portion, the draft resolution reaffirms the basic elements of previous resolutions, highlights in particular that all United Nations Member States belonging to the Latin American and Caribbean Group are already parties to the Treaty and, of course, recalls the commitments undertaken at the most recent session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, held at Havana, Cuba. That outcome will be reviewed and supplemented at the next session, to be held at Santiago, Chile, this year.

Those draft resolutions are ready to be considered by the Committee at this meeting.

The Chairman: The First Committee will now proceed to take a decision on the draft resolutions contained in cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons", beginning with draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.3, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East". I should like to remind delegations that the Committee will take action on all draft resolutions contained in revised informal working paper number 1, one after another, without interruption. Before doing so, I shall call upon those delegations wishing to explain their position or make statements or general comments on all draft resolutions and decisions contained in cluster 1 of the revised informal working paper number 1.

Mr. Freeman (United Kingdom): The European Union, on whose behalf I speak, would like to explain its position with respect to draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

We support the objective of the Middle East becoming a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. But we are concerned that the draft resolution does not cover some relevant recent developments, with respect to nuclear proliferation in the region.

The European Union will vote in favour of the draft resolution, and calls on all States in the region to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We also call on all States in the region that have not yet done so, to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol. The European Union shares the concerns of the international community over Iran's nuclear programme, reflected in the

relevant resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors.

Iran's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations raises serious questions, and is not compatible with the international non-proliferation regime. It is of critical importance, not only for all States in the Middle East to accede to relevant non-proliferation treaties and conventions, but also that all parties to the treaties and conventions implement fully their obligations under those instruments.

The European Union is concerned by Iran's decision to resume uranium conversion activity at its facility in Isfahan, contrary to the requests of the IAEA Board, and the agreement made in Paris in November 2004, by Iran with France, Germany and the United Kingdom, in association with the European Union's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This agreement has provided the basis for talks on long-term arrangements.

We hope that Iran will take the opportunity to implement in full, the requests made by the IAEA Board in its resolution of 24 September. The European Union supports the resumption of negotiations on the basis of the Paris agreement.

I also have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.26. I also speak on behalf of the countries that have aligned themselves with the draft resolution, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty" (CTBT).

Under the thematic nuclear cluster, I have the opportunity on behalf of the European Union to express the views of the EU regarding the CTBT, reiterating the EU's beliefs that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an essential part of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

We hope to move closer to the early entry into force of the Treaty, and to work towards its universality, because global adherence to the Treaty will contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the process of nuclear disarmament and, therefore, to the enhancement of international peace and security, while taking into account that the ultimate objective of the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The European Union attaches utmost importance to the early entry into force of the Treaty, and will continue to call on the States that have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay and without conditions. In particular, we call for early ratification by the so-called Annex 2 countries — States whose ratification is necessary for the Treaty to enter into force. In that context, the European Union also strongly supports the work of the Special Representative of the ratifying States, who is visiting several of the Annex 2 countries to promote universal adherence to the CTBT.

The European Union believes that the legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as well as a credible verification regime are vital. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the European Union urges all States to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any actions which are contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT.

That is the reason why the European Union fully supports draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.26 which has been sponsored by all EU Member States.

Mr. Gala López (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Among the cluster of items on nuclear weapons, it is projected today to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.36, entitled "Nuclear disarmament". My delegation backs the contents of that draft, taking the view that in fact, it appropriately reflects the priority attached to nuclear disarmament.

The operative paragraphs once again include an important appeal to the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as a priority matter beginning in 2006, an ad hoc committee to address the issue of nuclear disarmament, and to enter into negotiations on a phased nuclear disarmament programme, ending with the complete elimination of that type of weaponry.

We have also noted that the preambular part refers to the important declaration adopted at the special foreign ministers meeting of the Movement of Non-Aligned countries, held in Doha in June 2005. We reiterate that the elimination of nuclear weapons must continue to be considered as a top priority in the disarmament arena by the international community. My country has always supported any legitimate steps designed to attain that goal without delay.

Mr. Hu Xiaodi (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): Before voting on the three draft resolutions on nuclear disarmament, A/C.1/60/L.36, L.4 and L.28, I would like to explain China's voting position in the context of China's basic position and policies on nuclear disarmament.

China has always supported the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In order to promote the process of nuclear disarmament, China maintains that the following measures must be taken. First, an international legal instrument on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons should be concluded at an early date. Secondly, nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual reduction towards a downward balance.

The two States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament. They should earnestly comply with the treaties already concluded on the reduction of nuclear weapons, and further reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable and irreversible manner, in order to create conditions towards achieving the ultimate goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament.

Thirdly, before the goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to the non-first-use of nuclear weapons and undertake, unconditionally, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Fourthly, nuclear-weapon States should abandon the policy of nuclear deterrence based upon the first use of nuclear weapons and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security. Fifthly, nuclear disarmament measures, including various intermediate measures, should follow the guidelines of maintaining global strategic balance and stability, and undiminished security for all.

Sixthly, preventing the weaponization of, and an arms race in, outer space, would be conducive to promoting the process of nuclear disarmament. Seventh, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should reach an agreement on its programme of work at an early date, so as to establish ad hoc committees on nuclear disarmament, security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, fissile material cut-off, and prevention of an arms race in outer space, and then begin substantive work on those issues.

China supports the main thrust, objectives and major elements of draft resolutions A/C.1/60/L.36, L.4 and L.28, on promoting nuclear disarmament and the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world at an early date. However, the draft resolutions have not fully reflected the basic principles of nuclear disarmament, as mentioned above, and still have room for further improvement.

We shall vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.36, entitled "Nuclear disarmament" and draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.4, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments".

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.28, entitled "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", advocates a few measures whose implementation would be premature in the current international situation. We have some reservations and will abstain in the vote on that draft resolution.

Mr. Bar (Israel): I take the floor in order to explain our vote on the draft resolution contained in A/C.1/60/L.6, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

Once again, the First Committee is called upon to vote on the draft resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". The title is important. This draft resolution is blatantly one-sided, contentious and divisive and it undermines rather than enhances confidence among the States of the region.

There is no doubt that the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East indeed exists. In recent years we have seen public evidence that States in our region have repeatedly acted in non-compliance with their obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Surprisingly enough, the draft resolution does not reflect any of the facts and realities stated above. It chooses to ignore the internationally acknowledged evidence regarding States that join international arrangements but do not comply with them. This draft resolution also overlooks the profound hostility of States in the region towards Israel, as well as their refusal to maintain any form of peaceful reconciliation and coexistence with my country. Furthermore, this draft resolution focuses entirely and by name on one

country, a country which has never threatened its neighbours nor abrogated its obligations under any disarmament treaty. It singles out Israel as no other United Nations Member State is being singled out in the First Committee.

Singling out Israel and ignoring the real risk of proliferation in the Middle East does not lend the First Committee any credibility. Adopting such a draft resolution will not serve the greater objective of curbing proliferation in the Middle East, but could rather compromise it. Draft resolutions regarding the complex arms control problem in the Middle East should focus on objective ways to address them as they emerge. The First Committee should not once again become a venue for political discrimination. We would like to call upon the distinguished delegates to reconsider their vote and vote against this draft resolution.

I would also like to take this opportunity to explain our vote on A/C.1/60/L.26/Rev.1, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty" (CTBT). Israel signed the CTBT in September 1996. This decision reflects its long-standing policy on arms control and its support for international non-proliferation efforts, with due consideration to the specific characteristics of the Middle East and our national security requirements.

Furthermore, Israel has played an active role throughout the negotiations of the Treaty in Geneva and contributed conceptually, technically and politically to its drafting. Since the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in November 1996, Israel has played a major part in the endeavours to develop the elements of the CTBT verification regime, including the practical procedures to be adopted in the operational manuals by which the Treaty will be implemented. Israel decided it will vote in favour of resolution A/C.1/60/L.26/Rev.1 because of the importance it attaches to the objectives of the CTBT and notwithstanding its reservation regarding some of the wording in operative paragraph 1.

Israel remains committed to the objectives of the CTBT. We would like to emphasize, however, that there is still progress to be made on several important issues. The first issue is that of the development and readiness of the verification regime. In our view, its completion constitutes a prerequisite to entry into force as required by the first paragraph of article 4 of the Treaty. Moreover, it is our belief that the verification regime should provide for an overall system that is as effective as possible to detect non-compliance with the basic obligations of the Treaty. At the same time, it should be immune to abuse and allow every State signatory to protect its national security interests. These principles guide Israel in the development of the CTBT verification regime.

The second issue involves resolving several salient political issues, in particular those related to the geographical region of the Middle East and South Asia. A final issue involves reversing the negative dynamic evolving in our region, where certain State signatories are not fully cooperative with the efforts to complete and test the International Monitoring System (IMS) element of the verification regime, thus impeding the pace of development of this element in the verification regime.

Recognizing that entry into force of the Treaty is still pending and does not look imminent, we believe that advancement of the objective of the CTBT calls for the following commitments and activities to be diligently pursued. First and foremost, the commitment not to carry out any nuclear test explosion, in line with the Treaty's basic obligation, must be sustained. Secondly, sufficient funds must be provided to the CTBTO in order to complete as soon as possible the essential elements of the CTBT verification regime. Thirdly, the IMS stations and the International Data Centre must be operated, maintained and tested as appropriate to gain experience in order to provide detection capabilities prior to the Treaty's entry into force, as well as to smooth the operation of the monitoring system by entering into force. In addition, seismic cooperation among all Member States must be expanded. Fourthly, the onsite inspection element of the CTBT verification regime must be built.

Ms. Vatne (Norway): Norway would like to align itself with the explanation of vote given by the representative of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the European Union, regarding draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

Mr. Bugallo (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): This being the first time I am taking the floor in this Committee, I should like to congratulate you, Sir, upon

your election to the chairmanship and on the skill and leadership you have demonstrated.

I would like to make an explanation of vote on behalf of Spain with regard to the draft resolution entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas", contained in A/C.1/60/L.12.

Spain fully supports the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with arrangements freely worked out and consensually arrived at between and among States in any region.

Spain has consistently stated unequivocally its support for the objectives of treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the understanding that such zones represent a significant contribution to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to the promotion of efforts leading to nuclear disarmament.

Our delegation therefore believes that the draft resolution that has just been adopted is important to the consolidation of such zones and to cooperation among them. Indeed, Spain has in the past supported the provisions of the draft resolution and voted in favour of preceding ones, including resolutions 53/77 Q and 54/54 L at the fifty-third and fifty-fourth sessions, respectively.

However, this time around the Spanish delegation has decided to abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.12, as we did at the fifty-fifth, fifty-sixth, fifty-seventh, fifty-eighth and fifty-ninth sessions. We are doing so because an issue is involved about which my country has always had, and continues to have, reservations: the holding of an international Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones to reaffirm the common objectives set out in those treaties, as contained in the eighth preambular paragraph and in operative paragraph 8.

The seventh preambular paragraph of the draft resolution just adopted also contains a reference to the possibility of holding, among other kinds of exchanges, joint meetings of States parties and signatories to treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in order to enhance cooperation among such zones — a concept to which Spain has no objection whatsoever.

However, as pointed out earlier, the text of the draft resolution just adopted states, in the eighth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 8 alike, something that delegation has consistently viewed as a new concept: an international conference that is qualitatively different, and, what is more, one that represents a departure from the consensus agreements reached in the area of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The concept of an international conference such as the one mentioned in the eighth preambular paragraph and in operative paragraph 8 does not appear in the April 1999 report of the Disarmament Commission on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with agreements freely entered into among the States of the region, nor is it mentioned in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference in paragraphs relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Spain participated actively hand in both negotiating processes and welcomes the fact that they led to satisfactory though hard-won consensus agreements. Spain's view is that the foundation laid down in both documents is sufficient and that there are no additional juridical or political elements that could justify the holding of such an international conference.

For all those reasons, my delegation is not in a position to endorse such a proposal and, as a consequence, it cannot support this resolution.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on all draft decisions and draft resolutions contained in revised informal working paper 1, beginning with draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.3, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.3, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Egypt at the Committee's 14th meeting, on 18 October 2005. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.3 and A/C.1/60/INF/2. In addition, Bangladesh has now become a sponsor.

The Chairman: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote.

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.3 was adopted.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft decision A/C.1/60/L.5.

A recorded vote has been requested.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft decision A/C.1/60/L.5, entitled "Missiles". The draft decision was introduced by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the Committee's 9th meeting, on 11 October 2005. The sponsors of the draft decision are listed in document A/C.1/60/L.5.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Israel, United States of America

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Draft decision A/C.1/60/L.5 was adopted by 101 votes to 2, with 50 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6.

A recorded vote has been requested. A separate vote has also been requested on the sixth preambular paragraph. Thereafter, the Committee will vote on the draft resolution as a whole. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Egypt at the Committee's 14th meeting, on 18 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in the document. In addition, Bangladesh has become a sponsor.

The Committee will now proceed to take a separate vote on the sixth preambular paragraph, which reads as follows:

> "Recognizing with satisfaction that, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference undertook to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, called upon those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities, and underlined the

necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty and of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty".

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

India, Israel

Abstaining:

Bhutan, Cameroon, Mauritius, Pakistan, United States of America

The sixth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6 was retained by 145 votes to 2, with 5 abstentions.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6 as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Israel, United States of America

Abstaining:

Australia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, India

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6 as a whole was adopted by 149 votes to 2, with 4 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft decision A/C.1/60/L.7. I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft decision A/C.1/60/L.7, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia". The draft decision was introduced by the representative of Uzbekistan at the Committee's 12th meeting, on 14 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in the document. In addition, Bangladesh has become a sponsor.

The Chairman: I should like to inform members that the sponsors of draft decision A/C.1/60/L.7 have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft decision A/C.1/60/L.7 was adopted.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.9. I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.9, entitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Nigeria, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States, at the Committee's 18th meeting, on 24 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in the document. In addition, Bangladesh has become a sponsor.

The Chairman: I should like to inform members that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.9 have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.9 was adopted.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft decision A/C.1/60/L.11. A recorded vote has been requested. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft decision A/C.1/60/L.11, entitled "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament". The draft decision was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the Committee's 18th meeting, on 24 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in the document. In addition, Bangladesh has become a sponsor.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

France, Israel, Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey

Draft decision A/C.1/60/L.11 was adopted by 108 votes to 5, with 39 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.12/Rev.1. A recorded vote has also been requested. A request has also been made for separate recorded votes on the last three words of operative paragraph 5 and on operative paragraph 5 as a whole. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.12/Rev.1, entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of New Zealand at the Committee's 9th meeting, on 11 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.12/Rev.1 and A/C.1/60/INF/2. In addition, the following countries have become sponsors: the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Jamaica and Sierra Leone.

The Committee will now proceed to take a separate vote on the last three words of operative paragraph 5, which read as follows: "and South Asia".

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

India, Pakistan

Abstaining:

Bhutan, France, Israel, Russian Federation, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The last three words of operative paragraph 5 were retained by 140 votes to 2, with 7 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on operative paragraph 5 as a whole. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take a separate vote on operative paragraph 5 as a whole, which reads as follows:

"Welcomes the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and calls upon all States to consider all relevant proposals, including those reflected in its resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia".

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

India

Abstaining:

Bhutan, France, Israel, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Operative paragraph 5 as a whole was retained by 141 votes to 1, with 9 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.12/Rev.1 as a whole. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.12/Rev.1 as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab

Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Bhutan, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Spain

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.12/Rev.1 as a whole was adopted by 144 votes to 3, with 6 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.25. I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.25, entitled "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the Committee's 18th meeting, on 24 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.25 and A/C.1/60/INF/2. In addition, Bangladesh and Suriname have become sponsors.

The Chairman: I should like to inform members that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.25 have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.25 was adopted.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.26/Rev.1. A recorded vote has been requested. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.26/Rev.1, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the Committee's 15th meeting, on 19 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.26/Rev.1 and A/C.1/60/INF/2. In addition, the following countries have become sponsors: Austria, Canada, France, Iraq, Malaysia, Monaco, Mongolia, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:
United States of America

Abstaining:
Colombia, India, Mauritius, Syrian Arab Republic

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.26/Rev.1 was adopted by 149 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.36. A recorded vote has been requested. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.36, entitled "Nuclear disarmament". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Myanmar at the Committee's 10th meeting, on 12 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.36 and A/C.1/60/INF/2. In addition, Bangladesh and Malaysia have become sponsors.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:
Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:
Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, India, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Sweden, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.36 was adopted by 94 votes to 42, with 17 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.45. A recorded vote has been requested. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.45, entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Pakistan at the Committee's 16th meeting, on 20 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.45 and A/C.1/60/INF/2. In addition, Bangladesh and Iraq have become sponsors.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,

El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.45 was adopted by 98 votes to none, with 55 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.46. A recorded vote has been requested. A separate vote has been requested on operative paragraph 1. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.46, entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Malaysia at the Committee's 9th meeting, on 11 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.46 and A/C.1/60/INF/2. In addition, Bangladesh has become a sponsor.

The Committee will now proceed to take a separate vote on operative paragraph 1, which reads as follows:

"Underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon

Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Israel, Russian Federation, United States of America

Abstaining:

Belarus, France, Latvia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uzbekistan

Operative paragraph 1 was retained by 142 votes to 3, with 5 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.46 as a whole. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.46 as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.46 as a whole was adopted by 103 votes to 29, with 21 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.52. A recorded vote has been requested. I give the floor to the Committee Secretary to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.52 is entitled "Reducing nuclear danger". This draft resolution was introduced by the representative of India at the 9th meeting, held on 11 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.52 and A/C.1/60/INF/2. Bangladesh has also become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,

India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Paraguay, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.52 was adopted by 94 votes to 45, with 14 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.54. A recorded vote has been requested. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

The Secretary: Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.54 is entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons". This draft resolution was introduced by the representative of India at the 9th meeting, on 11 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.54 and A/C.1/60/INF/2. In addition, the following countries have become sponsors of the draft resolution: Malaysia and Bangladesh.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.54 was adopted by 97 votes to 46, with 11 abstentions.

The Chairman: I now call upon delegations wishing to explain their vote after the vote.

Mr. Mine (Japan): I would like to explain Japan's position in the voting on two draft resolutions. Regarding the first, in document A/C.1/60/L.36, entitled "Nuclear disarmament", we abstained in the vote.

Japan shares the ultimate goal of the draft resolution, namely, the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, my delegation takes note of positive elements concerning nuclear disarmament in this draft. My delegation appreciates its reference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and that it incorporates some of the steps towards nuclear disarmament agreed in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

However, this draft resolution does not contain elements necessary for the international community, including nuclear-weapon States, to form an agreement on nuclear disarmament. My delegation firmly believes that steps towards nuclear disarmament should be realistic and progressive, with the involvement of the nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, my delegation would prefer to see a approach towards the shared goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons that is different from what is proposed in this draft resolution.

Secondly, on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/60/L.46, entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*", first of all, we highly appreciate Malaysia's sincere attitude and firm commitment to the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament, which resulted in the proposal of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.46. Japan also believes that because of their immense power to cause destruction, death and injury to human beings, the use of nuclear weapons is clearly contrary to the fundamental humanitarianism that informs international law and provides its philosophical foundation. Therefore, we would like to stress that nuclear weapons should never be used again and continuous efforts should be made towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

However, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which this draft resolution addresses, clearly demonstrates the complexity of the subject. Japan supports the unanimous opinion of the judges of the Court on the existing obligations under international law to pursue nuclear disarmament and to conclude negotiations on the matter in good faith. Japan firmly believes that we must take concrete measures to achieve steady, step-by-step progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

In this context, we believe it premature to call upon all States immediately to fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading up to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat of use or use of nuclear weapons. We believe that such steady, incremental progress should be made prior to our embarking on the negotiations which draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.46 urges all States to commence. This is the reason for Japan's abstention in the vote on this draft resolution.

Mr. Rivasseau (France): I am speaking in English because I have asked for the floor on behalf of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France in order to explain our position on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.41, entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas".

As in previous years, our three delegations voted against this draft resolution. Last year, we noted the reference in the draft resolution's preamble that recalled the applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the rights of passage through maritime space, including those of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. We welcome, as usual, the acknowledgement of that important point; we do not want those principles and rules to be affected. But it would not affect the freedom of the high seas and the rights of passage through maritime space. We remain uncertain what value would be added by a Southern Hemisphere nuclear-weapon-free area over and above existing zones.

In essence, we believe it is contradictory to simultaneously propose an area that would be composed largely of the high seas and effectively say that it would not apply to the high seas. We would

question, therefore, whether the real goal of this draft resolution is the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone covering the high seas. We do not believe that this ambiguity has been sufficiently clarified. For that reason, we voted against the draft resolution again this year.

We would like to emphasize that we do not object in principle to the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, which could make an important contribution to regional and global security provided they are supported by all States of the region concerned, and would be the subject of appropriate treaties, including general assurances provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Concerning draft decision A/C.1/60/L.11, entitled "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament", our three countries indicated last year that they had to vote against it for reasons similar to those that I just expressed. Those reasons remain valid this year.

Mr. Roa Arboleda (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation is taking the floor in explanation of vote.

As in past sessions of the First Committee, at the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, my delegation felt obliged to abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.26/Rev.1, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", despite Colombia's long-standing commitment to disarmament, nuclear control and monitoring and inspection systems. The Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO are fully familiar with the constitutional difficulties that Colombia has encountered in becoming a State party to the Treaty. Our arguments have been expressed publicly and transparently over the past five years.

Colombia reaffirms once again its unquestionable commitment to the spirit and letter of the Treaty and our willingness to propose formulas aimed at overcoming those constitutional impediments, which exclusively involve contributions to the Preparatory Commission before the ratification of the Treaty. My delegation is very grateful for the interest of various States in finding a solution to those impediments that will enable us to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, which is our wish.

With regard to the proposal suggested by Colombia within the framework of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty, we trust that it will be a subject for consideration by the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO and its subsidiary bodies, with the advice of the Provisional Technical Secretariat.

Mr. Meyer (Canada): I have taken the floor to explain Canada's vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". It is important to ensure that our position is not misunderstood or misrepresented, and we will be vigilant in that regard.

The fundamental goal of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6 is to recognize that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East would pose a serious threat to international peace and security and to propose positive steps to be taken to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in that region. Clearly, Israel's adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon State would be such a positive step. On that basis, Canada voted in favour of this draft resolution last year and did so again this year.

Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon all States in the Middle East to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. While we voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6 today, we are, at the same time, disappointed that it contains no reference to resolution GOV/2005/77, adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 24 September 2005, which found Iran to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations pursuant to the NPT.

The long history of Iran's concealment of its nuclear activities, revealed as a result of two years of IAEA investigation, remains a matter of serious concern to Canada. We believe that the reference in draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6 to universal adherence to the NPT and full compliance with its obligations applies to all States — both those currently outside and those inside the Treaty.

In Canada's view, draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6 could have been strengthened with the inclusion of a reference to Iran's non-compliance, accompanied by a call for Iran to comply fully with its international nuclear non-proliferation obligations and to cooperate fully with the IAEA in that regard.

Ms. Sanders (United States of America): Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.5, my delegation has expressed clearly and repeatedly its disagreement with the inclusion of this item in our agenda. However, since once again we are going to address missiles as an agenda item, I am obliged to call the attention of all members to the many hours of diligent effort that the members of the second Panel of Governmental Experts expended the last time we took up this issue. In fact, the Panel made excellent progress and came very close to achieving a final report.

In our view, it would be unfortunate — even irresponsible — to waste the efforts of the many people who participated in those Panel meetings by simply walking away from the results that they achieved. My delegation therefore believes that, however this issue is again addressed, the draft report of the second Panel of Governmental Experts should be the basis for beginning further work.

Mr. Prasad (India): The Indian delegation has requested the floor to explain its vote on four draft resolutions under cluster 1.

India abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", as a whole, and voted against its sixth preambular paragraph because we believe it necessary to limit the focus of the draft resolution to the region that it is intended to address.

According to customary international law, as encapsulated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, States adhere to treaties considered to be in consonance with their national interests on the basis of their freely exercised sovereign choice. The call for those States remaining outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to accede to it and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities is at variance with that principle. Our long-standing position on the NPT is well known.

India joined the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.9, entitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes". However, the Indian delegation would like to state its position with regard to operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution.

India has been fully supportive of the draft resolution's central objective and is among the few countries that have supported the retention of radiological weapons on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, because we believe that the international community must remain vigilant as to the grave dangers posed by nuclear and other radioactive wastes and the possibility of their misuse.

Operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution refers to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. As a developing country, India attaches high importance not only to the safety but also to the full utilization of all aspects of the fuel cycle, to derive maximum benefits from it. Spent fuel is therefore not just a waste product but also a valuable resource, a position that India has consistently supported within the IAEA.

As regards the draft resolution entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas", contained in document A/C.1/60/L.12, India voted against the last three words of operative paragraph 5 — "and South Asia" — and operative paragraph 5 as a whole while abstaining in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole.

Operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution recognizes the well-established principle that nuclear-weapon-free zones must be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. That same principle has not been applied, however, in calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. This specific proposal logically has no greater validity than the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in many other parts of the world, such as East Asia, Western Europe or North America. We have therefore voted against operative paragraph 5 and abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole.

Finally, India has abstained in the voting on the draft resolution entitled "Nuclear disarmament", as contained in document A/C.1/60/L.36. It has been India's consistent view that the threat posed by nuclear weapons can be addressed only through their complete elimination in a progressive and systematic manner. As stated by our Prime Minister in Parliament recently, India's commitment to work for universal nuclear disarmament will remain our core concern. We very much share the objective of the draft resolution, which is to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons and establish a nuclear-weapon-free world.

We have, however, been constrained to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution, since it incorporates references to the NPT, on which India's position is well known. Our vote in no way detracts from our support for the long-standing position of the Non-Aligned Movement on nuclear disarmament; indeed, the Movement has accorded the highest priority to that goal.

Mr. MacLachlan (Australia): I take the floor in relation to draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6, entitled "Risk of non-proliferation in the Middle East".

Australia supports the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We strongly support the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and we have been consistent in our support for the General Assembly resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East freely arrived at among the States of the region.

Regrettably, however, we continue to have substantive difficulties with the draft resolution entitled "The risk of non-proliferation in the Middle East", notably its emphasis on the State of Israel, with no reference to other Middle Eastern States of nuclear proliferation concern.

In September, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, reflecting continuing international concern about Iran's nuclear intentions, found Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguard Agreement. The Board urged Iran to re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity, including conversion and reprocessing activity, and to implement the transparency measures requested by the IAEA Director General.

It is regrettable that the proposed draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6 makes no reference to the international community's serious concerns about this matter. Australia is committed to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. We will continue to promote those objectives within the NPT and in all other relevant international forums.

Mr. Najafi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am taking the floor to explain the position of my delegation with respect to draft decision A/C.1/60/L.3 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6 on the risk nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

The idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone as an important disarmament and confidence-building measure in the region of the Middle East, first initiated by Iran in 1974, was followed by the adoption by the General Assembly of numerous resolutions on that question. Since 1980, the General Assembly has annually adopted by consensus a resolution on this issue. The repeated adoption of this resolution by the General Assembly is a manifestation of global support for the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Middle East through the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

But, unfortunately, due to Israel's non-adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and, more importantly, the refusal of that regime to place its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification system, the realization of such a zone, a lofty and long-sought aspiration of the countries in the region, has yet to materialize.

The irresponsible behaviour of that regime, supported by certain nuclear-weapon States in this respect, has put the establishment of such a zone in the region in the near future in serious doubt. As the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference indicates, all countries in the Middle East region, except for the Israeli regime, have become States parties to the Treaty. The risk of Israel's nuclear facilities therefore make it necessary for the international community to exert enough pressure on Israel so that it accedes to the NPT and places all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards, in order to pave the way for the long-sought goal of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

As a State party to the NPT, the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to its international undertakings and believes that this international instrument is the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Universal adherence to this Treaty, in particular in the region of the Middle East, would effectively ensure the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

Mr. Streuli (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): I should like to explain Switzerland's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.6, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

Switzerland this year once again voted in favour of draft resolution L.6. The draft calls for universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and is aimed at the only State in the region that has not yet ratified the Treaty.

Switzerland supports those efforts and attaches great importance to the better implementation of existing obligations. We will continue to defend that position also in the area of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

In that context, full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is imperative.

My country is concerned at the situation that led to the resolution on Iran, which was adopted on 24 September 2005 by the Agency's Board of Governors.

Switzerland views the text of the draft resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" as a political appeal against nuclear proliferation in the region as a whole. To ensure the broadest possible support, it is critical that the authors of the draft resolution take into account the current context and all the events that affect the countries in the region.

Mr. Bar (Israel): I am taking the floor to explain Israel's vote on the draft resolution entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", contained in document A/C.1/60/L.3.

Israel joined the consensus on this draft resolution, as it has done for more than 20 years, but with substantive and important reservations regarding certain elements of the draft resolution. This action was taken, since Israel continues to support the eventual establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East that should also be free of chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic missiles.

The policy of Israel, as it has always maintained, is that the nuclear issue, as well as all regional security issues — conventional and non-conventional — should be addressed within the regional context. Experience in other regions has shown that a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone should emanate from within the region. Such a zone cannot be imposed on the parties from the outside, nor can it emerge before the conditions for it have ripened. Moreover, since the ultimate goal in the Middle East, as in other regions, is regional peace and security, arms control efforts should adequately address the threat perception of all participating States and must not hamper the security of any given party.

Israel believes that the political realities in the Middle East mandate a practical step-by-step approach. The first step should be agreements on modest confidence-building measures, followed by the establishment of peaceful relations.

The next steps would include a process of reconciliation, and good-neighbourliness, to be followed when ripe by negotiation on regional security arrangements that would be complemented by conventional and non-conventional arms control measures. This process could eventually lead to more ambitious goals, such as establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. As the international community has recognized, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be based on an arrangement freely arrived at among all the States and the regions concerned.

Israel believes that such a zone can only be established through direct negotiations among the States in the region, and those directly concerned. Mutual recognition and peaceful relations are, of course, a necessary first step for the initiation of the process. It clearly cannot begin in a situation where some of the parties concerned still maintain a state of war with one another, refusing on principle to maintain peaceful relations with Israel, or even to recognize its right to exist. As a matter of fact, we had one State recently that could not even express the name "Israel", but rather, used the term "Israeli regime".

In that context, it should be recalled that in the Middle East — unlike other regions in the world where nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established — there are continuing threats in the region and beyond, against the existence of one State — Israel. Those threats are significantly increased by the irresponsible behaviour of certain States concerning the export of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and WMD-related technologies, and the discrepancies between their commitments and their actual behaviour. Those

circumstances, and the acknowledged record of non-compliance with international obligations by States of the region, have a critical impact on the ability to embark on a joint process of regional security-building, that could eventually lead to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Let us bear in mind that out of four recognized cases of non-compliance with the NPT, three have taken place in the Middle East. Therefore, mutual verification arrangements and effective enforcement measures would be indispensable for guaranteeing that States' commitments are not breached.

Israel has reiterated its vision of promoting regional peace and stability that should facilitate, among other things, the eventual establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Recently, Israel has reacted positively to direct initiatives, learning from the experiences of other regions, as a part of a gradual process of confidence-building. Unfortunately, not all parties in the region agree with the very concept of gradually building confidence.

We harbour no illusions. Progress towards realizing that vision cannot be made without fundamental change in regional circumstances, and not least, without significant transformation in the attitude of States in the region towards Israel. Just as an illustration — out of eight delegations that took the floor on the thematic debate, calling for the immediate establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, six do not have diplomatic relations with my country, and two of them still publicly call for the destruction of Israel.

It is therefore our view that efforts in that context should be directed towards the creation of a stable environment of peace and reconciliation in our part of the world. The disengagement from the Gaza strip by Israel has been motivated by that objective, and therefore was implemented despite enormous internal difficulties. Israel will continue to dedicate all its efforts to achieve that goal. We call upon our neighbours to do the same.

Mr. Moon Seoung-hyun (Republic of Korea): My delegation wishes to explain its position on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.45, entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". As my delegation has pointed out on several occasions, it is our firm belief that non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), who have voluntarily committed to the path of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and who have remained in full compliance with NPT provisions, are entitled to be provided with credible and effective negative security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States.

However, in view of logical consequences and in contrast to the argument just mentioned, we do not believe that such negative security assurances are of the nature to be provided to all State parties to the NPT, regardless of their behaviour in fulfilling their obligation under the NPT regime. Moreover, on a practical note, we are of the view that both creative and innovative confidence-building measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should proceed to genuine discussions on providing legally binding negative security assurances, particularly taking into account the stalemate in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that is plaguing us these days.

That is why my delegation has again abstained in the vote on the draft resolution.

Mr. Hashmi (Pakistan): I have taken the floor to explain our vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/60/L.12/Rev.1, L.26/Rev.1 and L.36.

First, concerning draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.12/Rev.1, Pakistan supports the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of the principle that such arrangements are freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned. However, the call for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution betrays the reality on the ground. Pakistan had sought to promote that objective unsuccessfully for over two decades.

Following the nuclear explosions in South Asia, which obliged Pakistan to follow suit, the purpose of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region has been defeated. The reference to South Asia in the text is therefore at complete variance with the realities on the ground. That is why, in separate voting, we voted against the last three words in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, and abstained in the votes on operative paragraph 5 as a whole and on the draft resolution as a whole.

Secondly, I will explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.26/Rev.1. Pakistan has voted in favour of the draft resolution, in keeping with our long-standing and consistent record of support for the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, as regards the call in the draft resolution for promoting signatures and ratifications, leading to the entry into force of the CTBT, this of course be facilitated when major erstwhile supporters of the CTBT decide to restore their support. Acceptance of the CTBT obligations on a regional basis in South Asia will also facilitate its entry into force.

Finally, on draft resolution L.36, Pakistan has consistently supported the goal of nuclear disarmament. We share the objectives the resolution seeks to achieve. However, the resolution's references to documents and documentation of the NPT Review Conferences has obliged my delegation to abstain, in line with our well-known position on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Mr. Kucer (Slovakia): My delegation would like to request that Slovakia be added to the list of sponsors of draft resolution L.26, "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", as Slovakia did co-sponsor that draft resolution but was not mentioned among the sponsors.

Mr. Atieh (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): We requested the floor in order to explain our position on L.26/Rev.1, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty". My delegation abstained on the vote because Syria has stated time and again that such an important and sensitive treaty as the CTBT, as well as future commitments of States parties emanating therefrom, should in no way ignore the legitimate concerns of non-nuclear States. Non-nuclear States constitute the overwhelming majority of the States of the world and have received no guarantees concerning the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These States are not allowed to acquire the sophisticated technology that is indispensable to accelerating the pace of their development.

The fair and important observations made about the Treaty indicate that nuclear-weapon States are not committed to getting rid of their nuclear arsenals in a reasonable time frame. The text does not explicitly refer to the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nor does it emphasize the need to universalize the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or put an end to such proliferation in all its aspects. The text states that nuclear explosions are to be prohibited, but not laboratory testing or quality development or production of such weapons. Verification and inspection regimes in the field may open the way to the misuse of data coming from national monitoring machinery and to the use of such data for political purposes.

The most peculiar part of the text of the Treaty is that it allows signatories to take measures against non-signatories, including measures to be taken by the Security Council by virtue of Chapter VII, in violation of the sovereign rights of States to join the Treaty or not.

The Syrian Arab Republic views those substantial loopholes with great concern. We definitively reject the mention of Israel in the list of Middle East and South East Asia countries. In the explosive situation in the Middle East, Israel is the only country that possesses nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and is trying to develop them quantitatively and qualitatively. It refuses to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. Such actions impede the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and endanger the region and the world through the threat of an Israeli nuclear attack, without any effective international deterrence.

Mr. Shaimerdenov (Kazakhstan) (*spoke in Russian*): I have taken the floor to ask the Bureau to take into account our intention to join the sponsors of resolution L.26/Rev.1, the "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".

Mr. Rahman (Bangladesh): We wish to put on record that Bangladesh has co-sponsored resolution L.26/Rev.1, "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", but that was not mentioned during the voting. We wish to put that on record.

The Chairman: Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor to speak on cluster 1? If not, the Committee will take action on the draft resolutions that appear in cluster 2.

Before the Committee proceeds to take action on all draft resolutions contained in cluster 2, I shall give the floor to those delegations wishing to make a general statement or to introduce draft resolutions.

I give the floor to the representative of Belarus.

Mr. Baichorov (Belarus): Now we will take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/60/L.10, introduced by the Republic of Belarus, with a number of co-sponsors: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Georgia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Venezuela, Ukraine and the Central African Republic.

I am not going to repeat the arguments in favour of the adoption of the draft resolution that were already set out in the statement made by Ambassador Andrei Dapkiunas, Permanent Representative of Belarus to the United Nations, in the First Committee meeting on 12 October. I just want to remind delegations that the resolution, in its present form, has been adopted on a triennial basis by consensus by the General Assembly in 1996, 1999 and 2002.

The accelerating speed of the emergence of new achievements in computer and nanotechnologies makes it technically feasible to develop and even to test new weapons of mass destruction without physically testing them. Just because computer wizards are working today at Microsoft and other respectable corporations does not preclude the possibility that, one day, one or two of them might be recruited by a terrorist organization.

The world community must have a ready mechanism to react to the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction, no matter by whom or where they are developed. The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/60/L.10* contains such a mechanism, and I am convinced that our Committee will adopt it without a vote.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on the two draft resolutions contained in cluster 2, "Other weapons of mass destruction".

The Committee will first take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.10.

A recorded vote has been requested.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.10, entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Belarus at the Committee's 10th meeting, on 12 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.10 and A/C.1/60/INF.2.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:
United States of America

Abstaining:
Israel

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.10 was adopted by 150 votes to 1, with 1 abstention.

The Chairman: The Committee will next proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.31.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.31 is entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction".

The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Poland at the Committee's 10th meeting, on 12 October. The sponsors are listed in document A/C.1/60/L.31.

The Chairman: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.31 was adopted.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of the United States of America for an explanation of vote.

Ms. Sanders (United States of America): Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.10, our delegation believes that the international community should focus its efforts on the very real problem of the proliferation of known types of weapons of mass destruction, both by States that willfully violate their commitments with respect to existing treaties and by terrorists.

In the nearly 60 years since the 1948 definition of weapons of mass destruction was set forth, no new types of such weapons have appeared on the horizon. The idea of new types of weapons of mass destruction beyond chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear remains entirely hypothetical. No useful purpose is served by diverting the attention and efforts of the international community away from existing threats to such hypotheticals.

For those reasons, the United States voted against the draft resolution.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolutions contained in informal working paper 1 under cluster 5, "Regional disarmament and security"; cluster 6, "Other disarmament measures and international security"; and cluster 7, "Disarmament machinery".

Under cluster 5, there are two draft resolutions: A/C.1/60/L.23 and A/C.1/60/L.44.

The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.23. I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.23, entitled "Regional disarmament". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Pakistan at the Committee's 14th meeting, on 18 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.23 and A/C.1/60/INF/2. In addition, Bangladesh has become a sponsor.

The Chairman: I wish to inform members that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.23 have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.23 was adopted.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.44. A recorded vote has been requested. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.44, entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Pakistan at the Committee's 14th meeting, on 18 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.44 and A/C.1/60/INF/2. In addition, Bangladesh has become a sponsor.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia

Against:

India

Abstaining:

Bhutan

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.44 was adopted by 147 votes to 1, with 1 abstention.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of India, who wishes to speak in explanation of vote on the draft resolution just adopted.

Mr. Prasad (India): India has requested the floor to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.44, entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels". India voted against the draft resolution because we do not agree that the Conference on Disarmament should be asked — as the operative part of the draft resolution does — to consider the formulation of principles serving as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control. We believe that the Conference, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, should concern itself with negotiating legal instruments of global application. The United Nations Disarmament Commission is the mandated deliberative body within the United Nations disarmament machinery. Its function is to consider and make recommendations on specific disarmament issues. Indeed, in 1993, the Commission adopted by consensus guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security.

We therefore see no need for the Conference on Disarmament to formulate principles for a framework for regional arrangements on conventional arms control. Moreover, we believe that security concerns of States extend beyond narrowly defined regions and subregions, and consequently that the idea of preserving a balance in defence capabilities in a regional or subregional context is unrealistic and unacceptable.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on two draft resolutions under cluster 6, "Other disarmament measures and international security".

We will first take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.24. I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.24, entitled "Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Pakistan at the Committee's 16th meeting, on 20 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.24 and A/C.1/60/INF/2. In addition, Bangladesh has become a sponsor.

The Chairman: I wish to inform members that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.24 have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee

without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.24 was adopted.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.53. A recorded vote has been requested. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.53, entitled "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of India at the Committee's 14th meeting, on 18 October 2005. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/60/L.53 and A/C.1/60/INF/2. In addition, Bangladesh has become a sponsor.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Kazakhstan, Paraguay, Russian Federation, South Africa, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.53 was adopted by 88 votes to 49, with 13 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolution under cluster 7, "Disarmament machinery".

The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.20.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.2 is entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Peru at the Committee's 14th meeting, on 18 October 2005. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/60/L.20. In addition, Bangladesh has now become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

The Chairman: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote. May I take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly?

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.20 was adopted.

The Chairman: I give the floor to the representative of France.

Mr. Rivasseau (France) (*spoke in French*): Mr Chairman, I should like to thank you for having given us the list of draft resolutions that you will be submitting to the Committee tomorrow. It is my understanding that that the draft resolutions on which we did not take decisions today will be considered tomorrow or a later date, but I would like a clarification in that respect.

Finally, I should like to note that last week my delegation expressed the hope that the draft resolution on the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (A/C.1/60/L.2) would be among those draft resolutions adopted today or tomorrow. However, I do not see it listed either for today or for tomorrow. Mr. Chairman, I would therefore request that it be included in the list of draft resolutions to be considered tomorrow.

The Chairman: Those draft resolutions originally contained in clusters 1 through 7 that were not adopted today will be considered, not necessarily tomorrow, but sometime this week. Our working documents will be distributed as informal working documents number 1 and number 2, respectively, so I would request that members please pay attention to the number of the working document. Tomorrow we will be dealing with informal working document number 2.

Mr. Rivasseau (France) (*spoke in French*): Mr. Chairman, could you indicate that you will in fact add the draft resolution on the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to the list of resolutions to be considered tomorrow? I would request that you do so, unless a delegation objects. Let me recall that it not up to you to oppose putting a draft resolution to the vote.

The Chairman: Let me explain. Informal paper number 2 originally listed seven draft resolutions. If there is no objection, I will add one more item on the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Eight draft resolutions will therefore be considered tomorrow.

If no other delegation wishes to take the floor, I should like to inform the Committee that at its next meeting it will continue to take action on those draft resolutions contained in informal working paper number 2, which was distributed to the Committee a short while ago.

At its next meeting, the Committee will take action on the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/60/L.27, L.48, L.58, L.47, L.42, L.28, L.32/Rev.1 and the draft resolution on UNIDIR.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Stoute (Secretary of the Committee): There will be a meeting of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.39, entitled "Preventing the risk of radiological terrorism", in this room immediately following the meeting. The delegation of France has asked for this meeting to present possible amendments to its draft for the sponsors' approval.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.